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Independent Orbiter Assessment
Analysis of the Reaction Control System
1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) was selected in
June 1986 to perform an Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of
the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items
List (CIL). Direction was given by the STS Orbiter and GFE
Projects Office to perform the hardware analysis using the
instructions and ground rules defined in NSTS 22206, Instructions
for Preparation of FMEA and CIL, i0 October 1986. The IOA
a--_roach features a_-6p-_6-wn analysis of the-_dware to
determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical
items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished
without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA
FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents (Appendix C) the
independent analysis results for the Reaction Control System.
Although the aft Reaction Control System (RCS) and Orbital
Maneuvering System (OMS) are housed in the same pod, this report
only addresses the RCS, both aft and forward. The OMS report
addresses the analysis of the OMS separately.
The purpose of the RCS is to provide thrust in and about the X,
Y, Z axes for External Tank (ET) separation; orbit insertion
maneuvers; orbit translation maneuvers; onorbit attitude control;
rendezvous; proximity operations (payload deploy and capture);
deorbit maneuvers; and abort attitude control. The RCS is
situated in three independent modules, one forward in the orbiter
nose and one in each OMS/RCS pod. Each RCS module consists of
the following subsystems:
o Helium Pressurization Subsystem
o Propellant Storage and Distribution Subsystem
o Thruster Subsystem
o Electrical Power Distribution and Control Subsystem
Figure 1 presents a summary of the failure criticalities for each
of the major divisions of the RCS. A summary of the number of
failure modes, by criticality, is also presented below with
Hardware (HW) criticality first and Functional (F) criticality
second.
Summary of IOA Failure Modes By Criticality (HW/F)
CrlticalltYI llI2JiRNumber : 70 106 2/2137 3/IR 3/2R I 3/3288 448 1223 TOTAL2272
Figure 1 - RCS OVERVIEW ANALYSIS SUMMARY
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For each failure mode identified, the criticality and redundancy
screens were examined to identify critical items. A summary of
Potential Critical Items (PCIs) is presented as follows:
+
_-+
Summary of IOA Potential Critical Items (HW/F)
Criticality:
Number
I/I
7O
2/IR
106 2/2 I 3/IRI 3/2R137 131 146
TOTAL
590
Of the failure modes analyzed, 307 could potentially result in a
loss of life and/or loss of vehicle.
2.0 INTRODUCTION
2.1 Purpose
The 51-L Challenger accident prompted the NASA to readdress
safety policies, concepts, and rationale being used in the
National Space Transportation System (NSTS). The NSTS Office has
undertaken the task of reevaluating the FMEA/CIL for the Space
Shuttle design. The MDAC is providing an independent assessment
of the Orbiter FMEA/CIL reevaluation results for completeness and
technical accuracy.
2.2 Scope
The scope of the independent FMEA/CIL assessment activity
encompasses those Shuttle Orbiter subsystems and GFE hardware
identified in the Space Shuttle Independent FMEA/CIL Assessment
Contractor Statement of Work. Each subsystem analysis addresses
hardware, functions, internal and external interfaces, and
operational requirements for all mission phases.
2.3 Analysis Approach
The independent analysis approach is a top-down analysis utiliz-
ing as-built drawings to divide the respective subsystem into
components and low-level hardware items. Each hardware item is
evaluated for failure mode, effects, and criticality. These data
are documented in the respective subsystem analysis report, and
are used to assess the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEA/CIL
reevaluation results. The IOA analysis approach is summarized in
the following Steps 1.0 through 3.0. Step 4.0 summarizes the
assessment of the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEAs/CILs that is
performed and documented at a later date.
Step 1.0 Subsystem familiarization
1.1 Define subsystem functions
1.2 Define subsystem components
1.3 Define subsystem specific ground rules and
assumptions
Step 2.0 Define subsystem analysis diagram
2.1 Define subsystem
2.2 Define major assemblies
2.3 Develop detailed subsystem representations
Step 3.0 Failure events definition
3.1 Construct matrix of failure modes
3.2 Document IOA analysis results
Step 4.0 Compare IOA analysis data to NASA FMEA/CIL
4.1 Resolve differences
4.2 Review in-house
4.3 Document assessment issues
4.4 Forward findings to Project Manager
2.4 RCS Ground Rules and Assumptions
The RCS specific ground rules and assumptions used in the IOA
analysis are presented in Appendix B.
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3.0 SUBSYSTEM DESCRIPTION
3.1 Functional and Hardware Description
The Shuttle Orbiter includes three RCS packages, one forward and
two aft, one in each of the left and right OMS/RCS pods (Figure
2). Each RCS package consists of the following subsystems:
o Helium Pressurization
o Propellant Storage and Distribution
o Thruster
o Electrical Power Distribution and Control
Figures 3 through 6 present an overview of the RCS breakdown
hierarchy utilized in this analysis.
During a typical Shuttle mission, the RCS Jets are used during
External Tank (ET) separation, orbit insertion, orbital
operations, deorbit maneuver, and entry. The Aft RCS (ARCS) is
active from prelaunch through the transition to aerosurface
control during entry. The Forward RCS (FRCS) is active from pre-
launch through the post-deorbit propellant dump and is disabled
for entry. Figures 7 and 8 are hardware schematics of the FRCS
and ARCS, respectively.
The RCS jets are first used in the mission after Main Engine
Cutoff (MECO) to maintain vehicle attitude until ET separation.
The RCS provides a translation maneuver during ET separation to
ensure Orbiter separation from the ET. The RCS is also used to
control roll in the event of the failure of two main engines
during ascent.
After OMS-I burn cutoff, the vehicle goes into attitude hold.
The crew uses the Translational Hand Controller (THC) to command
RCS translational maneuvers to null any residual velocity.
Attitude hold is maintained until the maneuver to OMS-2 burn
attitude which is performed manually by the crew using the
Rotational Hand Controller (RHC). The RCS +X jets can be used to
complete either the OMS-I or OMS-2 burns or to perform the OMS-2
burn entirely in the case of OMS engine failures. In this case,
the OMS-to-RCS interconnect capability will be used to feed OMS
propellant to the four +X RCS thrusters.
Once in orbit, after the OMS-2 burn is completed, RCS maneuvers
are performed to control the vehicle attitude according to the
flight plan. For onorbit attitude control the crew may select
either primary or vernier jets.
During deorbit, the RCS is used to maneuver to the OMS deorbit
burn attitude, null any residual velocity, dump excess propellant
for center-of-gravity control, and maneuver to the Entry
Interface (EI) attitude. In case both OMS engines malfunction,
TEB
FUEL TANK • \
HELIUM TANK
VERNIER THRUSTER (2)
(14)
RCS HI_LIUM
TANKS RCS PROPELLANT
/ MANIFOLD VALVE8
RCS PRESSURIZATION COMPONENTS
Figure 2 - REACTION CONTROL SYSTEM (RCS)
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Figure 4 - AFT RCS HARDWARE BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY
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Figure 5 - FORWARD RCS EPD&C BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY
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Figure 6 - AFT RCS EPD&C BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY
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Figure 7 - FORWARD RCS SCHEMATIC
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Figure 8 - AFT RCS SCHEMATIC
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the RCS can be used to perform or complete the deorbit burn. In
this case, the OMS-to-RCS interconnect will be selected to feed
OMSpropellant to the four +X RCS thrusters.
Once the deorbit burn is completed, the vehicle is maneuvered to
the EI attitude.
From EI (400,000 ft) to approximately 262,000 ft, the vehicle is
controlled in roll, pitch, and yaw with the ARCS jets. The GPCs
disable the roll thrusters below this altitude, since the vehicle
is captured and stable in the roll axis. Shortly after entering
blackout, the pitch thrusters are disabled. From this time on,
the elevons are used to control pitch and banking. The yaw
thrusters are still used to assist the rudder. This mode of
control will be used until the vehicle slows to Mach 1 where the
yaw thrusters are disabled. Total vehicle control is then
accomplished by the aerodynamic control surfaces through landing.
3.1.1 Helium Pressurization Subsystem
The pressurization subsystem regulates and distributes
helium to the propellant tanks. This subsystem consists of
two helium storage tanks, isolation valves, pressure
regulators, check valves, and the lines necessary for
filling, draining, and distributing the helium.
3.1.1.a Helium Storage Tanks
The high pressure helium supply is contained in two
1.761 cubic ft spherical storage tanks in each module.
The tanks are made of a titanium liner overwrapped with
fiberglass. One tank supplies helium pressure to the
fuel propellant tank while the other helium tank
supplies pressure to the oxidizer propellant tank. The
helium tank's maximum operating pressure is 4000 psig
and is proof-pressure tested to 4480 psig.
3.1.l.b Helium Isolation Valve
For each propellant there are two helium isolation
valves in parallel between the helium tanks and the
pressure regulators which are used to isolate the high-
pressure gaseous helium from the remainder of the
pressurization subsystem (Figure 9).
The helium isolation valves are operated by two
solenoids, one of which is momentarily energized to
magnetically latch the valve open. The second solenoid
magnetically unlatches the valve, allowing spring
and helium pressure to force the valve closed.
The switching logic for the helium isolation valves is
contained in the Forward and Aft Load Control
Assemblies (FLCA and ALCA). Solenoid and power logic
14
..J
_t
>
\
!
..J
I Z
.C
I =
Figure 9 - HELIUM ISOLATION VALVE
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is provided by the Power Control Assemblies (PCA),
which are located within the LCAs. The LCAs and PCAs
must be powered up in order to operate the helium
isolation valves.
The helium isolation valves are controlled by the FWD
RCS, AFT LEFT RCS, and AFT RIGHT RCS HE PRESS A/B
switches on panels 07 and 08. These are permanent
position switches (OPEN, GPC, CLOSE), but only apply
momentary power to the solenoid due to the logic in
the LCA. Each switch controls two isolation valves,
one in the helium oxidizer line and one in the helium
fuel line.
These valves contain microswitches which are activated
when the valves are fully open or closed, when
commanded, the switch logic allows a one-second delay
for the valves to reach the command position before
sending a position indication signal to the GPCs,
telemetry, and a position indicator (talkback) above
each switch. Power is then removed from the solenoids.
The talkback logic displays barberpole when the valves
are in motion or when there is a position mismatch
between the fuel and oxidizer helium valves.
Otherwise, the talkback shows OP for open valves and CL
for closed valves.
The GPC can command the isolation valve to open and
close to maintain the system pressurization and to
prevent overpressurization when the isolation valve
switch is in the GPC position. In the event of a
switch failure in the GPC position, the crew can open
or close the valves using the GPC memory read/write
procedures.
The valve's nominal operating pressure is 200 to 4000
psig and limits the flow to 81 scfm.
3.l.l.c Pressure Regulator Assembly
Helium pressure regulation is accomplished by two
regulator assemblies connected in parallel and located
downstream of each helium isolation valve (Figure i0).
Each assembly contains two regulators, primary and
secondary, connected in series so that if the primary
regulator fails open, the secondary regulator can
regulate the pressure within acceptable limits. The
regulators cannot be controlled manually or by the GPC.
The primary and secondary regulators regulate the tank
pressure to 245 psig and 256 psig, respectively. The
flow rate is limited to 81 scfm for 500 to 1400 psig
inlet pressure, and 150 scfm for 1400 to 4000 psig
inlet pressure.
16
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Figure I0 - HELIUM PRESSURE REGULATOR ASSEMBLY
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3.l.l.d Check Valve Assembly
A check valve assembly, located between the pressure
regulator assemblies and each relief valve, is used to
preclude backflow of helium or propellant vapors or
liquids (Figure ii). Each assembly contains four
independent check valves connected in series-parallel.
The check valves cannot be controlled manually or by
the GPC.
The valve's normal operating pressure is 355 psig, with
a maximum of 370 psig.
3.1.2 Propellant Storage and Distribution Subsystem
The propellant subsystem distributes the fuel and oxidizer
to the thrusters. This subsystem consists of propellant
tanks, pressure relief valves, tank isolation valves,
crossfeed valves, manifold isolation valves, and the lines
and couplings necessary for filling, draining, and
distributing the propellant.
3.1.2.a Propellant Tanks
Each RCS module contains two titanium 39.2-inch
spherical propellant tanks, one for fuel and one for
oxidizer (Figure 12). Each tank contains an
internally-mounted surface-tension screen Propellant
Acquisition Device (PAD) which acquires and delivers the
propellant to the RCS thrusters on demand. The surface-
tension device also prevents the helium pressurant gas
from entering the propellant or the propellant
distribution lines prior to propellant depletion. The
forward propellant tanks have PADs which are designed
to operate primarily in a low-g environment. The aft
propellant tanks are designed to operate in both high
and low-g regimes.
3.1.2.b Pressure Relief Valve Assembly
The helium pressure relief valve assembly is located
between each check valve assembly and the propellant
tank, and will vent excess pressure overboard before it
can over pressurize the propellant tanks (Figure 13).
The assembly consists of a burst diaphragm, filter, and
relief valve. The burst diaphragm is of the non-
fragmentation type, but the filter is further insurance
that fragmentation or particles will not reach the
relief valve seat. The relief valve cannot be
controlled manually or by the GPC.
The burst disk ruptures at 332 psig.
reseats at 310 psig.
The relief valve
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3.1.2.c Tank Isolation, Crossfeed, and Manifold 1/2/3/4
Isolation Valves
The RCS propellant tank isolation, crossfeed, and
manifold 1/2/3/4 isolation valves are all AC motor
valves. Once a valve reaches the open or closed
position, an open or close microswitch is
automatically closed to remove AC power from the valve
motor. A signal is also sent to the GPC, to the
ground, and to the valve position indicator (talkback),
located above each switch. The talkback logic displays
barberpole when the valves are in motion or when there
is a position mismatch between the fuel and the
oxidizer valves. Otherwise, the talkback shows "OP"
for open valves and "CL" for closed valves.
The tank isolation valves are located between the
propellant tanks and the manifold isolation valves, and
are used to isolate the propellant tanks from the
remainder of the subsystem (Figure 14).
The tank isolation valves are AC motor-operated and
contain a lift-off ball-flow control device. For each
module, one valve isolates each propellant tank from
the 1/2 manifold. Two valves in parallel isolate each
propellant tank from the 3/4/5 manifold line in the aft
modules, and one valve isolates each propellant tank
from the 3/4/5 manifold line in the forward module.
The tank isolation valves are controlled by the FWD
RCS, AFT LEFT RCS, and AFT RIGHT RCS TANK ISOLATION 1/2
and 3/4/5 switches on panels 07 and 08. These are
permanent position switches (OPEN, GPC, CLOSE). Switch
logic, relay logic, and motor logic for the isolation
valves are contained in the Forward and Aft Motor
Control Assemblies (FMCA and AMCA). Therefore, it is
necessary to have the MCAs powered up to operate the
tank isolation valves.
The tank isolation valves are normally maintained open
throughout the mission with the switch in the GPC
position, with the switch in the GPC position, the
logic in the MCA is designed to receive computer
commands to control the valves. The GPC reconfigures
the aft tank isolation valves and the RCS and OMS
crossfeed valves in case of OMS-to-RCS interconnect, or
for RCS/RCS crossfeed operations. Manual configuration
is required in the case of manual RCS/RCS crossfeed and
on orbit/deorbit OMS-to-RCS interconnect. In the event
of a switch failure in the GPC position, the crew can
open or close the valves using GPC memory read/write
procedures.
22
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The RCS crossfeed valves are contained only in the ARCS
pods, and are used to isolate the RCS propellant cross-
feed lines from the OMS interconnect lines (Figure 14).
They are located between the tank isolation valves and
the manifold isolation valves.
The RCS crossfeed valves are AC motor-operated and
contain a lift-off ball-flow control device. One pair
of valves, one fuel and one oxidizer valve, isolate the
RCS crossfeed lines from the 1/2 propellant lines. One
pair of valves isolate the RCS crossfeed lines from the
3/4/5 propellant lines. The RCS crossfeed valves are
controlled by the LEFT, RIGHT RCS CROSSFEED 1/2 and
3/4/5 switches on panel 09. These are permanent
position switches (OPEN, GPC, CLOSE). Switch logic,
relay logic, and motor logic for the isolation valves
are contained in the AMCA. Therefore, it is necessary
to have the MCAs powered up to operate the RCS
crossfeed valves.
The RCS crossfeed valves are normally maintained closed
throughout the mission, with the switch in the GPC
position, wlth the switch in the GPC position, the
logic in the MCA is designed to receive computer
commands to control the valves. The GPC reconfigures
these valves, the OMS crossfeed valves, and the tank
isolation valves in case of OMS-to-RCS interconnect
during aborts, or for RCS/RCS crossfeed operations.
Manual configuration is required in the case of manual
RCS/RCS crossfeed and on orbit/deorbit OMS-to-RCS
interconnect. In the event of a switch failure in the
GPC position, the crew can open or close the valves
using GPC memory read/write procedures.
The primary manifold isolation valves are located
between the tank isolation valves, downstream of the
RCS crossfeed valves, and the primary thrusters (Figure
14). They are used to isolate the primary thrusters
from the propellant subsystem.
The primary manifold isolation valves are AC motor-
operated and contain a lift-off ball flow control
device. For each module, one valve isolates each
manifold from each propellant. The primary manifold
isolation valves are controlled by the FWD RCS, AFT
LEFT RCS, and AFT RIGHT RCS MANIFOLD ISOLATION i, 2, 3,
and 4 switches on panels 07 and 08. These are
permanent position switches (OPEN, GPC, CLOSE). Switch
logic, relay logic, and motor logic for the isolation
valves are contained in the FMCA and AMCA. Therefore,
it is necessary to have the MCAs powered up to operate
the manifold isolation valves.
24
Redundancy Management (RM) is used to monitor the
microswitches in these valves, and can cause the valves
to be declared closed, and the Jets on that manifold to
be removed from the Jet Available Table. The crew can
override the RM by CRT keyboard entries and reselect
the manifold and its jets.
The primary manifold isolation valves are normally
maintained open throughout ascent and entry, with the
switch in the GPC position. With the switch in the GPC
position, the logic in the MCA is designed to receive
computer commands to control the valves. These valves
are controlled by the GPC during aborts and are
controlled by RM at all times. In the event of a
switch failure in the GPC position, the crew can open
or close the valves using GPC memory read/write
procedures.
3.1.2.d Vernier Manifold Isolation Valves
The vernier manifold isolation valves are located
between the tank isolation valves, downstream of the
RCS crossfeed valves, and the vernier thrusters (Figure
15). They are used to isolate the thrusters from the
propellant subsystem.
The vernier manifold isolation valves are DC solenoid
operated. One valve isolates each vernier manifold
from each propellant. The manifold isolation valves
are controlled by the FWD RCS, AFT LEFT RCS, and AFT
RIGHT RCS MANIFOLD 5 ISOLATION switches on panels 07
and 08. These are permanent position switches (OPEN,
GPC, CLOSE). Switch logic for the vernier manifold
valves is contained in the FLCA and ALCA. Solenoid
logic and power logic is provided by the Power Control
Assemblies (PCAs). Therefore, it is necessary to have
the LCAs powered up to operate the manifold isolation
valves.
Once a valve reaches the open or closed position, a
microswitch is automatically closed to remove DC
power from the valve solenoid. A signal is also sent
to the GPC, to the ground, and to the valve position
indicator (talkback) located above each switch. The
talkback logic displays barberpole when the valves are
in motion or when there is a position mismatch between
the fuel and the oxidizer valves. Otherwise, the talk-
back shows "OP" for open valves and "CL" for closed
valves. Redundancy Management (RM) is used to monitor
the microswitches in these valves, and can cause the
valves to be declared closed, and the vernier jets to
be deselected. The crew can override the RM by CRT
keyboard entries and reselect the vernier jets.
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The vernier manifold isolation valves are normally
maintained open throughout orbit and closed during
ascent and entry, with the switch in the GPC position.
with the switch in the GPC position, the logic in the
LCAs and PCAs is set up to receive computer commands to
control the valves. The GPC controls these valves by
RM at all times. In the event of a switch failure in
the GPC position, the crew can open or close the valves
using the GPC memory read/write procedures.
3.1.3 Thruster Subsystem
The RCS jet thrusters are pressure-fed, bipropellant,
hypergolic engines. There are two types of thrusters in the
Shuttle: the primary thrusters, and the vernier thrusters
(Figure 16). Both types of thrusters contain a fuel and
oxidizer bipropellant solenoid valve, injector head
assembly, combustion chamber, expansion nozzle, and an
electrical junction box and can be operated in either pulse
mode or steady-state mode.
3.1.3.a Bipropellant Valves
The bipropellant control valves control the flow of
propellants to the thrusters by opening and closing in
response to electrical fire commands (Figure 17). Each
primary Jet engine assembly contains two injector
solenoid pilot poppet valves, one for fuel and one for
oxidizer. They are operated by coaxially-wound coils
which are energized open by a fire command, and are
spring-loaded closed. When the pilot valves open, the
propellant's hydraulic pressure opens the main poppet
valves to allow the propellants into the injector. The
vernier jets use single-stage, solenoid-operated poppet
valves.
The fuel and oxidizer valves on the primary jet
thrusters are mechanically linked. The pilot valve is
activated by a 80 msec pulse sent from the Reaction Jet
Driver. Commands are issued every 80 msec, so the
minimum on or off time is 80 msec. The vernier
bipropellant valves are operated similarly by a
mechanically linked torque motor.
During normal operations, if the isolation and manifold
valves are properly configured, a fire command to a jet
will cause that jet's bipropellant valves to open.
Removal of the fire command will cause the bipropellant
valves to close.
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3.1.3.b Injector Head Assembly
Each RCS jet contains an injector head assembly which
directs the propellant flow from the bipropellant
control valves to the combustion chamber (Figure 18).
The injector is welded to the combustion chamber.
For the primary jets, injector holes are arranged in
two concentric rings (outer fuel, inner oxidizer) which
are canted to cause impingment of the hypergolic
propellants within the combustion chamber. Separate
fuel holes near the outer edge of the injector plate
provide cooling for the combustion chamber wall.
Spaced between these fuel inlet holes are acoustic
cavities which are of varied depth to prevent acoustic
resonance when the jet is fired.
For the vernier jets, fuel and oxidizer enter the
combustion chamber through a single pair of injector
holes which are also canted to provide impingment of
the fuel and oxidizer streams for combustion. The
combustion chamber wall is cooled by making the fuel
stream more divergent than the oxidizer stream.
Unlike stream impingment is used to improve propellant
mixing in the combustion chamber with a mixture ratio
of 1.6 ibs oxidizer to 1.0 Ibs fuel for both the
primary and vernier jets.
The primary jets operate at 152 psia, produce 870 ibs
(vacuum) thrust, and have a specific impulse of 280
seconds. The vernier jets operate at 106 psia, produce
25 ibs (vacuum) thrust, and have a specific impulse of
265 seconds.
3.1.3.c Combustion Chamber and Nozzle
The combustion chamber and nozzle are made of columbium
C-I03 with a R512A Disilicide coating 0.003-inches
thick. Behind the columbium is Dynaflex molded
insulation covered with 0.02-inch thick titanium on the
outside.
3.1.4 Electrical Power Distribution and Control Subsystem
3.1.4.a Electrical Junction Box
The electrical junction box on each RCS thruster
contains an electric heater and thermostat, a chamber
pressure transducer, a propellant leak detection
device, and the electrical connections to the
bipropellant valves. The electrical heater contains
one heating element and is thermostatically controlled.
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The thermostat is set to a predetermined range, and
will regulate the on and off cycles of the heater as
long as voltage is present. The heaters are controlled
by the RCS/OMS HEATERS switches on panel AI4. These
are two-position switches, OFF and AUTO, and th_ heater
is controlled by the thermostat when this switch is in
the AUTO position.
3.2 Redundancy Management
The RCS Redundancy Management (RM) monitors the RCS jets' chamber
pressures, temperatures, reaction Jet driver output discretes
and jet fire commands, and manifold valves status. It also
provides a limited amount of automatic jet deselection and alerts
the crew when a fault is detected.
The Data Processing System (DPS) software provides status
information on I/O errors to the RCS RM software, referred to as
commfaults (communications faults). Commfault indicators are set
as the result of bus masking, Bus Control Element (BCE)
bypasses, and Bus Terminal Unit (BTU) bypasses. When an I/O
error is detected on a BCE chain by any GPC, the data on the
entire chain is flagged as invalid (commfaulted) for the
applications software. On subsequent transactions, if the
problem is isolated, only the faulty element is flagged as
invalid. In a similar way, if a bus mask is set all BCEs and
data associated with that bus is indicated via commfault as being
in error. In any case, the commfault will be set or latched when
it is present for two consecutive passes.
Commfaults are included in the RCS RM requirements to help
prevent the redundant GPCs from moding to dissimilar software,
to optimize the number of Jets available for use, and to prevent
the RCS RM from generating additional alerts to the Flight
Control Operational Software (FCOS) generated alerts associated
with commfaults. The RCS RM uses the MDM and Line Replaceable
Unit (LRU) commfaults (where LRU is defined to be either one RCS
jet or one RCS manifold), and will reconfigure for commfaults,
regardless of whether the commfault is permanent, permanent and
subsequently removed, or transient. The MDM and LRU commfaults
are set in the FCOS software when a commfault is present for two
cycles. There are 44 Jet LRU commfaults and 15 manifold LRU
commfaults.
All input signals associated with any one LRU (where LRU is
defined as either one RCS jet or one RCS manifold) will be within
the same BCE, and the FCOS will set a BCE flag for a BCE if it
determines an I/O problem at the BCE level. This flag will be
used by the manifold status monitor in determining the commfault
state of the RCS LRU, and/or input signals for the LRU. A jet
with an LRU commfault will not have any of its status flags or
counters modified as long as the fault exists, except by
subsequent crew action. An MDM commfault will set all LRU
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commfaults for each BCE associated with the MDMcommfault, thus
suspending the operation of the RCS RM failure monitors. An I/O
reset on a CRT keyboard will reset any latched commfaults. LRU
commfaults or transducer failures will cause the quantity monitor
to use substitute measurements or constants, and the CRTs will
shown on "M" to indicate missing data. If a substitute is not
available or a constant is used, the calculations are suspended,
a down arrow appears on the CRT, and a class 3 alarm is output.
All input signals associated with an LRU are required to be
within the same BCE. The input signals associated with each RCS
Jet are a chamber pressure discrete, fuel and oxidizer injector
temperatures, and reaction jet driver output discrete. The input
signals associated with each manifold are the open and close
discretes for the fuel and oxidizer manifold isolation valves.
3.2.1 Jet Failed-On Monitor
The Jet Failed Monitor uses the Reaction Jet Driver (RJD)
output discretes and the jet fire command discretes provided
by the RCS CMD SOP to detect jets failed on.
The Jet Failed-On Monitor uses the jet fire command A
discretes, the reaction Jet driver output discretes, the jet
RM inhibit discretes, and the Jet LRU commfault discretes as
inputs, and outputs the jet failed-on indicator discretes
and the Jet failed on counter discretes. There are 44 of
each of these discretes.
The Jet Failed-On Monitor's logic ANDs the reaction jet
driver output discrete with the complement of the jet fire
command A discrete, and declares the jet failed-on if this
calculation is true for three consecutive cycles.
Consecutive passes are not affected by commfaults or by
cycles in which there are fire commands for the affected
jets. The three consecutive cycle logic will be reset;
however, if the noncommanded Jet has its reaction jet
driver output discrete reset to indicate the jet is not
firing. A jet failed-on declaration will not cause
automatic deselection of the jet by RM, nor will the
Digital Autopilot (DAP) reconfigure the Jet Priority Table.
A Jet failed-on determination will set the Jet failed-on
indicator discrete and the jet failed-on counter discrete.
These discretes will be reset when the associated jet's RM
inhibit discrete is reset. The Jet Failed-On Monitor
outputs the Jet failed-on indicators to displays and
controls and to the Jet Fault Limit Module.
The Jet Failed-On Monitor's design is valid for a minimum
jet fire command pulse of 80 msec on and 80 msec off. The
crew will be alerted by a class 2 alarm, the backup C&W
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lights and RCS Jet light on the C&W matrix on panel F7, a
fault message on the CRT fault message line, and Jet-on
indications on the RCS SPEC display and the GNC SYS SUM 1
and 2 displays.
The Jet Failed-On Monitor is active in OPS i, 2, 3, 6, and 8
in the PASS, and i, 3, and 6 for the BFS, but only if BFS is
engaged.
3.2.2 Jet Failed-Off Monitor
The Jet Failed-Off Monitor uses the Jet fire command
discretes provided by the RCS Command SOP, and the jet
chamber pressure feedback discretes provided by the RJDs to
detect jets failed off.
The Jet Failed-Off Monitor uses the Jet fire command A
discretes, the Jet chamber pressure discretes, the jet RM
inhibit discretes, and the jet LRU commfault discretes as
inputs, and outputs the Jet failed-off indicator discretes
and the Jet failed-off counter discretes. There are 44 of
each of these discretes.
The Jet Failed-Off Monitor's logic ANDs the Jet fire command
A discrete with the complement of the jet chamber pressure
discrete, and declares the Jet failed off if this calcula-
tion is true for three consecutive cycles. Consecutive
passes are not affected by commfaults or by cycles in which
there are no fire commands for the affected jets. However,
consecutive passes leading to a failed-off indication must
begin anew if, prior to reaching the third consecutive
cycle, the fire command and its associated pressure discrete
indicates that the jet has fired. The RCS RM will automati-
cally deselect a jet which has failed off, and the DAP will
reconfigure Jet selection accordingly. (See section 3.6.1
for the DAP Jet Select Logic description.)
A failed-off Jet determination will set the associated jet
failed-off indicator and the jet failed-off counter
discretes. These discretes will be reset when the
associated jet's RM inhibit discrete is reset. The Jet
Failed-Off Monitor outputs these jet failed-off indicator
discretes to the Jet Fault Limit Module and to displays and
controls. The Jet Failed-Off Monitor will be inhibited for
the jet which has failed off until the crew resets the RM
inhibit discrete.
The Jet Failed-Off Monitor design is valid for a minimum jet
fire command pulse mode of 80 msec on and 80 msec off. The
crew is alerted to a failure by a class 2 alarm, the backup
C&W light and RCS jet light on the C&W matrix on panel F7, a
fault message on the CRT fault message line, and a jet-off
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indication on the RCS SPEC display and the GNC SYS SUM 1 and
2 displays. The Jet Failed Off Monitor is active in OPS 2,
3, 6, and 8 in the PASS, and i, 3, and 6 for the BFS, but
only if BFS is engaged.
3.2.3 Jet Leak Monitor
The Jet Leak Monitor uses the jet fuel and oxidizer injector
temperature transducer outputs of each Jet to detect a
leaking jet.
The Jet Leak Monitor uses the jet fuel and oxidizer injector
temperatures, the jet RM inhibit discretes, and the jet LRU
commfault discretes as inputs, and outputs the jet failed
leak indicator discretes and the jet failed leak counter
discretes. There are 44 of each of these discretes.
The Jet Leak Monitor's Logic compares the Jet fuel and
oxidizer injector temperatures with the specified
temperature limit of 30 degrees F, and declares the Jet
Failed Leak if either of the temperatures are less than 30
degrees F for three consecutive cycles. Consecutive passes
leading to a Jet Failed Leak indication will begin anew if
the fuel and oxidizer temperatures are both greater than 30
degrees F before the jet leak counter reaches three. The
RCS RM will automatically deselect a Jet which is declared
leaking and the DAP will reconfigure Jet selection
accordingly.
A Jet Failed Leak determination will set the associated jet
failed leak indicator and Jet failed leak counter discretes.
These discretes will be reset when the associated Jets RM
inhibit discrete is reset. The Jet Leak Monitor outputs the
Jet Failed Leak indicator discretes to the Jet Fault Limit
Module and to crew displays.
The crew is alerted to a failure by a class 2 alarm, the
backup C&W light and the RCS Jet light on the C&W matrix on
panel F7, a fault message on the CRT fault message line, and
a Jet Failed Leak indication on the RCS SPEC display and the
GNC SYS SUM 1 and 2 displays.
The Jet Leak Monitor is active in OPS 2, 3, and 8 for the
PASS, and I, 3, and 6 for the BFS, but only if BFS is
engaged.
3.2.4 Jet Fault Limit Module
The Jet Fault Limit module limits the number of jets which
can be automatically deselected in response to failures
detected by RCS RM. The limits are modifiable by crew input
on the RCS SPEC display (RCS F, L, R Jet Fail Limit integers
- one integer per pod). This module also reconfigures a
jet's availability status (jet deselect output discretes
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(44)) in response to crew inputs on the RCS SPEC display(jet RM inhibit discretes (44) and jet deselect input
discretes (44)).
An automatic deselection of a Jet occurs if all of the
following are satisfied:
o Jet Failed-Off or Jet Failed Leak (Jet Failed-On
failures do not result in automatic deselection)
o Jet select/deselect status is "SELECT"
o Jet's manifold status is "OPEN"
o RM is not inhibited for this Jet
o Jet failure has not been overridden
o The number of automatic deselections of primary jets on
this pod is less than the associated Jet Fail Limit (no
limit on vernier Jets)
All jet failures detected will be announced to the crew
even if they do not cause automatic Jet deselection. If
multiple failures occur on a Jet, only the last failure will
be annunciated. Failure indicators are the same as in the
Jet Failed Off and Jet Failed Leak Monitors.
The Jet fail limit counter is incremented by the number of
jets which have been automatically deselected for that pod by
the RCS RM and is decremented by one for each automatically
deselected jet that is reselected. The vernier jets do not
increment or decrement the Jet fail limit counter. The Jet
Fail Limit valves are individually changeable in major modes
2 and 3 on the RCS SPEC display. An increase in the Jet
Fail Limit allows previously failed jets to be deselected,
providing the above requirements are met. A descrease in
the Jet Fail Limit will not cause a change in the status of
any jet. Note that setting the Jet Fail Limit equal to or
less than the number of jets which have been automatically
deselected will effectively inhibit the RCS RM for that pod.
A jet's status can be changed from deselect to select only
by item entry on the RCS SPEC page. Failure resets or
reductions in the Jet Fail Limit will not cause the status
to be reset to select. The select item entries cause the
override to be invoked if there is a declared failure for
that jet, and will make those failures inoperative in the
Jet Fault Limit module. An overridden failure will remain
overridden until the applicable failure is reset.
Automatic deselection of a jet can be prevented by the use
of the Inhibit item entries on the RCS SPEC page. Changing
the Inhibit to Not Inhibited will reset a jet's failures,
but will not cause the Jet Fail Limit to be incremented or
decremented. Reset by use of the RM Inhibit of a failure
which has been overridden will reset the override. Jet
failures are unordered; that is, if there are more
candidates for automatic deselection than is permitted by the
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Jet Fail Limit, there is no preference as to which of the
candidates will be deselected.
3.2.5 Manifold Status Monitor
The Manifold Status Monitor uses the open and close
discretes of the oxidizer and fuel manifold isolation valves
(provided by the monitor control assemblies) to determine
the open/close status for each jet manifold.
The Manifold Status Monitor uses the fuel and oxidizer
manifold valve open discretes (15 of each discrete), the
fuel and oxidizer close discretes (15 of each), the manifold
status discrete (15 discretes), the manifold LRU commfault
discretes (15 discretes), the MDMcommfault discretes (8
discretes), and the manifold status override discrete (one
discrete) as inputs, and outputs the manifold open/close
status discretes (15 discretes), the RCS manifold RM dilemma
discretes (15 discretes), and the RM power fail discrete
(one discrete).
The Manifold Status Monitor monitors the open and close
discretes for each manifold for any changes of state. A
change of state in any one or more of these discretes will
cause a redetermination of that manifold's open/close
status, independent of status changes made by the crew.
This redetermination also contains logic which will deter-
mine if a power failure has occurred and will determine
whether a dilemma exists on a manifold (tables 3-I and 3-
II). A power failure condition exists when all of the open
and close discretes on a manifold are false for three
consecutive cycles, and will cause the RM Power Fail Flag to
be set. The manifold sets identified in Table 3-II are the
only manifolds which require power failure determination.
This flag will remain set until the GNC FDA module honors
it, when it will then be reset. There is only one RM Power
Fail Flag and all manifolds are capable of setting it, but
each can set the flag only once. Whenever a dilemma exists
for three consecutive passes, the RCS manifold RM Dilemma
Flag for that manifold will be set. MDMor LRU commfaults
will not modify the dilemma pass counter or the RM Dilemma
Flag. The flag will be reset, however, if any of the four
manifold open/close discretes change state.
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TABLE 3-I - MANIFOLD STATUS
LOGICAL STATE OF:
INPUT
OPEN
Fuel
DISCRETES
CLOSE
Ox. Fuel
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 1
0 1
1 0
1 0
1 1
1 1
0 0
0 0
0 1
0 1
1 0
1 0
1 1
1 1
0
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
POWER
FAI LURE
Yes
No
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
MANIFOLD
STATUS
(Previous)
Close
Close
Close
Close
Close
Close
Close
Close
Close
Close
Close
Close
Open
Open
Open
Close
RCS
MANIFOLD
RM
DILEMMA
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes
The manifold status from the previous pass is to be
maintained.
TABLE 3-II MANIFOLD SETS
FOR POWER FAILURE DETERMINATION
o Forward No. 3 and Forward No. 4
o Aft Left No. 1 and Aft Right No. 1
o Aft Left No. 2 and Aft Right No. 2
o Aft Left No. 3 and Aft Right No. 3
o Aft Left No. 4 and Aft Right No. 4
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The transition of an MDM commfault discrete from false to
true will cause the status of all affected manifolds to be
set to close in all major modes. In major mode i, the same
is true of an LRU commfault. In major modes 2 and 3, the
transition of an LRU commfault will cause no change in
manifold statuses.
The crew is able to override the status of all manifolds on
an individual basis by item entries on the RCS SPEC display
via the Manifold Status Override. The setting of this
discrete for a manifold will change the manifold's status to
its complementary state and will then reset the discrete.
The use of the Manifold Status Override feature will not
inhibit or modify any of the other functions of the manifold
status monitor. The module will continue to honor
subsequent changes in the affected manifold's input signals
(open/close discretes, commfaults, override discrete) as
specified in this section.
The Manifold Close Status Override is used in Major Modes 1
and 3 open all manifolds whose status is closed and whose
open/close discretes are in dilemma. This discrete can be
set by item entry on the Override page, and will be reset
to false after the reconfiguration is complete. The use of
the Manifold Close Status Override feature will not inhibit
or modify any of the other functions of the Manifold Status
Monitor.
3.2.6 Available Jet Status Table
The Available Jet Status table module provides a list of
jets available for use to the Jet Select Logic Module in the
Flight Control System software.
The Available Jet Status Table uses the manifold open/close
discretes (15 discretes)from the Manifold Status Monitor,
and the jet deselect output discretes (44 discretes) from
the Jet Fault Limit Module as inputs, and outputs the jet
available discretes (44 discretes) and the jet status change
discrete (one discrete).
The Available Jet Status Table's logic "AND"s the jet de-
select output discrete with the manifold open/close status
discrete and statuses a jet as available to the Flight
Control System if the discretes indicate select and open,
respectively. The Available Jet Status Table will be com-
puted each time that the jet status change discrete is true.
In the BFS, jet failures are detected only when BFS is
engaged. The Jet Failed Leaking and Jets Failed-Off
detection in the BFS is the same as in the PASS, but the jet
chamber pressure feedback discrete is used for Jet Fail-On
detection in the BFS rather than the RJD output discrete
which is used in the PASS.
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3.3 Interfaces and Locations
The RCS interfaces with the following systems: Data Processing
System, Displays and Controls, Caution and Warning, Orbital
Maneuvering System, Electrical Power Distribution and Control,
and the Pulse Code Modulator. In addition, the RCS interfaces
with the crew.
3.3.1 Data Processing System
The RCS sends data consisting of pressures, temperatures, and
valve positions to the Data Processing System (DPS) through
the flight-critical Multiplexer Demultiplexers (MDMs) to
have the data processed by the GPCs. The GPCs use this data
to monitor and display the configuration and status of the
RCS. The GPCs also provide valve configuration commands to
the RCS and jet on/off commands to the RCS via the Reaction
Jet Drivers Aft and Forward (RJDA and RJDF).
The Flight Control software uses the RCS Digital Automatic
Pilot (DAP) to hold attitude or to accomplish an attitude
maneuver by virtue of an error correction method. The State
Estimator takes IMU data from the Attitude Processor
software (ATT PROC), filters it, and sends it to a module
called RCS Errors Phase Plane. In the RCS Errors module,
attitude commands coming from the hand controller or from
the Universal Pointing software (which runs the display by
the same name) are compared with the actual attitude as
computed by the State Estimator. The result is an attitude
error and rate error which are passed on to the Phase Plane
module. The Phase Plane Module generates positive or
negative rate commands for each axis. These commands are
sent to the RCS Activity Lights and to the Jet Select
module.
The Jet Select Module uses a look-up table to determine how
many jets are needed from each directional cluster. (A
"directional cluster" is a group of jets located within the
same pod, forward, left, or right, which provide thrust
in the same axis and direction.) There are several such
tables which take into account Jet failures, propellant feed
constraints, and usage of OMS propellant. A Jet Priority
Table is used to determine the particular Jets to be fired.
Each jet in a directional cluster is assigned a priority
permission. If RCS RM removes a jet from the Available Jet
Status Table, the Jet will be removed from the Jet Priority
Table. Thus, the Jet Select Module logic will automatically
select the next highest priority jet in that directional
cluster. The crew has the capability to change a Jet's
priority on the Jet Priority Table or to override RM
deselection of a jet from the Available Jet Status Table.
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3.3.2 Displays and Controls
RCS data is sent to the Displays and Controls (D&C) to be
displayed on dedicated displays. Switches and circuit
breakers in the D&C panels are used for manual valve
configuration and power routing to the RCS.
3.3.3 Caution and Warning
A selected portion of the RCS parameters are sent to the
Caution and Warning (C&W) unit, where they are limit sensed
to determine if RCS anomalies exist. If system anomalies
are found, the C&W issues signals that illuminate the proper
light on the C&W panel, the master alarm pushbutton
indicators (pbis), and turn on the C&W tone.
3.3.4 Orbital Maneuvering System
The ARCS modules are connected with each other and with the
OMS by propellant interconnect lines so that either or both
OMS module's propellants can be fed to either or both of the
ARCS modules.
3.3.5 Electrical Power Distribution and Control System
The Electrical Power Distribution and Control System (EPD&C)
provides both AC and DC power to the RCS.
3.3.6 Pulse Code Modulator
Data from the RCS is routed through the Input/Output (I/O)
MDMs to the Pulse Code Modulator (PCM) for incorporation in
the telemetry downlink to be sent to the ground and to the
onboard recorders.
3.3.7 Crew
The crew monitors and controls the RCS performance through
CRT displays, fault messages, keyboard item entries, C&W
indications, and associated switches and indicators.
3.4 Hierarchy
Figures 3 through 6 illustrate the hierarchy of the RCS hardware
components. Figures 7 through 18 depict the functional details of
the RCS subsystem components.
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4.0 ANALYSIS RESULTS
Detailed analysis results for each of the identified failures are
presented in Appendix C. Tables I and II present summaries of
the failure criticalities for the three hardware subsystems of
the forward and aft RCS, respectively. Tables III and IV present
summaries of the failure criticalities for the Electrical Power
Distribution and Control (EPD&C) subsystems of the forward and
aft RCS, respectively. Further discussion of each of these
subsystems and the applicable failure modes is provided in sub-
sequent paragraphs. The RCS analysis hierarchy is illustrated in
Figures 3 through 6.
Of the ninety-nine (99) forward RCS hardware failure modes
analyzed, sixty-eight (68) were determined to be PCIs. Of the
one hundred nine (109) aft RCS hardware failure modes analyzed,
seventy-three (73) were determined to be PCIs. Summaries of the
forward and aft RCS hardware PCIs are presented in Tables V and
VI, respectively. Of the nine hundred nlnety-four (994) forward
RCS EPD&C failure modes analyzed, two hundred twenty-two (222)
were determined to be PCIs. Of the one thousand seventy (1070)
aft RCS EPD&C failure modes analyzed, two hundred twenty-seven
(227) were determined to be PCIs. Summaries of the forward and
aft RCS EPD&C PCIs are presented in tables VII and viii,
respectively.
Appendix D contains a cross reference between each PCI and
analysis worksheet in Appendix C.
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TABLE I
Criticality: LI/I 2/IR
Summary of IOA Failure Modes and Criticalities (FRCS HW)
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
STORAGE TANK
TANK ISOLATION VALVES
REGULATOR ASSEMBLIES
QUAD CHECK VALVE ASSEMBLY
COUPLINGS (SINGLE SEAL)
COUPLINGS (DOUBLE SEAL)
LINES AND FITTINGS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROPELLANT TANKS
PROPELLANT CHANNEL SCREENS
PROPELLANT FEEDOUT TUBES
PRESSURE RELIEF ASSEMBLIES
GROUND MANUAL ISOL VALVES
GIMBAL BELLOWS
TANK ISOL VALVES
MANIFOLD ISOL VLVS, PRIMARY
MANIFOLD ISOL VLVS, VERNIER
JET ALIGNMENT BELLOWS, PRIMARY
JET ALIGNMENT BELLOWS, VERNIER
COUPLINGS (SINGLE SEAL)
COUPLINGS (DOUBLE SEAL)
LINES AND FITTINGS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
PRIMARY JETS
BIPROP SOLENOID VALVES
COMBUSTION CHAMBER OR NOZZLE
VERNIER JETS
BIPROP SOLENOID VALVES
COMBUSTION CHAMBER OR NOZZLE
I .... i
1 i
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- I
2
.... i
1
1
1
1
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2
2
2
2
2
2
6
1
4
1
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1
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1
1
1
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m
1
4
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- 1
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- 1
- 2
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- 12
- 1
2 -
2 25TOTAL
TOTAL
1
1
1
2
3
2
6
i0
2
2
2
24
2
2
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TABLE II Summary of IOA Failure Modes and Criticalities (ARCS HW)
Criticality:
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
STORAGE TANK
TANK ISOLATION VALVES
REGULATOR ASSEMBLIES
QUAD CHECK VALVE ASSEMBLY
COUPLINGS (SINGLE SEAL)
COUPLINGS (DOUBLE SEAL)
LINES AND FITTINGS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROPELLANT TANKS
PROPELLANT CHANNEL SCREENS
PROPELLANT FEEDOUT TUBES
PRESSURE RELIEF ASSEMBLIES
GROUND MANUAL ISOL VALVES
GIMBAL BELLOWS
TANK ISOL VALVES
CROSSFEED VALVES
MANIFOLD ISOL VLVS, PRIMARY
MANIFOLD ISOL VLVS, VERNIER
JET ALIGNMENT BELLOWS, PRIMARY
JET ALIGNMENT BELLOWS, VERNIER
COUPLINGS (SINGLE SEAL)
COUPLINGS (DOUBLE SEAL)
LINES AND FITTINGS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
PRIMARY JETS
BIPROP SOLENOID VALVES
COMBUSTION CHAMBER OR NOZZLE
VERNIER JETS
BIPROP SOLENOID VALVES
COMBUSTION CHAMBER OR NOZZLE
TOTAL
i/i
1
2
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
4
6
1
4
1
37
2/IR
w
1
5
2
2
2
n
1
1
i0
u
24
2/2
D
m
m
i
D
D
1
4
1
1
7
3/IR
1
1
2
m
m
1
4
4
3
16
3/2R
m
B
Q
1
I
n
1
3/3 "
2
2
m
w
w
1
4
1
i0
4
m
24
TOTAL
1
2
6
2
4
4
4
1
1
1
2
3
2
6
6
i0
2
2
2
2O
8
4
9
1
5
1
109
44
TABLE III Summary of IOA Failure Modes and Criticalities(FRCS EPD&C)
Criticality: i/i 2/IR 2/2 3/IR 3/2R 3/3 TOTAL
_mn
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
CONTROLS
VALVES
CONTROLLER
DIODE
DRIVER
FUSE
RESISTOR
SWITCH, TOGGLE
INSTRUMENTATION
INDICATOR, POSITION
SENSOR, PRESSURE
SENSOR, TEMPERATURE
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
CONTROLS
VALVES
CONTROLLER
DIODE
DRIVER
FUSE
RELAY
RESISTOR
SWITCH, TOGGLE
INSTRUMENTATION
INDICATOR, POSITION
SENSOR, PRESSURE
SENSOR, TEMPERATURE
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
CONTROLS
VALVES
CONTROLLER
DIODE
DRIVER
FUSE
RELAY
RESISTOR
SWITCH, TOGGLE
INSTRUMENTATION
SENSOR, CONTINUITY
SENSOR, PRESSURE
SENSOR, TEMPERATURE
m
3
4
3
-- i
m
4
4
16
w
p
m
m
m
u
13
4
8
6
3
23
D
4
4
6
2
i0
1
5O
6
4
i0
5
n
t
D
m
w
m
3
4
3
1
23
1
4
19
3
4
6
31
I0
i0
1
4
3
16
5
8
6
3
114
28
3
20
108
48
w
24
14
7
15
1
3
3
74
2O
8
12
12
2
16
15
6
172
36
i0
40
108
81
6
24
14
24
38
12
13
6
8O
74
4
i0
i0
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TABLE III Summary of IOA Failure Modes and Criticalities(FRCS EPD&C)
aI||||||||||||N|||B|||||||R||||||||N|||||||B|||||||||||||CC_:
Criticality: I/I 2/IR 2/2 3/IR 3/2R 3/3
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
THRUSTERS
FUSE
HEATER
RESISTOR
SWITCH, THERMAL
SWITCH, TOGGLE
POD
DRIVER
FUSE
HEATER
RELAY
RESISTOR
SWITCH, TOGGLE
THERMOSTAT
TOTAL
m
m
l
m
w
w
w
m
4
D
m
m
D
38
5
2
1
14
w
D
I
2
1
i0
a
4
2
5
24
12
12
4
4
3
4
m
m
i0
ii
12
TOTAL
5
8
i0
8
40
24
12
12
4
16
3
4
80 i15 196 565 994
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TABLE IV Summary of IOA Failure Modes and Criticalities (ARCS EPD&C)
Criticality: l/l 2/IR _ 2/2 3/IR 3/2R 3/3 TOTAL
HE PRESSSUBSYSTEM
CONTROLS
VALVES
CONTROLLER
DIODE
DRIVER
FUSE
RESISTOR
SWITCH, TOGGLE
INSTRUMENTATION
INDICATOR, POSITION
SENSOR, PRESSURE
SENSOR, TEMPERATURE
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
CONTROLS
VALVES
CONTROLLER
DIODE
DRIVER
FUSE
RELAY
RESISTOR
SWITCH, TOGGLE
INSTRUMENTATION
INDICATOR, POSITION
SENSOR, PRESSURE
SENSOR, TEMPERATURE
THRUSTERSUBSYSTEM
CONTROLS
VALVES
CONTROLLER
DIODE
DRIVER
FUSE
RELAY
RESISTOR
SWITCH, TOGGLE
INSTRUMENTATION
SENSOR, CONTINUITY
SENSOR, PRESSURE
SENSOR, TEMPERATURE
m
2
m
m
I
m
D
4
12
- 16
- 8
- 18
- 4
- I0
- 1
3
4
6
15
22
3
2
2
4
8
- 8
- 3
3
9
5
9
i0
42
m
D
m
m
3
25
39
2
ii
158
43
1
- 8
- 4
l0
2O
4
3
113
56
- 5
- 12
1 8
24
50
16
19
3
9
48
- 16
12 20
4 24
- 4
32 32
5 15
- 1
8 8
4 4
6
4O
52
17
48
158
109
4
8
4
36
72
24
19
6
122
112
5
2O
12
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TABLE IV Summary of IOA Failure Modes and Criticalities (ARCS EPD&C)
Criticality: i/i 2/1R! 2/2 3/IR 3/2R 3/3 TOTAL
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
THRUSTERS
DRIVER
FUSE
HEATER
RESISTOR
SWITCH, THERMAL
SENSOR, TOGGLE
TOTAL
m
w
m
w
w
4
1
2
2
1
i0
4
6
3
I0
ll 48 153
m
m
249
- I0
- 6
- 8
i0 i0
- 8
I0 30
609 1070
48
TABLE V Summary of IOA Potential Critical Items (FRCS HW)
Criticality: i/i 2/IR 2/2 3/IR 3/2R TOTAL
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
STORAGE TANK
TANK ISOLATION VALVES
REGULATOR ASSEMBLIES
QUAD CHECK VALVE ASSEMBLY
COUPLINGS (SINGLE SEAL)
LINES AND FITTINGS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROPELLANT TANKS
PROPELLANT CHANNEL SCREENS
PROPELLANT FEEDOUT TUBES
PRESSURE RELIEF ASSEMBLIES
GROUND MANUAL ISOL VALVES
GIMBAL BELLOWS
TANK ISOL VALVES
MANIFOLD ISOL VLVS, PRIMARY
MANIFOLD ISOL VLVS, VERNIER
JET ALIGNMENT BELLOWS, PRIMARY
JET ALIGNMENT BELLOWS, VERNIER
COUPLINGS (SINGLE SEAL)
LINES AND FITTINGS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
PRIMARY JETS
BIPROP SOLENOID VALVES
COMBUSTION CHAMBER OR NOZZLE
VERNIER JETS
BIPROP SOLENOID VALVES
COMBUSTION CHAMBER OR NOZZLE
TOTAL
1
2
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
I
2
6
4
; 1
33
1
5
2
3
2
1
2
4
12
1
m
33
w
I
m
m
1
m
1
2
m
E
D
m
m
m
m
m
n
I
u
m
m
m
1
1
5
2
3
4
1
1
1
2
2
2
4
6
1
2
2
12
2
5
1
68
49
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TABLE VI Summary of IOA Potential Critical Items (ARCS HW)
Criticality: I/i 2/IR 2/2 3/IR 3/2_ TOTAL
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
STORAGE TANK
TANK ISOLATION VALVES
REGULATOR ASSEMBLIES
QUAD CHECK VALVE ASSEMBLY
COUPLINGS (SINGLE SEAL)
LINES AND FITTINGS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROPELLANT TANKS
PROPELLANT CHANNEL SCREENS
PROPELLANT FEEDOUT TUBES
PRESSURE RELIEF ASSEMBLIES
GROUND MANUAL ISOL VALVES
GIMBAL BELLOWS
TANK ISOL VALVES
CROSSFEED VALVES
MANIFOLD ISOL VLVS, PRIMARY
MANIFOLD ISOL VLVS, VERNIER
JET ALIGNMENT BELLOWS, PRIMARY
JET ALIGNMENT BELLOWS VERNIER
COUPLINGS (SINGLE SEAL)
LINES AND FITTINGS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
PRIMARY JETS
BIPROP SOLENOID VALVES
COMBUSTION CHAMBER OR NOZZLE
VERNIER JETS
BIPROP SOLENOID VALVES
COMBUSTION CHAMBER OR NOZZLE
TOTAL
- 1
- 5
- 2
- 2
2 2
i m
1
1
1 1
2
2
2 1
2
2
2
2
- 10
4
6
1
4
1
37 24
m
m
m
1
4
1
m
1
7
u
m
D
w
D
4
m
4
o
m
m
w
1
m
1
1
1
5
2
2
4
1
1
1
2
2
2
5
6
6
1
2
2
l0
4
6
1
5
1
73
50
TABLE VII Summary of IOA Potential Critical Items (FRCS EPD&C)
Criticality: I i/i J 2/IR I 2/2 1 3/IR I 3/2R ITOTAL
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
CONTROLS
VALVES
CONTROLLER
DIODE
DRIVER
FUSE
SWITCH, TOGGLE
3
4
3
D
4
2
1
5
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
CONTROLS
VALVES
DIODE
DRIVER
RELAY
SWITCH, TOGGLE
Q
4
4
16
- 42
1
- 4
- 6
2
12
48
5
20
18
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
CONTROLS
VALVES
CONTROLLER
DIODE
DRIVER
FUSE
RELAY
RESISTOR
SWITCH, TOGGLE
Q
- 13
- 4
- 8
- 6
- 3
- 23
m
- 19
- 6
13
23
8
6
3
6
23
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
THRUSTERS
FUSE
HEATER
SWITCH, THERMAL
SWITCH, TOGGLE
TOTAL
m
- 4
- 38
5
2
1
14
80
1
65
m
m
39
5
2
5
15
222
51
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TABLE VIII Summary of IOA Potential Critical Items (ARCS EPD&C)
Criticality: I i/i J 2/IR I 2/2 i 3/IR I 3/2R ITOTAL
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
CONTROLS
VALVES
CONTROLLER
DIODE
DRIVER
SWITCH, TOGGLE
w
2
I
6
8
4
5
B
6
8
6
5
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
CONTROLS
VALVES
CONTROLLER
DIODE
DRIVER
RELAY
SWITCH, TOGGLE
m
3
2
m
4
12
3
4
13
6
2
9
2
8
19
2
15
i0
33
27
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
CONTROLS
VALVES
CONTROLLER
DIODE
DRIVER
FUSE
RESISTOR
SWITCH, TOGGLE
m
- 50
- 7
- 9
2
52
4
7
9
8
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
THRUSTERS
DRIVER
FUSE
HEATER
SWITCH, THERMAL
SWITCH, TOGGLE
TOTAL
m
m
w
- 4
- ii
1
2
2
1
i0
48
9
4
62 106
- i0
- 6
- 2
- 5
- i0
227
52
4.1 Analysis Results - Helium Pressurization Subsystem
4.1.1 Analysis Results - Forward Helium Pressurization
Subsystem
Twenty-three (23) failure modes were analyzed in the forward
helium pressurization subsystem and sixteen (16) were identified
as PCIs. All sixteen of the PCIs are single point failures which
could result in possible damage to surrounding components,
inability to repressurize the propellant tanks, system over-
pressurization, or migration of propellants into helium lines.
These critical failures are caused by helium tank structural
failure, helium leakage due to structural failure of components
or lines, flow path loss due to failure-to-open of components or
system contamination, and check valve failures.
4.1.2 Analysis Results - Aft Helium Pressurization Subsystem
Twenty-three (23) failure modes were analyzed in the aft helium
pressurization subsystem and fifteen (15) were identified as
pcIs. All fifteen of the PCIs are single point failures which
could result in possible damage to surrounding components,
inability to repressurize the propellant tanks, system over-
pressurization, or migration of propellants into helium lines.
These critical failures are caused by helium tank structural
failure, helium leakage due to structural failure of components
or lines, flow path loss due to failure-to-open of components or
system contamination, and check valve failures.
4.2 Analysis Results - Propellant Storage and Distribution
Subsystem
4.2.1 Analysis Results - Forward Propellant Storage
and Distribution Subsystem
Sixty (60) failure modes were analyzed in the forward propellant
storage and distribution subsystem, of which thirty-eight (38)
were identified as PCIs. All thirty-eight of the PCIs are single
point failures which could result in leakage of propellant, loss
of propellant flow path, inability to use or deplete propellant,
system overpressurization, loss of manifolds, and loss of
thrusters.
These critical failures are caused by structural failure of the
propellant tank, components, and propellant lines, seal failures,
contamination, failure of valves to operate, failure of the
pressure relief assembly, and propellant tank screen structural
failures.
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4.2.2 Analysis Results - Aft Propellant Storage and
Distribution Subsystem
Seventy (70) failure modes were analyzed in the aft propellant
storage and distribution subsystem, of which forty-five (45) were
identified as PCIs. Forty (40) of the forty-five PCIs are single
point failures which could result in leakage of propellant, loss
of propellant flow path, inability to use or deplete propellant,
system overpressurization, loss of manifolds or crossfeed valves,
loss of thrusters, and loss of vehicle control. The remaining
five (5) PCIs could result in loss of life or vehicle during an
RTLS abort due to the inability to complete 0MS or RCS propellant
dumps leading to possible violations of pod structural con-
straints or vehicle entry center-of-gravity limits.
These critical failures are caused by structural failure of the
propellant tank, components, and propellant lines, seal failures,
contamination, failure of valves to operate, failure of the
pressure relief assembly, and propellant tank screen structural
failures.
4.3 Analysis Results - Thruster Subsystem
4.3.1 Analysis Results - Forward Thruster Subsystem
Sixteen (16) failure modes were analyzed in the forward thruster
subsystem, of which fourteen (14) were identified as PCIs. All
of the fourteen PCIs are single point failures resulting in
excessive propellant usage, leakage of propellant, loss of
propellant flow path, engine explosion or burnthrough, loss of
thruster on-off control, and inability to deplete propellants
leading to Orbiter center-of-gravity limit violations during
entry.
These critical failures are caused by loss of vernier jets,
structural failure of components and propellant lines, seal
failures, contamination, failure to open or close of thruster
valves, deselection of opposlte-firing thrusters by Redundancy
Management, improper propellant mixture ratios, and structural
failures of the injector assembly, combustion chamber, and nozzle
extension.
4.3.2 Analysis Results - Aft Thruster Subsystem
Sixteen (16) failure modes were analyzed in the aft thruster
subsystem, of which thirteen (13) were identified as PCIs. All
of the thirteen PCIs are single point failures resulting in
excessive propellant usage, leakage of propellant, loss of
propellant flow path, engine explosion or burnthrough, loss of
thruster on-off control, or loss of vehicle control.
These critical failures are caused by loss of vernier jets,
structural failure of components and propellant lines, seal
failures, contamination, failure to open or close of thruster
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valves, deselection of opposite-firing thrusters by Redundancy
Management, improper propellant mixture ratios, and structural
failures of the injector assembly, combustion chamber, and nozzle
extension.
4.4 Analysis Results - Electrical Power Distribution and Control
Subsystem
4.4.1 Analysis Results - Controls
4.4.1.1 Analysis Results - Forward Controls
Seven hundred sixty-five (765) failure modes were analyzed in the
forward EPD&C controls subsystem, of which one hundred ninety-
five (195) were identified as PCIs. Of the 195 PCIs, ninety-two
(92) are single point failures since their failure resulted in
critical valves being stuck open or closed. Another sixty-four
(64) of the 195 PCIs could result in loss of vehicle/ life if all
redundancy were lost. The remaining thirty-nine (39) PCIs could
result in loss of mission if all redundancy were lost.
Criticalities assigned to forward EPD&C failure modes were
derived from the effect the failure had on the component being
controlled, which was one or more valves, in all cases.
Therefore, critical EPD&C failure modes caused critical valves to
be stuck open or closed resulting in inability to use or deplete
propellant, system overpressurization, zots, loss of manifolds,
and loss of thrusters.
4.4.1.2 Analysis Results - Aft Controls
Nine hundred thirty-two (932) failure modes were analyzed in the
aft EPD&C controls subsystem, of which one hundred ninety-four
(194) were identified as PCIs. Of the 194 PCIs, thirty-nine (39)
are single point failures since their failure resulted in
critical valves being stuck open or closed. Another forty-nine
(49) of the 194 PCIs could result in loss of vehicle/life if all
redundancy were lost. The remaining one hundred six (106) PCIs
could result in loss of mission if all redundancy were lost.
Criticalities assigned to aft EPD&C failure modes were derived
from the effect the failure had on the component being
controlled, which was one or more valves, in all cases.
Therefore, critical EPD&C failure modes caused critical valves to
be stuck open or closed resulting in inability to use or deplete
propellant, system overpressurizatlon, zots, loss of manifolds,
loss of thrusters, and loss of vehicle control.
4.4.2 Analysis Results - Instrumentation
4.4.2.1 Analysis Results - Forward Instrumentation
Eighty-three (83) failure modes have been analyzed in the forward
EPD&C instrumentation subsystem, of which zero (0) were PCIs.
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4.4.2.2 Analysis Results - Aft Instrumentation
Sixty-six (66) failure modes have been analyzed in the aft EPD&C
instrumentation subsystem, of which zero (0) were PCIs.
4.4.3 Analysis Results - Thermal Control
4.4.3.1 Analysis Results - Forward Thermal Control
Seventy-five (75) failure modes were analyzed in the forward pod
thermal control subsystem, of which zero (0) were identified as
PCIs.
Seventy-one (71) failure modes were analyzed in the forward
thruster thermal control subsystem, of which twenty-seven (27)
were identified as PCIs. Twenty-six (26) of the 27 PCIs are
single point failures resulting in thruster explosion or loss of
thruster thermal control and unplanned changes in mission opera-
tions. The remaining one (i) PCI could result in loss of life or
vehicle after the failure of all redundancy.
4.4.3.2 Analysis Results - Aft Thermal Control
All of the OMS/RCS pod heaters and thermostats were analyzed in
the OMS analysis and are presented in the OMS report.
Seventy-two (72) failure modes were analyzed in the aft thruster
thermal control subsystem, of which thirty-three (33) were
identified as PCIs. Twenty (20) of the 33 PCIs are single point
failures resulting in thruster explosion or loss of thruster
thermal control and unplanned changes in mission operations. The
remaining thirteen (13) PCIs could result in loss of llfe or
vehicle after the loss of redundancy.
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APPENDIX A
ACRONYMS
AC
ALC
ALCA
AMCA
AOA
APC
ARCS
ASSY
ATO
ATT
BCE
BFS
BTU
C&W
CIL
CL
CMD
CNTL
CNTLR
CRIT
CRT
D&C
DAP
dc
DOD
DPS
DTO
EI
EPDC
ET
F
F
FA
FCOS
FDA
FF
FLCA
FLT
FM
FMCA
FMEA
FRCS
FSW
ft
FU
FUNC
FWD
G
GFE
GNC
- Alternating Current
- Aft Load Controller
- Aft Load Control Assembly
- Aft Motor Control Assembly
- Abort-Once-Around
- Aft Power Controller
- Aft Reaction Control System (Subsystem)
- Assembly
- Abort-To-Orbit
- Attitude
- Bus Control ELement
- Backup Flight System
- Bus Terminal Unit
- Caution and Warning
- Critical Items List
- Close (Closed)
- Command, Commander
- Control
- Controller
- Criticality
- Cathode-Ray Tube
- Displays and Controls
- Digital Autopilot
- Direct Current
- Department of Defense
- Data Processing System (Subsystem)
- Detailed Test Objective
- Entry Interface
- Electrical Power Distribution and Control
- External Tank
- Fahrenheit
- Functional
- Flight Aft
- Flight Control Operating System
- Fault Detection and Annunciation
- Flight Forward
- Forward Load Control Assembly
- Flight
- Failure Mode
- Forward Motor Control Assembly
- Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
- Forward Reaction Control System (Subsystem)
- Flight Software
- Feet
- Fuel
- Function
- Forward
- Gravity
- Government Furnished Equipment
- Guidance, Navigation, and Control
A-I
GPC
GSE
He
HW
I/C
I/O
ID
IMU
IOA
ISOL
ISP
JSC
L
LCA
LRU
MAN
MCA
MCC
MDAC
MDM
MECO
MM
MMH
msec
N204
NA
NASA
NSTS
NTO
OA
OF
OI
OMRSD
OMS
OP
OPS
OX
OXID
P
PAD
PASS
PBI
Pc
PCA
PCI
PCM
PCMMU
PLS
PRCS
PRESS
PROC
psi
psia
- General Purpose Computer
- Ground Support Equipment
- Helium
- Hardware
- Interconnect
- Input/Output
- Inside Diameter
- Inertial Measurement Unit
- Independent Orbiter Assessment
- Isolation
- Initial Specific Impulse
- Johnson Space Center
- Left
- Load Controller Assembly
- Line Replaceable Unit
- Manual
- Motor Control Assembly
- Mission Control Center (JSC)
- McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company
- Multiplexer/Demultiplexer
- Main Engine Cutoff
- Major Mode
- Monomethyl Hydrazine
- Millisecond
- Nitrogen Tetroxide
- Not Applicable
- National Aeronautics and Space Administration
- National Space Transportation System
- Nitrogen Tetroxide
- Operational Aft
- Operational Forward
- Operational Instrumentation
- Operational Maintenance Requirements and
Specifications Document
- Orbital Maneuvering System
- Open
- Operations Sequence
- Oxidizer
- Oxidizer
- Pitch
- Propellant Acquisition Device
- Primary Avionics Software System
- Push-Button Indicator
- Chamber Pressure
- Power Control Assembly
- Potential Critical Item
- Pulse Code Modulation
- Pulse Code Modulation Master Unit
- Primary Landing Site
- Primary Reaction Control System (jet)
- Pressure
- Processor
- Pounds per Square Inch
- Pounds per Square Inch Absolute
A-2
psid
psig
PTI
PWR
R
R
RCS
RHC
RI
RJD
RM
RPC
RTLS
scfm
SFOM
SOP
SPEC
SSSH
STS
SUM
SYS
TAL
THC
TK
TPS
VERN
VLV
VRCS
Y
- Pounds per Square Inch Differential
- Pounds per Square Inch Gage
- Programmed Test Input
- Power
- Right
- Roll
- Reaction Control System
- Rotation Hand Controller
- Rockwell International
- Reaction Jet Driver
- Redundancy Management
- Remote Power Controller
- Return-to-Launch Site
- Standard Cubic Feet per Minute
- Shuttle Flight Operations Manual
- Subsystem Operating Program
- Specification
- Space Shuttle Systems Handbook
- Space Transportation System
- Summary
- System
- Transatlantic Abort Landing
- Translation Hand Controller
- Tank
- Thermal Protection System
- Vernier
- Valve
- Vernier Reaction Control System (jet)
- Yaw
A-3

APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.1
B.2
B.3
Definitions
Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions
Subsystem-Specific Ground Rules and Assumptions
B-I
APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.I Definitions
Definitions contained in NSTS 22206, Instructions For Preparation
of FMEA/CIL, i0 October 1986, were used with the ir6_lowing
_plifications and additi-o-n-s.
INTACT ABORT DEFINITIONS:
RTLS - begins at transition to OPS 6 and ends at transition
_-60PS 9, post-flight
TAL - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
_-_nsition to OPS 9, post-flight
AOA - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
_-_nsition to OPS 9, post-flight
ATO - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
r_nsition to OPS 9, post-flight
CREDIBLE (CAUSE) - an event that can be predicted or expected in
anticipated operational environmental conditions. Excludes an
event where multiple failures must first occur to result in
environmental extremes
CONTINGENCY CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard m--_function procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
EARLY MISSION TERMINATION - termination of onorbit phase prior to
pa-_ed end of mission
EFFECTS/RATIONALE - description of the case which generated the
highest criticality
HIGHEST CRITICALITY - the highest functional criticality
determined in the phase-by-phase analysis
MAJOR MODE (MM) - major sub-mode of software operational sequence
(ops)
MC - Memory Configuration of Primary Avionics Software System
(PASS)
MISSION - assigned performance of a specific Orbiter flight with
payload/objective accomplishments including orbit phasing and
altitude (excludes secondary payloads such as GAS cans,
middeck P/L, etc.)
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MULTIPLE ORDER FAILURE - describes the failure due to a single
cause or eve--_ of all units which perform a necessary (critical)
function
OFF-NOMINAL CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard m--_function procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
OPS - software operational sequence
PRIMARY MISSION OBJECTIVES - worst case primary mission objec-
tives are equal to mission objectives
PHASE DEFINITIONS:
PRELAUNCH PHASE - begins at launch count-down Orbiter
power-up 'an--_ds at moding to OPS Major Mode 102 (liftoff)
LIFTOFF MISSION PHASE - begins at SRB ignition (MM 102) and
ends at transition out of OPS 1 (Synonymous with ASCENT)
ONORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS 2 or OPS 8 and
ends at _-r-_sitlon out of OPS 2 or OPS 8
DEORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS Major Mode
301 and en--n_at first main landing gear touchdown
LANDING/SAFING PHASE - begins at first main gear
touchdown and ens--_ith the completion of post-landing
safing operations
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APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUNDRULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.2 IOA Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions
The philosophy embodied in NSTS 22206, Instructions for
Preparation of FMEA/CIL, I0 b-_ober 1986, was employe--_-with the
following amp-[ifications a-nd addition-s[
.
•
•
•
•
The operational flight software is an accurate
implementation of the Flight System Software Requirements
(FSSRs).
RATIONALE: Software verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
After liftoff, any parameter which is monitored by system
management (SM) or which drives any part of the Caution and
Warning System (C&W) will support passage of Redundancy
Screen B for its corresponding hardware item.
RATIONALE: Analysis of on-board parameter availability
and/or the actual monitoring by the crew
is beyond the scope of this task.
Any data employed with flight software is assumed to be
functional for the specific vehicle and specific mission
being flown.
RATIONALE: Mission data verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
All hardware (including firmware) is manufactured and
assembled to the design specifications/drawings.
RATIONALE: Acceptance and verification testing is
designed to detect and identify problems
before the item is approved for use.
All Flight Data File crew procedures will be assumed
performed as written, and will not include human error in
their performance•
RATIONALE: Failures caused by human operational error
are out-of-scope of this task.
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ii.
All hardware analyses will, as a minimum, be performed at
the level of analysis existent within NASA/Prime Contractor
Orbiter FMEA/CILs, and will be permitted to go to greater
hardware detail levels but not lesser.
RATIONALE: Comparison of IOA analysis results with
other analyses requires that both analyses
be performed to a comparable level of
detail.
verification that a telemetry parameter is actually
monitored during AOS by ground-based personnel is not
required.
RATIONALE: Analysis of mission-dependent telemetry
availability and/or the actual monitoring of
applicable data by ground-based personnel is
beyond the scope of this task.
The determination of criticalities per phase is based on the
worst case effect of a failure for the phase being analyzed.
The failure can occur in the phase being analyzed or in
any previous phase, whichever produces the worst case
effects for the phase of interest.
RATIONALE: Assigning phase criticalities ensures a
thorough and complete analysis•
Analysis of wire harnesses, cables, and electrical connectors
to determine if FMEAs are warranted will not be performed
nor FMEAs assessed•
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.
Analysis of welds or brazed Joints that cannot be inspected
will not be performed nor FMEAs assessed.
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.
Emergency system or hardware will include burst discs and
will exclude the EMU Secondary Oxygen Pack (SOP), pressure
relief valves and the landing gear pyrotechnics.
RATIONALE: Clarify definition of emergency systems to
ensure consistency throughout IOA project.
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APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUNDRULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.3 RCS Ground Rules and Assumptions
The IOA analysis was performed to the component or assembly
level. The analysis considered the worst case effects of the
hardware or functional failure on the subsystem, mission, and
crew and vehicle safety.
i • The function of an RCS thruster is to provide thrust in
a certain axis and direction• Therefore, from a top
down system analysis approach, thrusters which fire in
the same axis and direction may be considered redundant
to each other. The function of electrical systems is
to provide power to the components of the RCS hardware
systems. Redundancy, as applied to electrical systems,
is considered to be redundant electrical paths,
systems, or controls. Therefore, thrusters which fire
in the same direction may not be considered redundant
to an electrical failure. Thruster hardware and
certain electrical components may be grouped by firing
axes.
• For the ARCS, entry criticalities are dependent on the
number of pitch, yaw, and roll thrusters available
(e.g., loss of pitch control results in loss of
vehicle)• Abort criticalities for both FRCS and ARCS
are also dependent upon the number of thrusters
available in certain axes. All aft RCS pitch, yaw, and
roll thrusters and all forward RCS yaw thrusters are
required for the successful completion of OMS/RCS
propellant dumps during RTLS aborts• The time
available to complete propellant dumps is less during
RTLS than during other intact abort modes•
• Only PASS software is considered in this analysis• BFS
is not considered for flight or abort analyses• RCS
Redundancy Management (RM), certain software sequences,
and Software Operating Procedures (SOPs) are considered
in the analysis•
. Inability to accomplish DTOs or PTIs during entry due
to an RCS failure can lead to loss of mission during
the deorbit phase.
, Internal leakage of a valve is fluid which leaks
through the valve into the line. External leakage of a
valve is fluid which leaks through the valve housing.
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i0.
Ii.
12.
13.
14.
Coupling caps are considered redundancy for quick dis-
connect couplings. Leaks through poppet seals and
coupling caps are assumed to be leaking overboard, not
internally• Where it cannot be determined how many
seals exist in a coupling, it will be assumed that only
a poppet seal and a cap seal exist.
The pressure relief valve is considered to be an
emergency system because it incorporates a burst disk.
If applicable, the redundancy and criticalities
assigned to an electrical component may be tied to
those assigned to hardware components affected by the
failure of the electrical component•
Software capabilities which allow control over the
operation of hardware components are considered to be
redundant to electrical components which control the
operation.
For the thermal control analysis it is assumed that, at
the time of vehicle liftoff, all areas of the thermal
environment are within redlines.
Instrumentation passage of screen B does not require
the ability to discern between sensor or hardware
failure, but on detection of the measurement being out
of a predefined limit• The ability to differentiate
between sensor and hardware failure will be reflected
in the criticality assignment.
It is assumed that propellants leaking through RCS
thrusters will not freeze during aborts due to the
short duration of these phases•
It is assumed that after the failure of an RCS
thruster, the RCS redundancy management will
automatically deselect the opposite-firing thruster•
The Shuttle Launch Commit Criteria and Background (JSC
16007) and the Operational Maintenance Requirements and
Specifications Document (OMRSD) will not be used to
determine the passage of redundancy screens. The
criteria for determining screen passage outlined in
NSTS 22206 will be used as the basis for the passage or
failure of the redundancy screens•
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APPENDIX C
DETAILED ANALYSIS
This section contains the IOA analysis worksheets generated
during the analysis of this subsystem. The information on these
worksheets is intentionally similar to the NASA FMEAs. Each of
these sheets identifies the hardware item being analyzed and
parent assembly. For each failure mode, the possible causes are
outlined, and the assessed hardware and functional criticality
for each mission phase is listed, as described in the NSTS 22206,
Instructions for Preparation of FMEA and CIL, i0 October 1986.
Finally, effects are entered a-_ _-6-bo--_om--_ e-ach sheet, _ the
worst case criticality is entered at the top.
LEGEND FOR IOA ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS
Hardware Criticalities:
1 = Loss of life or vehicle
2 = Loss of mission or next failure of any redundant item
(like or unlike) could cause loss of life/vehicle
3 _ All others
Functional Criticalities:
1R - Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of life or vehicle.
2R - Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of mission.
Redundancy Screen A:
1 = Is Checked Out PreFlight
2 = Is Capable of Check Out PreFlight
3 = Not Capable of Check Out PreFlight
NA = Not Applicable
Redundancy Screens B and C:
P = Passed Screen
F = Failed Screen
NA = Not Applicable
LEGEND FOR IOA RCS MDAC ID
100- 198 - Forward RCS Hardware
199- 307 - Aft RCS Hardware
308-1301 - Forward RCS EPD&C
1302-2371 - Aft RCS EPD&C
C-I
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: i00
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/I
i/I
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HELIUM STORAGE TANK
STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE OR LEAK)
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3) HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
4) HELIUM STORAGE TANK
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA:
DEORBIT: I/I ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
i/i
i/1
i/i
i/i
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FRCS POD
FU & OX:
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, HIGH PRESSURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF HELIUM PRESSURIZATION WILL AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS, AND
MAY CAUSE THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES TO BE EXCEEDED DURING ENTRY OR
ABORTS DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT'S WEIGHT.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.6;
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01 (42BN & 42BT); FLIGHT RULE 6-41 C, D.
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-2
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: I01 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM: HELIUM FILL COUPLING
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN), OR LEAKS
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
S)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HELIUM FILL COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
211R
211R
2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] c[p]
LOCATION: HELIUM/FUEL/OXIDIZER SERVICING PANEL
PART NUMBER: FU & OX:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE (COUPLING OR COUPLING CAP) CANNOT BE DETECTED.
NEXT ASSOCIATED FAILURE WILL CAUSE LOSS OF HELIUM PRESSURIZATION
CAPABILITY. LOSS OF HELIUM PRESSURIZATION WILL AFFECT ONORBIT
OPERATIONS, AND MAY CAUSE THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES TO BE
EXCEEDED DURING ENTRY OR ABORTS DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT'S
WEIGHT.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.6;
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01 (42BN & 42BT); FLIGHT RULE 6-41 A, B.
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-3
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 102 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HELIUM FILL COUPLING
FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED)
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HELIUM FILL COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [
LOCATION: HELIUM/FUEL/OXIDIZER SERVICING PANEL
PART NUMBER: FU & OX:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.6;
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01 (42BN & 42BT)
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-4
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 3/1R
103 ABORT: 3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HE ISOL A & B VLVS
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN) OR LEAKS INTERNALLY
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3) HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
4) HE ISOL A & B VLVS
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 1R RTLS: 3/ 1R
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/ IR ATO: 3/ IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS :
FRCS POD
FU & OX:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
A[ 2 ] B [P] C [ P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
LOSS OF SIGNAL FROM MDM
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY PRESSURE REGULATORS. FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE OVERPRESSURIZATION AND RUPTURE OF TANKS
AND/OR LINES, AND MAY CAUSE ZOTS.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.6;
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01 (42BN & 42BT)
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-5
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 104 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HE ISOL A & B VLVS
FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED)
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3) HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
4) HE ISOL A & B VLVS
S)
6)
7)
8)
S)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FRCS POD
FU & OX:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
LOSS OF SIGNAL FROM MDM
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
STANDBY REDUNDANCY. NEXT ASSOCIATED FAILURE (OTHER VALVE A OR B)
WILL CAUSE LOSS OF HELIUM PRESSURIZATION CAPABILITY. LOSS OF
HELIUM PRESSURIZATION WILL AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS, AND MAY
CAUSE THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES TO BE EXCEEDED DURING ENTRY OR
ABORTS DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT'S WEIGHT.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.6;
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01 (42BN & 42BT); FLIGHT RULE 6-41 C, D.
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-6
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: I/1
105 ABORT: i/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAD ANALYST:
HE LINE, ALL EXCEPT ISOL VLV TO PRESS REGULATOR
STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE OR LEAK)
SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3) HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
4) HE LINE, ALL EXCEPT ISOL VLV TO PRESS REGULATOR
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: I/1
LI FTOFF: 3/ 3 TAL: I/1
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO: I/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
BETWEEN HELIUM TANKAND QUAD CHECK VALVES
FU & OX:
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, HIGH PRESSURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL CAUSE LOSS OF HELIUM PRESSURIZATION CAPABILITY, WILL
AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS, AND WILL CAUSE THE CG SAFETY
BOUNDARIES TO BE EXCEEDED DURING ENTRY OR ABORTS DUE TO THE
TRAPPED PROPELLANT'S WEIGHT.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.6;
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01 (42BN).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-7
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT: 1/1
MDAC ID: 106 ABORT: i/i
ITEM: HE LINE, ALL EXCEPT ISOL VLV TO PRESS REGULATOR
FAILURE MODE: RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3) HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE LINE, ALL EXCEPT ISOL VLV TO PRESS REGULATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: I/1
LI FTOFF: i/1 TAL: I/1
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] c[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
BETWEEN HELIUM TANK AND QUAD CHECK VALVES
FU & OX:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE MAY CAUSE UNACCEPTABLE PROPELLANT MIXTURE RATIO,
RESULTING IN ZOTS AND/OR THRUSTER NOZZLE BURNTHROUGH AND LOSS OF
VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.6;
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01 (42BN).
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INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 107 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
211R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HE LINE, ISOL VLV TO PRESS REGULATOR
STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE OR LEAK)
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE LINE, ISOL VLV TO PRESS REGULATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PI_LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] SIP] C[P]
LOCATION:
REGULATOR
PART NUMBER:
BETWEEN HELIUM ISOLATION VALVES AND PRESSURE
FU & OX:
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, HIGH PRESSURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY CLOSING HELIUM ISOLATION VALVE, AND USING
THE PARALLEL HELIUM SUPPLY PATH. FAILURE CAUSES LOSS OF HELIUM
PRESSURIZATION. NEXT ASSOCIATED FAILURE WILL AFFECT ONORBIT
OPERATIONS, AND MAY CAUSE THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES TO BE
EXCEEDED DURING ENTRY OR ABORTS DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT'S
WEIGHT.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.6;
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01 (42BN).
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 108 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HE LINE, ISOL VLV TO PRESS REGULATOR
RESTRICTED FLOW
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3) HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
4) HE LINE, ISOL VLV TO PRESS REGULATOR
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
2/IR TAL: 2/IR
2/IR AOA: 2/IR
2/IR ATO: 2/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
REGULATOR
PART NUMBER:
BETWEEN HELIUM ISOLATION VALVES AND PRESSURE
FU & OX:
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, HIGH PRESSURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY PARALLEL HELIUM PATH. FAILURE MAY CAUSE
UNACCEPTABLE PROPELLANT MIXTURE RATIO, RESULTING IN ZOTS AND/OR
THRUSTER NOZZLE BURNTHROUGH AND LOSS OF VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.6;
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01 (42BN).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-10
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 3/IR
109 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HIGH PRESSURE HELIUM TEST PORT COUPLINGS A & B
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN), OR LEAKS
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HIGH PRESSURE HELIUM TEST PORT COUPLINGS A & B
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FUEL/OXIDIZER PRESSURE SYSTEM INTERNAL PANEL
FU & OX:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE (COUPLING OR COUPLING CAP) CANNOT BE DETECTED.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE LOSS OF HELIUM
PRESSURIZATION. LOSS OF HELIUM PRESSURIZATION WILL AFFECT
ONORBIT OPERATIONS, AND MAY CAUSE THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES TO BE
EXCEEDED DURING ENTRY OR ABORTS DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT'S
WEIGHT.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.6;
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01 (42BN & 42BT); FLIGHT RULE 6-41 A, B.
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-ll
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 3/3
ii0 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HIGH PRESSURE HELIUM TEST PORT COUPLINGS A & B
FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED)
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HIGH PRESSURE HELIUM TEST PORT COUPLINGS A & B
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: FUEL/OXIDIZER PRESSURE SYSTEM INTERNAL PANEL
PART NUMBER: FU & OX:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.6;
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01 (42BN & 42BT)
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-12
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: iii ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PRESSURE
HE PRESS REGULATOR ASSEMBLY
FAILS OPEN OR REGULATES AT HIGHER THAN NORMAL
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE PRESS REGULATOR ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/ IR AOA: 3/ IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCAT ION:
PART NUMBER:
FRCS POD
FU & OX:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE HELIUM ISOLATION VALVE AND THE SERIES
PRESSURE REGULATOR. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE
OVERPRESSURIZATION AND RUPTURE OF THE TANK AND LINES, AND MAY
CAUSE ZOTS.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.6;
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01 (42BN & 42BT); FLIGHT RULE 6-41 A, B.
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-13
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 112 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HE PRESS REGULATOR ASSEMBLY
FAILS CLOSED
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
211R
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
S)
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE PRESS REGULATOR ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FRCS POD
FU & OX:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
STANDBY REDUNDANCY. NEXT ASSOCIATED FAILURE (PARALLEL REGULATOR
OR PARALLEL HE ISOLATION VALVE) WILL CAUSE LOSS OF HELIUM
PRESSURIZATION CAPABILITY. LOSS OF HELIUM PRESSURIZATION WILL
AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS, AND MAY CAUSE THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES
TO BE EXCEEDED DURING ENTRY OR ABORTS DUE TO THE TRAPPED
PROPELLANT'S WEIGHT.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.6;
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01 (42BN & 42BT); FLIGHT RULE 6-41 A, B.
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-14
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 113 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM: HE PRESS REGULATOR ASSEMBLY
FAILURE MODE: RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE PRESS REGULATOR ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FRCS POD
FU & OX:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, BLOCKAGE OF INLET FILTER
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY PARALLEL REGULATOR. RESTRICTED FLOW
THROUGH REGULATORS MAY CAUSE UNACCEPTABLE PROPELLANT MIXTURE
RATIOS, WHICH MAY RESULT IN ZOTS.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.6;
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01 (42BN & 42BT).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-15
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 114 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM: HE PRESS REGULATOR ASSEMBLY
FAILURE MODE: LEAKS EXTERNALLY
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
S)
ASSEMBLIES
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE PRESS REGULATOR ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2 R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/ 1R ATO: 2/ IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: FUEL/OXIDIZER MANIFOLD DRAIN, PURGE AND CHECKOUT
PANEL
PART NUMBER: FU & OX:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY HELIUM ISOLATION VALVE AND PARALLEL
REGULATOR. CREW ACTION TO CLOSE ISOLATION VALVE TO LEAKING
REGULATOR AND OPEN REDUNDANT PATH WILL PREVENT TOTAL HELIUM LOSS.
LOSS OF HELIUM PRESSURIZATION WILL AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS, AND
MAY CAUSE THE CG TO EXCEED SAFETY BOUNDARIES DURING ENTRY OR
ABORTS DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT'S WEIGHT. THERE ARE NO
VALVES OR CAPS IN THE SENSING PORT LINES.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.6;
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01 (42BN & 42BT); FLIGHT RULE 6-41 A, B.
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-16
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 115 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HE PRESS REGULATOR PRIMARY SENSING PORT
LEAKS EXTERNALLY
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE PRESS REGULATOR PRIMARY SENSING PORT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PANEL
PART NUMBER:
FUEL/OXIDIZER MANIFOLD DRAIN, PURGE AND CHECKOUT
FU & OX:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY PARALLEL HELIUM PATH AND MANUAL OPERATION
OF THE HELIUM ISOLATION VALVE. NEXT ASSOCIATED FAILURE WILL
RESULT IN LOSS OF HELIUM PRESSURIZATION CAUSING THE INABILITY TO
EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS DURING ENTRY OR ABORTS TO MEET THE
CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT'S WEIGHT.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.6;
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01 (42BN & 42BT); FLIGHT RULE 6-50.
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-17
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 116 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HE PRESS REGULATOR PRIMARY SENSING PORT
FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED)
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE PRESS REGULATOR PRIMARY SENSING PORT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/ IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/ 1R ATO: 2 / IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PANEL
PART NUMBER:
FUEL/OXIDIZER MANIFOLD DRAIN, PURGE AND CHECKOUT
FU & OX:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY PARALLEL REGULATOR. FAILURE WILL CAUSE
REGULATOR TO REGULATE AT A HIGHER PRESSURE WHICH MAY CAUSE AN
UNACCEPTABLE MIXTURE RATIO, RESULTING IN ZOTS. ZOTS MAY CAUSE
THRUSTER VALVE DAMAGE LEADING TO PROPELLANT IGNITION WITHIN THE
POD AND/OR NOZZLE BURNTHROUGH.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.6;
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01 (42BN & 42BT); FLIGHT RULE 6-50.
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-18
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 117 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HE PRESS REGULATOR OUTLET TEST PORT COUPLING
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN), OR LEAKS
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE PRESS REGULATOR OUTLET TEST PORT COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS : 2/1R
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2 R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PANEL
PART NUMBER:
FUEL/OXIDIZER MANIFOLD DRAIN, PURGE AND CHECKOUT
FU & OX:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE (COUPLING OR CAP) WILL BE UNDETECTABLE. NEXT
ASSOCIATED FAILURE WILL CAUSE LOSS OF HELIUM PRESSURIZATION.
LOSS OF HELIUM PRESSURIZATION WILL AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS, AND
MAY CAUSE THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES TO BE EXCEEDED DUE TO THE
TRAPPED PROPELLANT'S WEIGHT.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.6;
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01 (42BN & 42BT); FLIGHT RULE 6-41 B, H, I,
6-50, 6-95.
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-19
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 118 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: HE PRESS REGULATOR OUTLET TEST PORT COUPLING
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED)
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE PRESS REGULATOR OUTLET TEST PORT COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: FUEL/OXIDIZER MANIFOLD DRAIN, PURGE AND CHECKOUT
PANEL
PART NUMBER: FU & OX:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.6;
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01 (42BN & 42BT); FLIGHT RULE 6-50.
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-20
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 119 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FLOW)
QUAD CHECK VALVE ASSEMBLY
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN) OR LEAKS (REVERSE
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
QUAD CHECK VALVE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FRCS POD
FU & OX:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NEXT ASSOCIATED FAILURE (VALVE IN SERIES WITH FAILED VALVE FAILS
OPEN) WILL ALLOW PROPELLANT TO BACKFLOW INTO THE HELIUM
PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM. THIS CAN CAUSE LOSS OF LIFE DURING GROUND
SERVICING DUE TO INHALATION OF PROPELLANT VAPORS. CORROSION OF
HELIUM REGULATORS AND/OR HELIUM ISOLATION VALVES BY PROPELLANT
WHICH HAS BACKFLOWED MAY CAUSE LOSS OF HELIUM PRESSURIZATION
CAPABILITY.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.6;
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01 (42BN & 42BT).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-21
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 120 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
QUAD CHECK VALVE ASSEMBLY
FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED)
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
QUAD CHECK VALVE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FRCS POD
FU & OX:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, LOW TEMPERATURE FREEZES
PROPELLANT INSIDE VALVE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NEXT ASSOCIATED FAILURE (PARALLEL VALVE FAILS CLOSED) WILL CAUSE
LOSS OF HELIUM PRESSURIZATION. LOSS OF HELIUM PRESSURIZATION
CAPABILITY WILL AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS, AND MAY CAUSE THE CG
SAFETY BOUNDARIES TO BE EXCEEDED DURING ENTRY OR ABORTS DUE TO
THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT'S WEIGHT.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.6;
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01 (42BN & 42BT); FLIGHT RULE 6-41 C, D.
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-22
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 121 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
QUAD CHECK VALVE TEST PORT COUPLINGS A & B
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN), OR LEAKS
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
QUAD CHECK VALVE TEST PORT COUPLINGS A & B
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/ IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PANEL
PART NUMBER:
FUEL/OXIDIZER MANIFOLD DRAIN, PURGE AND CHECKOUT
FU & OX:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE (COUPLING OR COUPLING CAP) CANNOT BE DETECTED.
NEXT ASSOCIATED FAILURE WILL CAUSE LOSS OF HELIUM UNTIL CREW
CLOSES HELIUM ISOLATION VALVES. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL
CAUSE LOSS OF HELIUM PRESSURIZATION, WILL AFFECT ONORBIT
OPERATIONS, AND MAY CAUSE THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES TO BE EXCEEDED
DURING ENTRY OR ABORTS DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT'S WEIGHT.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.6;
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01 (42BN & 42BT).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-23
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 122 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
QUAD CHECK VALVE TEST PORT COUPLINGS A & B
FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED)
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
QUAD CHECK VALVE TEST PORT COUPLINGS A & B
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: FUEL/OXIDIZER MANIFOLD DRAIN, PURGE AND CHECKOUT
PANEL
PART NUMBER: FU & OX:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.6;
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01 (42BN & 42BT).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-24
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 123 ABORT:
ITEM: PROPELLANT TANK
FAILURE MODE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE OR LEAK)
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
v)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROPELLANT TANK
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: i/1 RTLS:
LI FTOFF: I/1 TAL:
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA:
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: i/i
HDW/FUNC
i/i
i/i
1/l
i/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FRCS POD
FU & OX:
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, HIGH PRESSURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE RESULTS IN PROPELLANT LEAKING INTO THE POD/VEHICLE.
OF PROPELLANT INTO THE POD CAN CAUSE CORROSION, LEADING TO
ELECTRICAL SHORTS AND PROPELLANT IGNITION.
HDW/FUNC
i/i
I/i
LOSS
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.6;
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01 (42BN & 42BT).
REPORT DATE o3/18/8v c-25 C
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 124 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/l
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PROP LINES, ALL
STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE OR LEAK)
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROP LINES, ALL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: i/1 RTLS: I/1
LIFTOFF: i/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] BC ] cC ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ANY LINE BETWEEN PROPELLANT TANK AND THRUSTERS.
FU & OX:
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, HIGH PRESSURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PRESSURE IN TANK AND LINE WILL FORCE PROPELLANT OUT OF LINE INTO
POD/VEHICLE. LOSS OF PROPELLANT CAN CAUSE CORROSION, LEADING TO
ELECTRICAL SHORTS AND PROPELLANT IGNITION.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.6;
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01 (42BN & 42BT).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-26
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 125 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PROP LINES, ALL
RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROP LINES, ALL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF: 1/1 TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: I/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ANY LINE BETWEEN PROPELLANT TANK AND THRUSTERS.
FU & OX:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE MAY CAUSE UNACCEPTABLE PROPELLANT MIXTURE RATIO,
RESULTING IN ZOTS AND/OR THRUSTER NOZZLE BURNTHROUGH AND LOSS OF
VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.6;
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01 (42BN & 42BT).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-27
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 2/IR
126 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PROP FILL VENT REGULATOR CHECKOUT COUPLING
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN), OR LEAKS EXTERNALLY
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROP FILL VENT REGULATOR CHECKOUT COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS: 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/ IR ATO: 2/ IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: FUEL/OXIDIZER MANIFOLD DRAIN, PURGE AND CHECKOUT
PANEL
PART NUMBER: FU & OX:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE (COUPLING OR COUPLING CAP) CANNOT BE DETECTED.
NEXT ASSOCIATED FAILURE WILL RESULT IN PROPELLANT LEAKING
OVERBOARD WHICH COULD IGNITE DURING ASCENT, ENTRY, OR ABORTS,
RESULTING IN LOSS OF VEHICLE. DURING ONORBIT, LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE FOLLOWING EVA
OPERATIONS IF EVA SUITS ARE CONTAMINATED BY LEAKING PROPELLANT.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.6;
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01 (42BN & 42BT); FLIGHT RULE 6-41 A, B.
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-28
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 127 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PROP FILL VENT REGULATOR CHECKOUT COUPLING
FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED)
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROP FILL VENT REGULATOR CHECKOUT COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: FUEL/OXIDIZER MANIFOLD DRAIN, PURGE AND CHECKOUT
PANEL
PART NUMBER: FU & OX:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.6;
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01 (42BN & 42BT).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-29
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 128 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
i/i
ITEM: PROP CHANNEL SCREENS
FAILURE MODE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE)
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROP CHANNEL SCREENS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : i/1
LI FTOFF: I/1 TAL: i/i
ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: PROPELLANT TANK INTERIOR
PART NUMBER: FU & OX:
CAUSES: HIGH PRESSURE, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
HELIUM INGESTION WILL CAUSE ZOTS AND/OR THRUSTER NOZZLE
BURNTHROUGH. FAILURE IS NOT DETECTABLE UNTIL THRUSTERS FAIL DUE
TO HELIUM INGESTION OR ZOTS.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.6;
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01 (42BN & 42BT); RCS 2102, FIG. 3.1.
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-30
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 129 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
i/i
ITEM: PROP FEEDOUT TUBE
FAILURE MODE: RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROP FEEDOUT TUBE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 1/1
ONORBIT: 1/1
DEORBIT: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS : 1/1
TAL: 1/1
AOA: 1/1
ATO: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: PROPELLANT TANK INTERIOR
PART NUMBER: FU & OX:
] c C ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VACUUM, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE MAY CAUSE UNACCEPTABLE PROPELLANT MIXTURE RATIO,
RESULTING IN ZOTS AND/OR THRUSTER NOZZLE BURNTHROUGH AND LOSS OF
VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.6;
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01 (42BN & 42BT); FLIGHT RULE 6-41 F
APPLIES; RCS 2102, FIG. 3.1.
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-31
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 2/IR
130 ABORT: 2/1R
ITEM:
COUPLING
FAILURE MODE:
PROP TK UPPER COMPARTMENT CHANNEL CHECKOUT
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN), OR LEAKS EXTERNALLY
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
1) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROP TK UPPER COMPARTMENT CHANNEL CHECKOUT COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FRCS FRONT TRUNNION
FU & OX:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE (COUPLING OR COUPLING CAP) CANNOT BE DETECTED.
NEXT ASSOCIATED FAILURE WILL RESULT IN PROPELLANT LEAKING
OVERBOARD WHICH COULD IGNITE DURING ASCENT, ENTRY, OR ABORTS,
RESULTING IN LOSS OF VEHICLE. DURING ONORBIT, LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE FOLLOWING EVA
OPERATIONS IF EVA SUITS ARE CONTAMINATED BY LEAKING PROPELLANT.
INHALATION OF PROPELLANT VAPORS ON THE GROUND CAN CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.6;
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01 (42BN & 42BT); FLIGHT RULE 6-41 E.
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-32
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
131 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
COUPLING
FAILURE MODE:
PROP TK UPPER COMPARTMENT CHANNEL CHECKOUT
FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED)
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROP TK UPPER COMPARTMENT CHANNEL CHECKOUT COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ON ORBIT: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: FRCS FRONT TRUNNION
PART NUMBER: FU & OX:
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.6;
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01 (42BN & 42BT).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-33
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 2/IR
132 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PROP TK LOWER COMPARTMENT CHANNEL BLEED COUPLING
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN), OR LEAKS EXTERNALLY
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROP TK LOWER COMPARTMENT CHANNEL BLEED COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: HELIUM/FUEL/OXIDIZER SERVICING PANEL
PART NUMBER: FU & OX:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE (COUPLING OR COUPLING CAP) CANNOT BE DETECTED.
NEXT ASSOCIATED FAILURE WILL RESULT IN PROPELLANT LEAKING
OVERBOARD WHICH COULD IGNITE DURING ASCENT, ENTRY, OR ABORTS,
RESULTING IN LOSS OF VEHICLE. DURING ONORBIT, LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE FOLLOWING EVA
OPERATIONS IF EVA SUITS ARE CONTAMINATED BY LEAKING PROPELLANT.
INHALATION OF PROPELLANT VAPORS ON THE GROUND CAN CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.6;
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01 (42BN & 42BT); FLIGHT RULE 6-41 E.
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-34
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 3/3
133 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PROP TK LOWER COMPARTMENT CHANNEL BLEED COUPLING
FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED)
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROP TK LOWER COMPARTMENT CHANNEL BLEED COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: HELIUM/FUEL/OXIDIZER SERVICING PANEL
PART NUMBER: FU & OX:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.6;
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01 (42BN & 42BT).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-35
INDEPENDENT ORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 2/IR
134 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PROP TK LOWER COMPARTMENT BULKHEAD BLEED COUPLING
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN), OR LEAKS EXTERNALLY
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROP TK LOWER COMPARTMENT BULKHEAD BLEED COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS : 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/ IR AOA: 2/ IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: HELIUM/FUEL/OXIDIZER SERVICING PANEL
PART NUMBER: FU & OX:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE (COUPLING OR COUPLING CAP) CANNOT BE DETECTED.
NEXT ASSOCIATED FAILURE WILL RESULT IN PROPELLANT LEAKING
OVERBOARD WHICH COULD IGNITE DURING ASCENT, ENTRY, OR ABORTS,
RESULTING IN LOSS OF VEHICLE. DURING ONORBIT, LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE FOLLOWING EVA
OPERATIONS IF EVA SUITS ARE CONTAMINATED BY LEAKING PROPELLANT.
INHALATION OF PROPELLANT VAPORS ON THE GROUND CAN CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.6;
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01 (42BN & 42BT); FLIGHT RULE 6-41 E.
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-36
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 3/3
135 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PROP TK LOWER COMPARTMENT BULKHEAD BLEED COUPLING
FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED)
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROP TK LOWER COMPARTMENT BULKHEAD BLEED COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: HELIUM/FUEL/OXIDIZER SERVICING PANEL
PART NUMBER: FU & OX:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.6;
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01 (42BN & 42BT).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-37
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 2/IR
136 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PROP TK VENT AND REGULATOR CHECKOUT COUPLING
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN), OR LEAKS EXTERNALLY
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROP TK VENT AND REGULATOR CHECKOUT COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRE LAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS:
LI FTOFF: 2/IR TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] c[P]
LOCATION: HELIUM/FUEL/OXIDIZER SERVICING PANEL
PART NUMBER: FU & OX:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE (COUPLING OR COUPLING CAP) CANNOT BE DETECTED.
NEXT ASSOCIATED FAILURE WILL RESULT IN PROPELLANT LEAKING
OVERBOARD WHICH COULD IGNITE DURING ASCENT, ENTRY, OR ABORTS,
RESULTING IN LOSS OF VEHICLE. DURING ONORBIT, LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE FOLLOWING EVA
OPERATIONS IF EVA SUITS ARE CONTAMINATED BY LEAKING PROPELLANT.
INHALATION OF PROPELLANT VAPORS ON THE GROUND CAN CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.6;
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01 (42BN & 42BT); FLIGHT RULE 6-41 E.
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-38
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 137 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PROP TK VENT AND REGULATOR CHECKOUT COUPLING
FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED)
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROP TK VENT AND REGULATOR CHECKOUT COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [
LOCATION: HELIUM/FUEL/OXIDIZER SERVICING PANEL
PART NUMBER: FU & OX:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.6;
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01 (42BN & 42BT).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-39
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 138 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
i/1
ITEM: GIMBAL BELLOWS
FAILURE MODE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE OR LEAK)
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
GIMBAL BELLOWS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: i/1 RTLS:
LI FTOFF: i/1 TAL:
ONORBI T: i/1 AOA:
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: i/I
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
1/1
1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
LOCATION: DOWNSTREAM OF PROPELLANT TANK
PART NUMBER: FU & OX: 73P550015-I006
c [ ]
CAUSES: HIGH PRESSURE, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ASSUME THIS IS A SINGLE BARRIER FAILURE, THAT IS, NO INTERNAL
LEAK PATH REDUNDANCY EXISTS. FAILURE RESULTS IN PROPELLANT
LEAKING INTO THE POD/VEHICLE. LOSS OF PROPELLANT CAN CAUSE
CORROSION, LEADING TO ELECTRICAL SHORTS AND PROPELLANT IGNITION.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.6;
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01 (42BN & 42BT).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-40
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 139 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GIMBAL BELLOWS
RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
GIMBAL BELLOWS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LI FTOFF: 1/1 TAL:
ONORBI T: 1/1 AOA:
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
1/1
1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
LOCATION: DOWNSTREAM OF PROPELLANT TANK
PART NUMBER: FU & OX: 73P550015-I006
c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VACUUM, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE MAY CAUSE UNACCEPTABLE PROPELLANT MIXTURE RATIO,
RESULTING IN ZOTS AND/OR THRUSTER NOZZLE BURNTHROUGH AND LOSS OF
VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.6;
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01 (42BN & 42BT); FLIGHT RULE 6-41 F.
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-41
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 140 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PRESSURE RELIEF ASSEMBLY
BURST DISK RUPTURES AT LOW PRESSURE, OR LEAKS
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
1) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PRESSURE RELIEF ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/ IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FRCS POD
FU & OX:
CAUSES: MATERIAL FLAW, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE (BURST DISK RUPTURE) CANNOT BE DETECTED. NEXT
ASSOCIATED FAILURE (PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE) WILL RESULT IN
PROPELLANT LEAKING OVERBOARD WHICH COULD IGNITE DURING ASCENT,
ENTRY, OR ABORTS, RESULTING IN LOSS OF VEHICLE. DURING ONORBIT,
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE FOLLOWING
EVA OPERATIONS IF EVA SUITS ARE CONTAMINATED BY LEAKING
PROPELLANT.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.6;
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01 (42BN & 42BT); FLIGHT RULE 6-41 A, B.
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-42
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT: I/i
MDAC ID: 141 ABORT: 1/1
ITEM: PRESSURE RELIEF ASSEMBLY
FAILURE MODE: BURST DISK FAILS TO RUPTURE, RUPTURES AT A HIGHER
THAN NOMINAL PRESSURE, OR POPPET VALVE FAILS CLOSED AFTER BURST
DISK RUPTURES AT NOMINAL PRESSURE.
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PRESSURE RELIEF ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 1/1 RTLS: I/1
LIFTOFF: 1/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [
LOCATION: FRCS POD
PART NUMBER: FU & OX:
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: MATERIAL FLAW, CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OVERPRESSURIZATION OF PROPELLANT TANK AND LINES WILL CAUSE TANK
AND/OR LINE RUPTURE. LOSS OF PROPELLANT INTO THE POD CAN CAUSE
CORROSION, LEADING TO ELECTRICAL SHORTS AND PROPELLANT IGNITION.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.6;
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01 (42BN & 42BT).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-43
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 142 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM: RELIEF VALVE TEST PORT COUPLING
FAILURE MODE: PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE TEST PORT FAILS TO CLOSE
(FAILS OPEN) OR LEAKS OVERBOARD
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
RELIEF VALVE TEST PORT COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PANEL
PART NUMBER:
FUEL/OXIDIZER MANIFOLD DRAIN, PURGE AND CHECKOUT
FU & OX:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE (BURST DISC RUPTURE) CANNOT BE DETECTED. FAILURE
OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN PROPELLANT LEAKING OVERBOARD
WHICH COULD IGNITE DURING ASCENT, ENTRY, OR ABORTS, RESULTING IN
LOSS OF VEHICLE. DURING ONORBIT, LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL
CAUSE LOSS OF LIFE FOLLOWING EVA OPERATIONS IF EVA SUITS ARE
CONTAMINATED BY LEAKING PROPELLANT.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.6;
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01 (42BN & 42BT); FLIGHT RULE 6-41 A, B.
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-44
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
143 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
(FAILS CLOSED)
RELIEF VALVE TEST PORT COUPLING
PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE TEST PORT FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
RELIEF VALVE TEST PORT COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PANEL
PART NUMBER:
FUEL/OXIDIZER MANIFOLD DRAIN, PURGE AND CHECKOUT
FU & OX:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.6;
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01 (42BN & 42BT).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-45
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 3/3
144 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GROUND MANUAL ISOLATION VALVE
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN), OR LEAKS INTERNALLY
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
GROUND MANUAL ISOLATION VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PANEL
PART NUMBER:
FUEL/OXIDIZER MANIFOLD DRAIN, PURGE AND CHECKOUT
FU & OX:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
MECHANICAL SHOCK (GROUND HANDLING)
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.6;
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01 (42BN & 42BT).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-46
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 145 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
I/i
1/l
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GROUND MANUAL ISOLATION VALVE
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN (FAILS CLOSED)
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
s)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
GROUND MANUAL ISOLATION VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/1
LI FTO F F: 3/ 3 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: FUEL/OXIDIZER MANIFOLD DRAIN, PURGE AND CHECKOUT
PANEL
PART NUMBER: FU & OX:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
MECHANICAL SHOCK (GROUND HANDLING)
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF HELIUM PRESSURIZATION (VALVE IS
UPSTREAM OF PROPELLANT TANKS). LOSS OF HELIUM PRESSURIZATION
WILL AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS, AND MAY CAUSE THE CG SAFETY
BOUNDARIES TO BE EXCEEDED DURING ENTRY OR ABORTS DUE TO THE
TRAPPED PROPELLANTIS WEIGHT.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.6;
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01 (42BN & 42BT); FLIGHT RULE 6-41 C, D.
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-47
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
146 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/l
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GROUND MANUAL ISOLATION VALVE
LEAKS EXTERNALLY
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
GROUND MANUAL ISOLATION VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: i/1 RTLS: 1/1
LI FTOFF: i/1 TAL: I/1
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: 1/1
DEORBI T: 1/1 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PANEL
PART NUMBER:
FUEL/OXIDIZER MANIFOLD DRAIN, PURGE AND CHECKOUT
FU & OX:
CAUSES: VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL
SHOCK (GROUND HANDLING)
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF PROPELLANT AND HELIUM. PROPELLANT
WILL LEAK INTO THE POD CAUSING CORROSION, LEADING TO ELECTRICAL
SHORTS AND PROPELLANT IGNITION. INHALATION OF PROPELLANT VAPORS
ON THE GROUND CAN CAUSE LOSS OF LIFE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.6;
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01 (42BN & 42BT).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-48
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 147 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
1/i
ITEM: PROP TK ISOL VLVS 1/2 & 3/4/5
FAILURE MODE: LEAKS EXTERNALLY
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROP TK ISOL VLVS 1/2 OR 3/4/5
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: i/1 RTLS: I/1
LIFTOFF: i/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: I/1 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: i/i
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
VALVES
PART NUMBER:
BETWEEN PROPELLANT TANK AND MANIFOLD ISOLATION
FU & OX:
CAUSES: VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE RESULTS IN PROPELLANT LEAKING INTO POD/VEHICLE CAUSING
CORROSION, WHICH CAN RESULT IN ELECTRICAL SHORTS AND PROPELLANT
IGNITION.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.6;
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01 (43DC).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-49
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 148 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PROP TK ISOL VLVS 1/2 & 3/4/5
RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROP TK ISOL VLVS 1/2 OR 3/4/5
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF: I/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: I/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: BETWEEN PROPELLANT TANK AND MANIFOLD ISOLATION
VALVES
PART NUMBER: FU & OX:
CAUSES: VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE MAY CAUSE UNACCEPTABLE PROPELLANT MIXTURE RATIO,
RESULTING IN ZOTS AND/OR THRUSTER NOZZLE BURNTHROUGH AND LOSS OF
VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.6;
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01 (43DC).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-50
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 3/3
149 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PROP TK ISOL VLV 1/2
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN), OR LEAKS INTERNALLY
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROP TK ISOL VLV 1/2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
VALVES
PART NUMBER:
BETWEEN PROPELLANT TANK AND MANIFOLD ISOLATION
FU & OX:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
LOSS OF SIGNAL FROM MDM
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.6;
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01 (42BN & 42BT).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-51
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 150 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PROP TK ISOL VLV 1/2
FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED)
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROP TK ISOL VLV 1/2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : I/1
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBI T: 3/ 2R AOA: 2/ IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
VALVES
PART NUMBER:
BETWEEN PROPELLANT TANK AND MANIFOLD ISOLATION
FU & OX:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
LOSS OF SIGNAL FROM MDM
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY IN ALL PHASES EXCEPT RTLS IS PROVIDED BY THE 3/4/5
TANK ISOLATION VALVE. FIRST FAILURE WILL CAUSE LOSS OF EIGHT
PRIMARY JETS WHICH WILL AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS, AND MAY CAUSE
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANT DURING RTLS TO MEET THE CG
SAFETY BOUNDARIES. SIMILARLY, FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY (3/4/5
VALVE) WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE DURING ENTRY AND ALL OTHER
ABORTS.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.6;
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01 (42BN & 42BT).
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-52
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 3/3
151 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PROP TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN), OR LEAKS INTERNALLY
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROP TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
VALVES
PART NUMBER:
BETWEEN PROPELLANT TANK AND MANIFOLD ISOLATION
FU & OX:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
LOSS OF SIGNAL FROM MDM
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.6;
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01 (42BN & 42BT).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-53
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 152 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PROP TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED)
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
1/1
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROP TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: BETWEEN PROPELLANT TANK AND MANIFOLD ISOLATION
VALVES
PART NUMBER: FU & OX:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
LOSS OF SIGNAL FROM MDM
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY IN ALL PHASES EXCEPT RTLS IS PROVIDED BY THE 1/2 TANK
ISOLATION VALVE. FIRST FAILURE WILL CAUSE LOSS OF SIX PRIMARY
JETS WHICH WILL AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS, AND MAY CAUSE
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANT DURING RTLS TO MEET THE CG
SAFETY BOUNDARIES. SIMILARLY, FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY (1/2
VALVE) WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE DURING ENTRY AND ALL OTHER
ABORTS.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.6;
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01 (42BN & 42BT).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-54
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 2/IR
153 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 1/2 FILL & DRAIN/PURGE COUPLING
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN), OR LEAKS EXTERNALLY
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 1/2 FILL & DRAIN/PURGE COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS : 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PANEL
PART NUMBER:
FUEL/OXIDIZER MANIFOLD DRAIN, PURGE AND CHECKOUT
FU & OX:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE (COUPLING OR COUPLING CAP) CANNOT BE DETECTED.
NEXT ASSOCIATED FAILURE WILL RESULT IN PROPELLANT LEAKING
OVERBOARD WHICH COULD IGNITE DURING ASCENT, ENTRY, OR ABORTS,
RESULTING IN LOSS OF VEHICLE. DURING ONORBIT, LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE FOLLOWING EVA
OPERATIONS IF EVA SUITS ARE CONTAMINATED BY LEAKING PROPELLANT.
INHALATION OF PROPELLANT VAPORS ON THE GROUND CAN CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.6;
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01 (42BN & 42BT); FLIGHT RULE 6-41 E.
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-55
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 154 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 1/2 FILL & DRAIN/PURGE COUPLING
FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED)
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 1/2 FILL & DRAIN/PURGE COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] c[ ]
LOCAT ION:
PANEL
PART NUMBER:
FUEL/OXIDIZER MANIFOLD DRAIN, PURGE AND CHECKOUT
FU & OX:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.6;
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01 (42BN & 42BT).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-56
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 2/1R
155 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 3/4/5 FILL & DRAIN/PURGE COUPLING
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN), OR LEAKS EXTERNALLY
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3/4/5 FILL & DRAIN/PURGE COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS:
LI FTOFF: 2/IR TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C[P]
LOCATION: HELIUM/FUEL/OXIDIZER SERVICING PANEL
PART NUMBER: FU & OX:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE (COUPLING OR COUPLING CAP) CANNOT BE DETECTED.
NEXT ASSOCIATED FAILURE WILL RESULT IN PROPELLANT LEAKING
OVERBOARD WHICH COULD IGNITE DURING ASCENT, ENTRY, OR ABORTS,
RESULTING IN LOSS OF VEHICLE. DURING ONORBIT, LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE FOLLOWING EVA
OPERATIONS IF EVA SUITS ARE CONTAMINATED BY LEAKING PROPELLANT.
INHALATION OF PROPELLANT VAPORS ON THE GROUND CAN CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.6;
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01 (42BN & 42BT); FLIGHT RULE 6-41 E.
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-57
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
156 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 3/4/5 FILL & DRAIN/PURGE COUPLING
FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED)
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
S)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3/4/5 FILL & DRAIN/PURGE COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [
LOCATION: HELIUM/FUEL/OXIDIZER SERVICING PANEL
PART NUMBER: FU & OX:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.6;
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01 (42BN & 42BT).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-58
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 3/3
157 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD i, ISOL VLV
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN), OR LEAKS INTERNALLY
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
_)
7)
S)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, ISOL VLV
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
BETWEEN TANK ISOLATION VALVES AND THRUSTERS
FU & OX:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
LOSS OF SIGNAL FROM MDM
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.6;
VS70-942099 REV D EO DO1 (42BN & 42BT).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-59
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 158 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD i, ISOL VLV
FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED)
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, ISOL VLV
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/1
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: BETWEEN TANK ISOLATION VALVES AND THRUSTERS
PART NUMBER: FU & OX:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
LOSS OF SIGNAL FROM MDM
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY IN ALL PHASES EXCEPT RTLS FOR THIS FUNCTION IS
PROVIDED BY THRUSTERS WHICH FIRE IN THE SAME DIRECTION ON OTHER
MANIFOLDS. NEXT ASSOCIATED FAILURE MAY RESULT IN INABILITY TO
COMPLETE FRCS DUMP, LEADING TO POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF THE CG
SAFETY BOUNDARY. DURING RTLS, JETS ON OTHER MANIFOLDS FIRING IN
THE SAME DIRECTION AS THOSE ON THIS MANIFOLD ARE NOT CONSIDERED
TO BE REDUNDANT, SINCE LOSS OF THE FOUR PRIMARY JETS ON THIS
MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT PROPELLANT DUMP LENGTHS DURING ABORTS AND
ENTRY, AND MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS
DURING RTLS ABORTS TO MEET THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01 (42BN & 42BT); RCS SFOM, FIG. 3-4.
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-60
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 159 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM: MANIFOLD i, GROUND PURGE/DRAIN COUPLING
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN), OR LEAKS EXTERNALLY
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, GROUND PURGE/DRAIN COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: FUEL/OXIDIZER MANIFOLD DRAIN, PURGE AND CHECKOUT
PANEL
PART NUMBER: FU & OX:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE (COUPLING OR COUPLING CAP) CANNOT BE DETECTED.
NEXT ASSOCIATED FAILURE WILL RESULT IN PROPELLANT LEAKING
OVERBOARD WHICH COULD IGNITE DURING ASCENT, ENTRY, OR ABORTS,
RESULTING IN LOSS OF VEHICLE. DURING ONORBIT, LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE LOSS OF THE MANIFOLD AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF
LIFE FOLLOWING EVA OPERATIONS IF EVA SUITS ARE CONTAMINATED BY
LEAKING PROPELLANT. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE THE
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANT DURING RTLS TO MEET THE CG
SAFETY BOUNDARIES. INHALATION OF PROPELLANT VAPORS ON THE GROUND
CAN CAUSE LOSS OF LIFE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.6;
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01 (42BN & 42BT).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-61
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 160 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: MANIFOLD I, GROUND PURGE/DRAIN COUPLING
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED)
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, GROUND PURGE/DRAIN COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: FUEL/OXIDIZER MANIFOLD DRAIN, PURGE AND CHECKOUT
PANEL
PART NUMBER: FU & OX:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.6;
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01 (42BN & 42BT).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-62
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 3/3
161 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 2, ISOL VLV
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN), OR LEAKS INTERNALLY
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
S)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, ISOL VLV
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBI T: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
BETWEEN TANK ISOLATION VALVES AND THRUSTERS
FU & OX:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
LOSS OF SIGNAL FROM MDM
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.6;
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01 (42BN & 42BT).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-63
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 162 ABORT:
HDWIFUNC
211R
i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 2, ISOL VLV
FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED)
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
_)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, ISOL VLV
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: I/1
LI FTOFF: 3/ 3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
BETWEEN TANK ISOLATION VALVES AND THRUSTERS
FU & OX:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
LOSS OF SIGNAL FROM MDM
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
REDUNDANCY IN ALL PHASES EXCEPT RTLS FOR THIS FUNCTION IS
PROVIDED BY THRUSTERS WHICH FIRE IN THE SAME DIRECTION ON OTHER
MANIFOLDS. NEXT ASSOCIATED FAILURE MAY RESULT IN INABILITY TO
COMPLETE FRCS DUMP, LEADING TO POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF THE CG
SAFETY BOUNDARY. DURING RTLS, JETS ON OTHER MANIFOLDS FIRING IN
THE SAME DIRECTION AS THOSE ON THIS MANIFOLD ARE NOT CONSIDERED
TO BE REDUNDANT, SINCE LOSS OF THE FOUR PRIMARY JETS ON THIS
MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT PROPELLANT DUMP LENGTHS DURING ABORTS AND
ENTRY, AND MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS
DURING RTLS ABORTS TO MEET THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01 (43DE); RCS SFOM, FIG. 3-4.
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-64
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 2/IR
163 ABORT: 2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 2, GROUND PURGE/DRAIN COUPLING
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN), OR LEAKS EXTERNALLY
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, GROUND PURGE/DRAIN COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/1R RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PANEL
PART NUMBER:
FUEL/OXIDIZER MANIFOLD DRAIN, PURGE AND CHECKOUT
FU & OX:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE (COUPLING OR COUPLING CAP) CANNOT BE DETECTED.
NEXT ASSOCIATED FAILURE WILL RESULT IN PROPELLANT LEAKING
OVERBOARD WHICH COULD IGNITE DURING ASCENT, ENTRY, OR ABORTS,
RESULTING IN LOSS OF VEHICLE. DURING ONORBIT, LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE LOSS OF THE MANIFOLD AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF
LIFE FOLLOWING EVA OPERATIONS IF EVA SUITS ARE CONTAMINATED BY
LEAKING PROPELLANT. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE THE
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANT DURING RTLS TO MEET THE CG
SAFETY BOUNDARIES. INHALATION OF PROPELLANT VAPORS ON THE GROUND
CAN CAUSE LOSS OF LIFE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.6;
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01 (42BN & 42BT).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-65
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 164 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 2, GROUND PURGE/DRAIN COUPLING
FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED)
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, GROUND PURGE/DRAIN COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: FUEL/OXIDIZER MANIFOLD DRAIN, PURGE AND CHECKOUT
PANEL
PART NUMBER: FU & OX:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.6;
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01 (42BN & 42BT).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-66
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 3/3
165 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAD ANALYST:
MANIFOLD 3, ISOL VLV
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN), OR LEAKS INTERNALLY
SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
e)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, ISOL VLV
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
BETWEEN TANK ISOLATION VALVES AND THRUSTERS
FU & OX:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
LOSS OF SIGNAL FROM MDM
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.6;
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01 (42BN & 42BT).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-67
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 166 ABORT:
HDWIFUNC
211R
1/1
ITEM: MANIFOLD 3, ISOL VLV
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED)
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, ISOL VLV
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: i/1
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: BETWEEN TANK ISOLATION VALVES AND THRUSTERS
PART NUMBER: FU & OX:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
LOSS OF SIGNAL FROM MDM
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY IN ALL PHASES EXCEPT RTLS FOR THIS FUNCTION IS
PROVIDED BY THRUSTERS WHICH FIRE IN THE SAME DIRECTION ON OTHER
MANIFOLDS. NEXT ASSOCIATED FAILURE MAY RESULT IN INABILITY TO
COMPLETE FRCS DUMP, LEADING TO POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF THE CG
SAFETY BOUNDARY. DURING RTLS, JETS ON OTHER MANIFOLDS FIRING IN
THE SAME DIRECTION AS THOSE ON THIS MANIFOLD ARE NOT CONSIDERED
TO BE REDUNDANT, SINCE LOSS OF THE FOUR PRIMARY JETS ON THIS
MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT PROPELLANT DUMP LENGTHS DURING ABORTS AND
ENTRY, AND MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS
DURING RTLS ABORTS TO MEET THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01 (43DE); RCS SFOM, FIG. 3-4.
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-68
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 2/IR
167 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 3, GROUND PURGE/DRAIN COUPLING
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN), OR LEAKS EXTERNALLY
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, GROUND PURGE/DRAIN COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 2/ IR RTLS: 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/ IR AOA: 2/ IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PANEL
PART NUMBER:
FUEL/OXIDIZER MANIFOLD DRAIN, PURGE AND CHECKOUT
FU & OX:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE (COUPLING OR COUPLING CAP) CANNOT BE DETECTED.
NEXT ASSOCIATED FAILURE WILL RESULT IN PROPELLANT LEAKING
OVERBOARD WHICH COULD IGNITE DURING ASCENT, ENTRY, OR ABORTS,
RESULTING IN LOSS OF VEHICLE. DURING ONORBIT, LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE LOSS OF THE MANIFOLD AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF
LIFE FOLLOWING EVA OPERATIONS IF EVA SUITS ARE CONTAMINATED BY
LEAKING PROPELLANT. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE THE
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANT DURING RTLS TO MEET THE CG
SAFETY BOUNDARIES. INHALATION OF PROPELLANT VAPORS ON THE GROUND
CAN CAUSE LOSS OF LIFE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.6;
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01 (42BN & 42BT).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-69
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 168 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: MANIFOLD 3, GROUND PURGE/DRAIN COUPLING
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED)
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, GROUND PURGE/DRAIN COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: FUEL/OXIDIZER MANIFOLD DRAIN, PURGE AND CHECKOUT
PANEL
PART NUMBER: FU & OX:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.6;
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01 (42BN & 42BT).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-70
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 169 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: MANIFOLD 4, ISOL VLV
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN), OR LEAKS INTERNALLY
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, ISOL VLV
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
BETWEEN TANK ISOLATION VALVES AND THRUSTERS
FU & OX:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
LOSS OF SIGNAL FROM MDM
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.6;
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01 (42BN & 42BT).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-71
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 170 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
i/I
ITEM: MANIFOLD 4, ISOL VLV
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED)
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, ISOL VLV
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2 R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: BETWEEN TANK ISOLATION VALVES AND THRUSTERS
PART NUMBER: FU & OX:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
LOSS OF SIGNAL FROM MDM
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY IN ALL PHASES EXCEPT RTLS FOR THIS FUNCTION IS
PROVIDED BY THRUSTERS WHICH FIRE IN THE SAME DIRECTION ON OTHER
MANIFOLDS. NEXT ASSOCIATED FAILURE MAY RESULT IN INABILITY TO
COMPLETE FRCS DUMP, LEADING TO POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF THE CG
SAFETY BOUNDARY. DURING RTLS, JETS ON OTHER MANIFOLDS FIRING IN
THE SAME DIRECTION AS THOSE ON THIS MANIFOLD ARE NOT CONSIDERED
TO BE REDUNDANT, SINCE LOSS OF THE FOUR PRIMARY JETS ON THIS
MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT PROPELLANT DUMP LENGTHS DURING ABORTS AND
ENTRY, AND MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS
DURING RTLS ABORTS TO MEET THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01 (43DE); RCS SFOM, FIG. 3-4.
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-72
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 171 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM: MANIFOLD 4, GROUND PURGE/DRAIN COUPLING
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN), OR LEAKS EXTERNALLY
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, GROUND PURGE/DRAIN COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PANEL
PART NUMBER:
FUEL/OXIDIZER MANIFOLD DRAIN, PURGE AND CHECKOUT
FU & OX:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE (COUPLING OR COUPLING CAP) CANNOT BE DETECTED.
NEXT ASSOCIATED FAILURE WILL RESULT IN PROPELLANT LEAKING
OVERBOARD WHICH COULD IGNITE DURING ASCENT, ENTRY, OR ABORTS,
RESULTING IN LOSS OF VEHICLE. DURING ONORBIT, LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE LOSS OF THE MANIFOLD AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF
LIFE FOLLOWING EVA OPERATIONS IF EVA SUITS ARE CONTAMINATED BY
LEAKING PROPELLANT. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE THE
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANT DURING RTLS TO MEET THE CG
SAFETY BOUNDARIES. INHALATION OF PROPELLANT VAPORS ON THE GROUND
CAN CAUSE LOSS OF LIFE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.6;
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01 (42BN & 42BT).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-73
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 172 ABORT:
HDWIFUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 4, GROUND PURGE/DRAIN COUPLING
FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED)
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, GROUND PURGE/DRAIN COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PIW.ELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: FUEL/OXIDIZER MANIFOLD DRAIN, PURGE AND CHECKOUT
PANEL
PART NUMBER: FU & OX:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.6;
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01 (42BN & 42BT).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-74
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 3/3
173 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 5, ISOL VLV
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN), OR LEAKS INTERNALLY
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, ISOL VLV
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/ 3 TAL: 3/ 3
ONORBI T: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
BETWEEN TANK ISOLATION VALVES AND THRUSTERS
FU & OX:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
LOSS OF SIGNAL FROM MDM
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.6;
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01 (42BN & 42BT).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-75
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 174 ABORT:
ITEM: MANIFOLD 5, ISOL VLV
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED)
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, ISOL VLV
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] BC ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
BETWEEN TANK ISOLATION VALVES AND THRUSTERS
FU & OX:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
LOSS OF SIGNAL FROM MDM
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF VRCS.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.6;
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01 (42BN & 42BT).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-76
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 2/IR
175 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 5, GROUND PURGE/DRAIN COUPLING
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN), OR LEAKS EXTERNALLY
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, GROUND PURGE/DRAIN COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/1R RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PANEL
PART NUMBER:
FUEL/OXIDIZER MANIFOLD DRAIN, PURGE AND CHECKOUT
FU & OX:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE (COUPLING OR COUPLING CAP) CANNOT BE DETECTED.
NEXT ASSOCIATED FAILURE WILL RESULT IN PROPELLANT LEAKING
OVERBOARD WHICH COULD IGNITE DURING ASCENT, ENTRY, OR ABORTS,
RESULTING IN LOSS OF VEHICLE. DURING ONORBIT, LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE LOSS OF THE MANIFOLD AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF
LIFE FOLLOWING EVA OPERATIONS IF EVA SUITS ARE CONTAMINATED BY
LEAKING PROPELLANT. INHALATION OF PROPELLANT VAPORS ON THE
GROUND CAN CAUSE LOSS OF LIFE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.6;
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01 (42BN & 42BT).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-77
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 176 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: MANIFOLD 5, GROUND PURGE/DRAIN COUPLING
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED)
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, GROUND PURGE/DRAIN COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORB IT: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/ 3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PANEL
PART NUMBER:
FUEL/OXIDIZER MANIFOLD DRAIN, PURGE AND CHECKOUT
FU & OX:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
VALVE NORMALLY CLOSED.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.6;
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01 (42BN & 42BT).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-78
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 177 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAD ANALYST:
MANIFOLD ISOL VLVS
LEAKS EXTERNALLY
SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD ISOL VLVS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: I/1 RTLS: I/1
LI FTOFF: i/1 TAL: I/1
ONORBIT: I/1 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: I/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: BETWEEN TANK ISOLATION VALVES AND THRUSTERS
PART NUMBER: FU & OX:
CAUSES: VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE RESULTS IN PROPELLANT LEAKING INTO POD/VEHICLEWHICH WILL
CAUSE CORROSION, RESULTING IN ELECTRICAL SHORTS AND PROPELLANT
IGNITION.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.6;
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01 (42BN & 42BT).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-79
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 178 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
I/I
i/i
ITEM: MANIFOLD ISOL VLVS
FAILURE MODE: RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD ISOL VLVS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : I/1
LIFTOFF: 1/1 TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: BETWEEN TANK ISOLATION VALVES AND THRUSTERS
PART NUMBER: FU & OX:
CAUSES: VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE MAY CAUSE UNACCEPTABLE PROPELLANT MIXTURE RATIO, CAUSING
ZOTS AND/OR NOZZLE BURNTHROUGH, RESULTING IN LOSS OF VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01 (43DE).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-80
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 179 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
ITEM: JET ALIGNMENT BELLOWS, PRIMARY, ALL AXES
FAILURE MODE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE OR LEAK)
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
JET ALIGNMENT BELLOWS, PRIMARY, ALL AXES
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: I/1 RTLS : i/1
LIFTOFF: i/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: I/1
DEORBI T: 1/1 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
VALVE
PART NUMBER:
FUEL/OXIDIZER LINES LEADING INTO JET BIPROPELLANT
FU & OX:
CAUSES: HIGH PRESSURE, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE CAUSES PROPELLANT TO LEAK INTO THE POD/VEHICLE.
LOSS OF PROPELLANT CAN CAUSE CORROSION, LEADING TO ELECTRICAL
SHORTS AND PROPELLANT IGNITION.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.6;
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01 (42BN & 42BT).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-81
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 180 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
I/i
I/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
JET ALIGNMENT BELLOWS, PRIMARY, ALL AXES
RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
JET ALIGNMENT BELLOWS, PRIMARY, ALL AXES
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: I/1
LI FTOFF: 1/1 TAL: 1/1
ONORB IT: i/1 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: FUEL/OXIDIZER LINES LEADING INTO JET BIPROPELLANT
VALVE
PART NUMBER: FU & OX:
CAUSES: VACUUM, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE MAY CAUSE UNACCEPTABLE PROPELLANT MIXTURE RATIO,
RESULTING IN ZOTS AND LOSS OF VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.6;
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01 (42BN).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-82
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: i/i
181 ABORT: I/I
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLV, PRIMARY, ALL AXES
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN/ON)
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLV, PRIMARY, ALL AXES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
i/1 RTLS: i/1
i/i TAL: i/i
i/1 AOA: i/1
i/i ATO: i/i
I/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: JET ASSEMBLY
PART NUMBER: FU & OX:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A FAILED-ON JET CAN CAUSE CONTACT WITH PAYLOADS DURING
RENDEZVOUS, RESULTING INLOSS OF VEHICLE AND/OR EVA CREW. RM
WILL NOT DESELECT JET; MUST BE SECURED BY CREW CLOSING ITS
MANIFOLD. INHALATION OF PROPELLANT VAPORS ON THE GROUND CAN
CAUSE LOSS OF LIFE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.6;
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01 (42BN & 42BT).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-83
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: i/i
182 ABORT: i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
THRUSTERBIPROP SOLENOIDVLV, PRIMARY, ALL AXES
LEAKS EXTERNALLY, ONE PROPELLANT
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLV, PRIMARY, ALL AXES
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 1/1 RTLS : I/1
LI FTOFF: 1/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: i/1
DEORBI T: 1/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: JET ASSEMBLY
PART NUMBER: FU & OX:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE RESULTS IN PROPELLANT LEAKING INTO POD/VEHICLE, CAUSING
CORROSION, RESULTING IN ELECTRICAL SHORTS AND PROPELLANT
IGNITION.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.6;
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01 (42BN & 42BT).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-84
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT: i/i
MDAC ID: 183 ABORT: 1/1
ITEM: THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLV, PRIMARY, ALL AXES
FAILURE MODE: RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3) THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLV, PRIMARY, ALL AXES
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 1/1
LIFTOFF: i/1 TAL: I/1
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: JET ASSEMBLY
PART NUMBER: FU & OX:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE MAY CAUSE UNACCEPTABLE PROPELLANT MIXTURE RATIO,
RESULTING IN ZOTS AND/OR THRUSTER NOZZLE BURNTHROUGH AND LOSS OF
VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.6;
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01 (42BN & 42BT).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-85
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 184 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLV, PRIMARY, -X AXIS
FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED)
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLV, PRIMARY, -X AXIS
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: JET ASSEMBLY
PART NUMBER: FU & OX:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, LOSS OF
SIGNAL FROM MDM, LOW TEMPERATURE FREEZES PROPELLANT IN VALVE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY FOR THIS FUNCTION IS PROVIDED BY THRUSTERS WHICH FIRE
IN THE SAME DIRECTION. RM WILL DESELECT JET. FAILURE CANNOT BE
DETECTED UNTIL JET TRIES TO FIRE. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY AFFECTS
ONORBIT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.6;
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01 (42BN & 42BT).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-86
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: I/i
185 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLV, PRIMARY, -XAXIS
LEAKS INTERNALLY, ONE PROPELLANT
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
e)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLV, PRIMARY, -X AXIS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 1/1 RTLS: 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: I/1 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: JET ASSEMBLY
PART NUMBER: FU & OX:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE RESULTS IN PROPELLANT LEAKING INTO COMBUSTION CHAMBER,
WHICH CAN FREEZE, RESULTING IN LOSS OF THE JET. INHALATION OF
PROPELLANT VAPORS ON THE GROUND CAN CAUSE LOSS OF LIFE.
LEAKAGE ONORBIT CAN CAUSE LOSS OF LIFE FOLLOWING EVA IF CREW IS
CONTAMINATED BY PROPELLANTS.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.6;
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01 (42BN & 42BT).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-87
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 186 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
1/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLV, PRIMARY, Y AXIS
FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED)
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLV, PRIMARY, Y AXIS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS : i/1
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: JET ASSEMBLY
PART NUMBER: FU & OX:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, LOSS OF
SIGNAL FROM MDM, LOW TEMPERATURE FREEZES PROPELLANT IN VALVE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY FOR THIS FUNCTION IS PROVIDED BY THRUSTERS WHICH FIRE
IN THE SAME DIRECTION. RM WILL DESELECT JET. FAILURE CANNOT BE
DETECTED UNTIL JET TRIES TO FIRE. NEXT ASSOCIATED FAILURE
ONORBIT MAY CAUSE CONTACT WITH PAYLOADS AND/OR EVA CREW
AND MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS DURING
ABORTS AND ENTRY TO MEET THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES. FAILURE
DURING RTLS MAY RESULT IN THE INABILITY TO COMPLETE A FRCS DUMP.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.6;
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01 (42BN & 42BT).
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-88
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 187 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
I/i
3/3
ITEM: THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLV, PRIMARY, Y AXIS
FAILURE MODE: LEAKS INTERNALLY, ONE PROPELLANT
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLV, PRIMARY, Y AXIS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: i/1 RTLS : 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: I/1 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: I/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: JET ASSEMBLY
PART NUMBER: FU & OX:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE RESULTS IN PROPELLANT LEAKING INTO COMBUSTION CHAMBER,
WHICH CAN FREEZE, RESULTING IN LOSS OF THE JET. FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE INABILITY TO DUMP ENOUGH PROPELLANTS DURING
ENTRY OR ABORTS TO MEET THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
LEAKAGE ONORBIT CAN CAUSE LOSS OF LIFE FOLLOWING EVA IF CREW IS
CONTAMINATED BY PROPELLANTS. INHALATION OF PROPELLANT VAPORS ON
THE GROUND CAN CAUSE LOSS OF LIFE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.6;
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01 (42BN & 42BT).
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-89
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 188 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM: THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLV, PRIMARY, Z AXIS
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED)
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLV, PRIMARY, Z AXIS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: JET ASSEMBLY
PART NUMBER: FU & OX:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, LOSS OF
SIGNAL FROM MDM, LOW TEMPERATURE FREEZES PROPELLANT IN VALVE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY FOR THIS FUNCTION IS PROVIDED BY THRUSTERS WHICH FIRE
IN THE SAME DIRECTION. RM WILL DESELECT JET. FAILURE CANNOT BE
DETECTED UNTIL JET TRIES TO FIRE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.6;
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01 (42BN & 42BT).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-90
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
189 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLV, PRIMARY, Z AXIS
LEAKS INTERNALLY, ONE PROPELLANT
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLV, PRIMARY, Z AXIS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: i/i RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: I/1 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: JET ASSEMBLY
PART NUMBER: FU & OX:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE RESULTS IN PROPELLANT LEAKING INTO COMBUSTION CHAMBER,
WHICH CAN FREEZE, RESULTING IN LOSS OF THE JET. INHALATION OF
PROPELLANT ON THE GROUND CAN CAUSE LOSS OF LIFE.
LEAKAGE ONORBIT CAN CAUSE LOSS OF LIFE FOLLOWING EVA IF CREW IS
CONTAMINATED BY PROPELLANTS.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.6;
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01 (42BN & 42BT).
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-91
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 190 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
JET ALIGNMENT BELLOWS, VERNIER, ALL AXES
STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE OR LEAK)
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
HDW/FUNC
1/l
1/1
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
JET ALIGNMENT BELLOWS, VERNIER, ALL AXES
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: i/1 RTLS: i/1
LI FTOFF: I/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: I/1 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: I/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] BC ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FUEL/OXID LINES LEADING INTO JET BIPROP VALVE
FU & OX:
CAUSES: HIGH PRESSURE, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE CAUSES PROPELLANT TO LEAK INTO POD/VEHICLE. LOSS OF
PROPELLANT CAN CAUSE CORROSION, LEADING TO ELECTRICAL SHORTS AND
PROPELLANT IGNITION. FAILURE CAUSES HAZARD TO GROUND CREW.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.6;
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01 (42BN & 42BT).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-92
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 191 ABORT:
ITEM: JET ALIGNMENT BELLOWS, VERNIER, ALL AXES
FAILURE MODE: RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
JET ALIGNMENT BELLOWS, VERNIER, ALL AXES
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] c[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FUEL/OXID LINES LEADING INTO JET BIPROP VALVE
FU & OX:
CAUSES: VACUUM, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE MAY CAUSE UNACCEPTABLE PROPELLANT MIXTURE RATIO,
RESULTING IN ZOTS AND LOSS OF VEHICLE.
HDW/FUNC
1/1
3/3
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.6;
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01 (42BN).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-93
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: i/i
192 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLV, VERNIERS, ALL AXES
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN/ON)
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLV, VERNIERS, ALL AXES
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: JET ASSEMBLY
PART NUMBER: FU & OX:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF VERNIER RCS. RM WILL NOT DESELECT
JET, MUST BE SECURED BY CREW CLOSING ITS MANIFOLD. A FAILED ON
JET CAN CAUSE CONTACT WITH PAYLOADS DURING RENDEZVOUS, RESULTING
IN LOSS OF VEHICLE, AND/OR EVA CREW.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.6;
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01 (42BN & 42BT).
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-94
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 2/2
193 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
THRUSTERBIPROP SOLENOIDVLV, VERNIERS, ALL AXES
FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED)
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3) THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLV, VERNIERS, ALL AXES
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] c[ ]
LOCATION: JET ASSEMBLY
PART NUMBER: FU & OX:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, LOSS OF
SIGNAL FROM MDM, LOW TEMPERATURE FREEZES PROPELLANT IN VALVE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF VERNIER RCS. RM WILL DESELECT JETS.
FAILURE CANNOT BE DETECTED UNTIL JET IS COMMANDED TO FIRE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.6;
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01 (42BN & 42BT).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-95
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: i/1
194 ABORT: i/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLV, VERNIERS, ALL AXES
LEAKS EXTERNALLY, ONE PROPELLANT
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLV, VERNIERS, ALL AXES
CRITI CALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 1/1 RTLS: 1/1
LI FTOFF: i/1 TAL: I/1
ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: I/1
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO: I/1
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: JET ASSEMBLY
PART NUMBER: FU & OX:
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE RESULTS IN PROPELLANT LEAKING INTO POD/VEHICLE CAUSING
CORROSION, RESULTING IN ELECTRICAL SHORTS AND PROPELLANT
IGNITION.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.6;
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01 (42BN & 42BT).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-96
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: i/i
195 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLV, VERNIERS, ALL AXES
LEAKS INTERNALLY, ONE PROPELLANT
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLV, VERNIERS, ALL AXES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
1/1 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
I/i AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
1/l
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: JET ASSEMBLY
PART NUMBER: FU & OX:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE RESULTS IN PROPELLANT LEAKING INTO COMBUSTION CHAMBER,
WHICH CAN FREEZE, RESULTING IN LOSS OF THE VERNIER RCS.
INHALATION OF PROPELLANT VAPORS ON THE GROUND CAN CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE. LEAKAGE ONORBIT CAN CAUSE LOSS OF LIFE FOLLOWING EVA IF
CREW IS CONTAMINATED BY PROPELLANT.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.6;
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01 (42BN & 42BT).
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-97
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: i/i
196 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLV, VERNIERS, ALL AXES
RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3) THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLV, VERNIERS, ALL AXES
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: JET ASSEMBLY
PART NUMBER: FU & OX:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE MAY CAUSE UNACCEPTABLE PROPELLANT MIXTURE RATIO,
RESULTING IN ZOTS AND LOSS OF VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.6;
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01 (43DH).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-98
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT: I/i
MDAC ID: 197 ABORT: I/i
ITEM: THRUSTER COMBUSTION CHAMBER OR NOZZLE EXTENSION,
PRIMARY, ALL AXES
FAILURE MODE: THRUSTER COMBUSTION CHAMBER OR NOZZLE EXTENSION
BURNTHROUGH
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3) THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
4) THRUSTER COMBUSTION CHAMBER OR NOZZLE EXTENSION, PRIMARY,
ALL AXES
5)
6)
7)
8)
S)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 1/1 TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO: I/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3 / 3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: JET ASSEMBLY
PART NUMBER: FU & OX:
] B[ ] c[ ]
CAUSES: IMPROPER MIXTURE RATIO FROM RESTRICTED PROPELLANT FLOW,
PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
HOT, HIGH PRESSURE GAS VENTS INTO POD.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.6;
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01 (42BN & 42BT).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-99
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT: i/i
MDAC ID: 198 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: THRUSTER COMBUSTION CHAMBER OR NOZZLE EXTENSION,
VERNIER, ALL AXES
FAILURE MODE: THRUSTER COMBUSTION CHAMBER OR NOZZLE EXTENSION
BURNTHROUGH
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3) THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
4) THRUSTER COMBUSTION CHAMBER OR NOZZLE EXTENSION, VERNIER,
ALL AXES
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: I/1 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] c[ ]
LOCATION: JET ASSEMBLY
PART NUMBER: FU & OX:
CAUSES: IMPROPER MIXTURE RATIO FROM RESTRICTED PROPELLANT FLOW,
PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF VRCS.
INTO POD.
HOT, HIGH PRESSURE GAS VENTING
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.6;
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01 (42BN & 42BT).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-100
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 199 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/l
ITEM: HELIUM STORAGE TANK
FAILURE MODE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE OR LEAK)
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3) HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
4) HELIUM STORAGE TANK
5)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/ 3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA:
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
1/I
I/i
I/1
i/i
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: OMS/RCS POD
PART NUMBER: FU & OX: MC282-0082-0032,0031
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, HIGH PRESSURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSS OF HELIUM PRESSURIZATION WILL AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS AND
MAY CAUSE THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY
BOUNDARIES TO BE EXCEEDED DURING ENTRY OR ABORTS DUE TO THE
TRAPPED PROPELLANT'S WEIGHT.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43DA) ; FLIGHT RULE 6-41 G, H, I AND 6-
95.
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-101
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 200 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/XR
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HELIUM FILL COUPLING
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN), OR LEAKS
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HELIUM FILL COUPLING
CRITI CALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: OMS/RCS FUEL SERVICING PANEL
PART NUMBER: FU & OX: MC276-0017-402,403
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE (COUPLING OR COUPLING CAP) CANNOT BE DETECTED.
NEXT ASSOCIATED FAILURE WILL CAUSE LOSS OFHELIUM PRESSURIZATION
CAPABILITY. LOSS OF HELIUM PRESSURIZATION WILL AFFECT ONORBIT
OPERATIONS, AND MAY CAUSE THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS
AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES TO BE EXCEEDED DURING ENTRY OR ABORTS
DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANTtS WEIGHT.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43DA); FLIGHT RULE 6-41 G, H, I AND 6-
95.
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-i02
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 201 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HELIUM FILL COUPLING
FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED)
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HELIUM FILL COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
OMS/RCS FUEL SERVICING PANEL
FU & OX: MC276-0017-0402,0403
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43DA).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-i03
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/IR
202 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HE ISOL A & B VLVS
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN) OR LEAKS INTERNALLY
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3) HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
4) HE ISOL A & B VLVS
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/ IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION: OMS/RCS POD
PART NUMBER: FU & OX: MC284-0419-0012,0011 or 0022,0021
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE DUAL SERIES PRESSURE REGULATOR AND
MANUAL OPERATION OF THE HELIUM ISOLATION VALVE. FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE OVERPRESSURIZATION OF TANKS AND/OR LINES,
AND MAY CAUSE ZOTS.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43DA).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-I04
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 203 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HE ISOL A & B VLVS
FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED)
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3) HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
4) HE ISOL A & B VLVS
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2 R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: OMS/RCS POD
PART NUMBER: FU & OX: MC284-00419-0012,0011 or 0022,0021
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
LOSS OF SIGNAL FROM MDM
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
STANDBY REDUNDANCY. NEXT ASSOCIATED FAILURE (OTHER VALVE A OR B)
WILL CAUSE LOSS OF HELIUM PRESSURIZATION CAPABILITY. LOSS OF
HELIUM PRESSURIZATION WILL AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS, AND MAY
CAUSE THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND THE CG SAFETY
BOUNDARIES TO BE EXCEEDED DURING ENTRY OR ABORTS DUE TO THE
TRAPPED PROPELLANT'S WEIGHT.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43DA); FLIGHT RULE 6-8C, 6-41 G, H, I
AND 6-95.
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-105
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 1/1
204 ABORT: 1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HE LINE, ALL EXCEPT ISOL VLV TO PRESS REGULATOR
STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE OR LEAK)
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE LINE, ALL EXCEPT ISOL VLV TO PRESS REGULATOR
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 1/1
3/3 TAL: i/i
2/2 AOA: I/i
1/1 ATO: 1/1
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
BETWEEN HELIUM TANK AND QUAD CHECK VALVE
FU & OX:
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, HIGH PRESSURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF HELIUM PRESSURIZATION, WHICH WILL
AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS AND MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL
ENOUGH PROPELLANTS DURING ABORTS OR ENTRY TO MEET THE CG SAFETY
BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43CA & 43DA).
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-I06
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT: I/i
MDAC ID: 205 ABORT: i/i
ITEM: HE LINE, ALL EXCEPT ISOL VLV TO PRESS REGULATOR
FAILURE MODE: RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE LINE, ALL EXCEPT ISOL VLV TO PRESS REGULATOR
CRITI CALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: i/1
LI FTOFF: 1/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: I/1
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO: I/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: BETWEEN HELIUM TANK AND QUAD CHECK VALVE
PART NUMBER: FU & OX:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE MAY CAUSE UNACCEPTABLE PROPELLANT MIXTURE RATIO,
RESULTING IN ZOTS AND/OR THRUSTER NOZZLE BURNTHROUGH AND LOSS OF
VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43CA & 43DA).
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-I07
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 206 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HE LINE, ISOL VLV TO PRESS REGULATOR
STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE OR LEAK)
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE LINE, ISOL VLV TO PRESS REGULATOR
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
3/2R TAL: 2/IR
3/2R AOA: 2/IR
2/1R ATO: 2/1R
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
BETWEEN HELIUM ISOL VLVS AND PRESS REG
FU & OX:
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, HIGH PRESSURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY PARALLEL HELIUM PATH. NEXT ASSOCIATED
FAILURE CAUSES LOSS OF HELIUM PRESSURIZATION. LOSS OF HELIUM
PRESSURIZATION WILL AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS, AND MAY CAUSE THE
TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES TO
BE EXCEEDED DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT'S WEIGHT.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO B12 (43CA & 43DA).
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-I08
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 207 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HE LINE, ISOL VLV TO PRESS REGULATOR
RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
_)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE LINE, ISOL VLV TO PRESS REGULATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ANY LINE BETWEEN PROPELLANT TANK AND THRUSTERS.
FU & OX:
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, HIGH PRESSURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY PARALLEL HELIUM PATH. FAILURE MAY CAUSE
UNACCEPTABLE PROPELLANT MIXTURE RATIO, RESULTING IN ZOTS AND/OR
THRUSTER NOZZLE BURNTHROUGH AND LOSS OF VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43CA & 43DA).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-I09
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/IR
208 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HIGH PRESSURE HELIUM TEST PORT COUPLINGS A & B
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN), OR LEAKS
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
1) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3) HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HIGH PRESSURE HELIUM TEST PORT COUPLINGS A & B
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] S [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: OMS/RCS POD
PART NUMBER: FU & OX: ME276-0032-0021,0019
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE (COUPLING OR COUPLING CAP) CANNOT BE DETECTED.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE LOSS OF HELIUM
PRESSURIZATION. LOSS OF HELIUM PRESSURIZATION WILL AFFECT
ONORBIT OPERATIONS, AND MAY CAUSE THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT
CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES TO BE EXCEEDED DURING ENTRY
OR ABORTS DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT'S WEIGHT.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43DA); FLIGHT RULE 6-41 G, H, I AND 6-
95.
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-110
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/3
209 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HIGH PRESSURE HELIUM TEST PORT COUPLINGS A & B
FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED)
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
3)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HIGH PRESSURE HELIUM TEST PORT COUPLINGS A & B
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
LOCATION: OMS/RCS POD
PART NUMBER: FU & OX: ME276-0032-0021,0019
c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43DA).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-Ill
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 210 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PRESSURE
HELIUM PRESSURE REGULATORASSEMBLY
FAILS OPEN OR REGULATES AT HIGHER THAN NORMAL
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HELIUM PRESSURE REGULATOR ASSEMBLY
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
3/1R TAL: 3/1R
3/IR AOA: 3/IR
3/IR ATO: 3/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: OMS/RCS POD
PART NUMBER: FU & OX: MC284-0418-0012,0011
C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE HELIUM ISOLATION VALVE AND THE SERIES
PRESSURE REGULATOR. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE
OVERPRESSURIZATION AND RUPTURE OF THE PROPELLANT TANK AND LINES,
AND MAY CAUSE ZOTS.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43DA); FLIGHT RULE 6-41 G, H, I AND 6-
95.
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-i12
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
211 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HELIUM PRESSURE REGULATOR ASSEMBLY
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HELIUM PRESSURE REGULATOR ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
2/1R
2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: OMS/RCS POD
PART NUMBER: FU & OX: MC284-0418-0012,0011
c[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
STANDBY REDUNDANCY. NEXT ASSOCIATED FAILURE (PARALLEL REGULATOR
OR PARALLEL HELIUM ISOLATION VALVE) WILL CAUSE LOSS OF HELIUM
PRESSURIZATION CAPABILITY. LOSS OF HELIUM PRESSURIZATION WILL
CAUSE THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND THE CG SAFETY
BOUNDARIES TO BE EXCEEDED DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT'S WEIGHT.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43DA); FLIGHT RULE 6-41 G, H, I AND 6-
95.
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-I13
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 212 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM: HELIUM PRESSURE REGULATOR ASSEMBLY
FAILURE MODE: RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HELIUM PRESSURE REGULATOR ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA:
DEORBI T: 2/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: OMS/RCS POD
PART NUMBER: FU & OX: MC284-0418-0012,0011
c[P]
CAUSES: BLOCKAGE OF INLET FILTER
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY PARALLEL REGULATOR. RESTRICTED FLOW
THROUGH REGULATORS MAY CAUSE UNACCEPTABLE PROPELLANT MIXTURE
RATIO, WHICH MAY RESULT IN ZOTS AND/OR THRUSTER NOZZLE
BURNTHROUGH.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43DA).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-I14
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 213 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HELIUM PRESSURE REGULATORASSEMBLY
LEAKS EXTERNALLY
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
S)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HELIUM PRESSURE REGULATOR ASSEMBLY
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
3/3 TAL: 2/IR
3/2R AOA: 2/IR
2/IR ATO: 2/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: OMS/RCS POD
PART NUMBER: FU & OX: MC284-0418-0012,0011
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY PARALLEL REGULATOR AND MANUAL OPERATION OF
THE HELIUM ISOLATION VALVE. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL
RESULT IN LOSS OF HELIUM PRESSURIZATION, CAUSING THE INABILITY TO
EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS DURING ENTRY OR ABORTS TO MEET THE CG
SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43DA).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-115
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 2/IR
214 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HELIUM PRESSURE REGULATOR PRIMARY SENSING PORT
LEAKS EXTERNALLY
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HELIUM PRESSURE REGULATOR PRIMARY SENSING PORT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS :
LI FTOFF: 3/ 3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: OMS/RCS FUEL/OXIDIZER CHECKOUT PANEL
PART NUMBER: FU & OX: 73A620096-2001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY MANUAL OPERATION OF THE HELIUM ISOLATION
VALVE AND THE PARALLEL HELIUM PATH. LOSS OF HELIUM
PRESSURIZATION WILL AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS, AND MAY CAUSE THE
TANK LANDING CONSTRAINT AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES TO BE EXCEEDED
DURING ENTRY OR ABORTS DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT'S WEIGHT.
THERE ARE NO VALVES OR CAPS IN THE SENSING PORT LINES.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43DA); FLIGHT RULE 6-41 G, H, I AND 6-
95.
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-i16
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 215 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM: HELIUM PRESSURE REGULATOR PRIMARY SENSING PORT
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED)
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3) HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HELIUM PRESSURE REGULATOR PRIMARY SENSING PORT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: OMS/RCS FUEL/OXIDIZER CHECKOUT PANEL
PART NUMBER: FU & OX: 73A620096-2001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY PARALLEL HELIUM PATH, AND OTHER SERIES
PRESSURE REGULATOR. NEXT ASSOCIATED FAILURE WILL CAUSE
REGULATION AT A HIGHER PRESSURE WHICH MAY CAUSE AN UNACCEPTABLE
MIXTURE RATIO AND/OR RUPTURE OF THE PROPELLANT TANKS AND LINES.
ZOTS MAY CAUSE THRUSTER VALVE DAMAGE, LEADING TO PROPELLANT
IGNITION WITHIN THE POD AND/OR THRUSTER NOZZLE BURNTHROUGH.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43DA); FLIGHT RULE 6-50.
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-I17
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 216 ABORT:
HDW/nmC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
COUPLING
FAILURE MODE:
HELIUM PRESSURE REGULATOR OUTLET TEST PORT
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN), OR LEAKS
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ASSEMBLIES
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HELIUM PRESSURE REGULATOR OUTLET TEST PORT COUPLING
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
3/3 TAL: 2/IR
3/2R AOA: 2/IR
2/1R ATO: 2/1R
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: OMS/RCS FUEL/OXIDIZER TEST PORT PANEL
PART NUMBER: FU & OX: MC276-0018-3851,3801
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE (COUPLING OR CAP) WILL BE UNDETECTABLE. NEXT
ASSOCIATED FAILURE WILL CAUSE LOSS OF HELIUM PRESSURIZATION.
LOSS OF HELIUM PRESSURIZATION WILL AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS, AND
MAY CAUSE THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINT AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES TO
BE EXCEEDED DURING ENTRY OR ABORTS DUE TO THE TRAPPED
PROPELLANT'S WEIGHT.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43DA); FLIGHT RULE 6-41 G, H, I AND 6-
95.
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-i18
INDEPENDENT ORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 217 ABORT:
HDWIFUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
COUPLING
FAILURE MODE:
HELIUM PRESSURE REGULATOR OUTLET TEST PORT
FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED)
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HELIUM PRESSURE REGULATOR OUTLET TEST PORT COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [
LOCATION: OMS/RCS FUEL/OXIDIZER TEST PORT PANEL
PART NUMBER: FU & OX: MC276-0018-3851,3801
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43DA); FLIGHT RULE 6-50.
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-119
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 218 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FLOW)
QUAD CHECK VALVE ASSEMBLY
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN) OR LEAKS (REVERSE
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
QUAD CHECK VALVE ASSEMBLY
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LI FTO F F:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
3/3 TAL: 2/IR
3/2R AOA: 2/IR
2/IR ATO: 2/IR
3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
LOCATION: OMS/RCS POD
PART NUMBER: FU & OX: MC284-0481-0002,0001
c[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
NEXT ASSOCIATED FAILURE (VALVE IN SERIES WITH FAILED VALVE FAILS
OPEN) WILL ALLOW PROPELLANT TO BACKFLOW TO THE REGULATORS. THIS
CAN CAUSE LOSS OF LIFE DURING GROUND SERVICING DUE TO INHALATION
OF PROPELLANT VAPORS. CORROSION OF HELIUM REGULATORS
AND/OR HELIUM ISOLATION VALVES BY PROPELLANT WHICH HAS BACKFLOWED
MAY CAUSE LOSS OF HELIUM PRESSURIZATION CAPABILITY.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43DA).
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-120
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 219 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
ITEM: QUAD CHECK VALVE ASSEMBLY
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED)
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
QUAD CHECK VALVE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B IF] C [ P]
LOCATION: OMS/RCS POD
PART NUMBER: FU & OX: MC284-0481-0002,0001
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, LOW TEMPERATURE FREEZES
PROPELLANT INSIDE VALVE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NEXT ASSOCIATED FAILURE (PARALLEL VALVE FAILS CLOSED) WILL CAUSE
LOSS OF HELIUM PRESSURIZATION. LOSS OF HELIUM PRESSURIZATION
CAPABILITY WILL AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS, AND MAY CAUSE THE TANK
LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES TO BE
EXCEEDED DURING ENTRY OR ABORTS DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT'S
WEIGHT.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43DA); FLIGHT RULE 6-41 G, H, I AND 6-
95.
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-121
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 220 ABORT:
HDWIFUNC
3/1R
311R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
QUAD CHECK VALVE TEST PORT COUPLINGS A & B
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN), OR LEAKS
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
QUAD CHECK VALVE TEST PORT COUPLINGS A & B
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/ IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: OMS/RCS FUEL/OXIDIZER CHECKOUT PANEL
PART NUMBER: FU & OX: ME276-0032-0007,0008
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE (COUPLING OR COUPLING CAP) CANNOT BE DETECTED.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE LOSS OF HELIUMUNTIL CREW
CLOSES HELIUM ISOLATION VALVES. LOSS OF HELIUM PRESSURIZATION
WILL AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS, AND MAY CAUSE THE TANK LANDING
WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES TO BE EXCEEDED DURING
ENTRY OR ABORTS DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT'S WEIGHT.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43DA).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-122 C
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 221 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
QUAD CHECK VALVE TEST PORT COUPLINGS A & B
FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED)
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
QUAD CHECK VALVE TEST PORT COUPLINGS A & B
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: OMS/RCS FUEL/OXIDIZER CHECKOUT PANEL
PART NUMBER: FU & OX: ME276-0032-0007,0008
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43DA).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-123
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 222 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PROPELLANT TANK
STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE OR LEAK)
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROPELLANT TANK
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: i/1 RTLS:
LI FTOFF: I/1 TAL:
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA:
DEORBIT: I/I ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: I/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] S[ ]
LOCATION: OMS/RCS POD
PART NUMBER: FU & OX: MC282-0061-0604,0603
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
1/1
1/1
c C ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, HIGH PRESSURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF PROPELLANT INTO THE POD/VEHICLE. LOSS
OF PROPELLANT CAN CAUSE CORROSION, LEADING TO ELECTRICAL SHORTS
AND PROPELLANT IGNITION.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43DA).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-124
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 223 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/I
1/l
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PROP LINES, ALL
STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE OR LEAK)
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROP LINES, ALL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: i/1 RTLS: I/1
LIFTOFF: i/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: i/1
DEORB IT: 1/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: i/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ANY LINE BETWEEN PROPELLANT TANK AND THRUSTERS.
FU & OX:
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, HIGH PRESSURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PRESSURE IN TANK AND LINE WILL FORCE PROPELLANT OUT OF LINE INTO
POD/VEHICLE. LOSS OF PROPELLANT CAN CAUSE CORROSION, LEADING TO
ELECTRICAL SHORTS AND PROPELLANT IGNITION.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO B12 (43CA & 43DA; 43CH & 43DH).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-125
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 224 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
i/I
ITEM: PROP LINES, ALL
FAILURE MODE: RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROP LINES, ALL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/1
LI FTOFF: 1/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: I/1 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ANY LINE BETWEEN PROPELLANT TANK AND THRUSTERS.
FU & OX:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE MAY CAUSE UNACCEPTABLE PROPELLANT MIXTURE RATIO, CAUSING
ZOTS AND/OR NOZZLE BURNTHROUGH RESULTING IN LOSS OF VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43CA & 43DA; 43CB & 43DB).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-126
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 2/IR
225 ABORT: 2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PROP FILL/VENT COUPLING
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN), OR LEAKS EXTERNALLY
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROP FILL/VENT COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
HDWIFUNC
2/IR
211R
211R
2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: OMS/RCS FUEL SERVICING PANEL
PART NUMBER: FU & OX: MC276-0018-3851,3801
c[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE (COUPLING OR CAP) CANNOT BE DETECTED. NEXT
ASSOCIATED FAILURE WILL RESULT IN PROPELLANT LEAKING OVERBOARD
WHICH COULD IGNITE DURING ASCENT, ENTRY, OR ABORTS, RESULTING IN
LOSS OF VEHICLE. DURING ONORBIT, LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL
CAUSE POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW FOLLOWING EVA OPERATIONS IF EVA SUITS
ARE CONTAMINATED BY LEAKING PROPELLANT.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO B12 (43DA); FLIGHT RULE 6-41 G, H, I AND 6-
95.
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-127
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 226 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PROP FILL/VENT COUPLING
FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED)
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROP FILL/VENT COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/ 3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: OMS/RCS FUEL SERVICING PANEL
PART NUMBER: FU & OX: MC276-0018-3851,3801
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43DA).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-128
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 227 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
I/i
i/I
ITEM: PROP CHANNEL SCREENS
FAILURE MODE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE)
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROP CHANNEL SCREENS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: I/1 TAL:
ONORBI T: i/1 AOA:
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
1/1
1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] c[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PROPELLANT TANK INTERIOR
FU & OX:
CAUSES: HIGH PRESSURE, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
HELIUM INGESTION WILL CAUSE ZOTS AND OR THRUSTER NOZZLE
BURNTHROUGH. FAILURE IS NOT DETECTABLE UNTIL THRUSTERS FAIL DUE
TO HELIUM INGESTION OR ZOTS.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43DA); RCS 2102, FIG. 3.2.
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-129
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 228 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/1
i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PROP FEEDOUT TUBE
RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROP FEEDOUT TUBE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 1/1 TAL:
ONORBIT: i/1 AOA:
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
I/1
i/i
i/1
i/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: PROPELLANT TANK INTERIOR
PART NUMBER: FU & OX:
] c[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VACUUM
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE MAY CAUSE UNACCEPTABLE PROPELLANT MIXTURE RATIO,
RESULTING IN ZOTS AND/OR THRUSTER NOZZLE BURNTHROUGH AND LOSS OF
VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43DA); FLIGHT RULE 6-41 J, K AND 6-95.
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-130
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/IR
229 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
COUPLING
FAILURE MODE:
PROP TK UPPER COMPARTMENT CHANNEL CHECKOUT
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN), OR LEAKS EXTERNALLY
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROP TK UPPER COMPARTMENT CHANNEL CHECKOUT COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: OMS/RCS POD
PART NUMBER: FU & OX: ME276-0032-0007,0005
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE (COUPLING OR COUPLING CAP) CANNOT BE DETECTED.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN PROPELLANT LEAKING
OVERBOARD WHICH COULD IGNITE DURING ASCENT, ENTRY, OR ABORTS,
RESULTING IN LOSS OF VEHICLE. DURING ONORBIT, LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE FOLLOWING EVA
OPERATIONS IF EVA SUITS ARE CONTAMINATED BY LEAKING PROPELLANT.
INHALATION OF PROPELLANT VAPORS ON THE GROUND CAN CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43DA); FLIGHT RULE 6-41 J, K AND 6-95.
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-131
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 230 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
COUPLING
FAILURE MODE:
PROP TK UPPER COMPARTMENT CHANNEL CHECKOUT
FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED)
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROP TKUPPER COMPARTMENT CHANNEL CHECKOUT COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
OMS/RCS POD
FU & OX: ME276-0032-0007,0005
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43DA).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-132
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 2/IR
231 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PROP TK LOWER COMPARTMENT CHANNEL BLEED COUPLING
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN), OR LEAKS EXTERNALLY
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROP TK LOWER COMPARTMENT CHANNEL BLEED COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS : 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/ IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
NOT SPECIFIED ON DRAWING
FU & OX: MC276-0018-3451,3401
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE (COUPLING OR COUPLING CAP) CANNOT BE DETECTED.
NEXT ASSOCIATED FAILURE WILL RESULT IN PROPELLANT LEAKING
OVERBOARD WHICH COULD IGNITE DURING ASCENT, ENTRY, OR ABORTS,
RESULTING IN LOSS OF VEHICLE. DURING ONORBIT, LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE FOLLOWING EVA
OPERATIONS IF EVA SUITS ARE CONTAMINATED BY LEAKING PROPELLANT.
INHALATION OF PROPELLANT VAPORS ON THE GROUND CAN CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43DA); FLIGHT RULE 6-41 J, K AND 6-95.
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-133
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/3
232 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PROP TK LOWER COMPARTMENT CHANNEL BLEED COUPLING
FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED)
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROP TK LOWER COMPARTMENT CHANNEL BLEED COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C C ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
NOT SPECIFIED ON DRAWING
FU & OX: MC276-0018-3451,3401
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43DA).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-134
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/1R
233 ABORT: 3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PROP TK LOWER COMPARTMENT CHECKOUT COUPLING
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN), OR LEAKS EXTERNALLY
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROP TK LOWER COMPARTMENT CHECKOUT COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: OMS/RCS POD
PART NUMBER: FU & OX: ME276-0032-0007,0005
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE (COUPLING OR COUPLING CAP) CANNOT BE DETECTED.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN PROPELLANT LEAKING
OVERBOARD WHICH COULD IGNITE DURING ASCENT, ENTRY, OR ABORTS,
RESULTING IN LOSS OF VEHICLE. DURING ONORBIT, LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE FOLLOWING EVA
OPERATIONS IF EVA SUITS ARE CONTAMINATED BY LEAKING PROPELLANT.
INHALATION OF PROPELLANT VAPORS ON THE GROUND CAN CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43DA)_ FLIGHT RULE 6-41 J, K AND 6-95.
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-135
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 234 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PROP TK LOWER COMPARTMENT CHECKOUT COUPLING
FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED)
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROP TK LOWER COMPARTMENT CHECKOUT COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: OMS/RCS POD
PART NUMBER: FU & OX: ME276-0032-0007,0005
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43DA).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-136
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/IR
235 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PROP TK PLENUM SCREEN CHECKOUT COUPLING
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN), OR LEAKS EXTERNALLY
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROP TK PLENUM SCREEN CHECKOUT COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: NOT SPECIFIED ON DRAWING
PART NUMBER: FU & OX: ME276-0032-0007,0005
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE (COUPLING OR COUPLING CAP) CANNOT BE DETECTED.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN PROPELLANT LEAKING
OVERBOARD WHICH COULD IGNITE DURING ASCENT, ENTRY, OR ABORTS,
RESULTING IN LOSS OF VEHICLE. DURING ONORBIT, LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE FOLLOWING EVA
OPERATIONS IF EVA SUITS ARE CONTAMINATED BY LEAKING PROPELLANT.
INHALATION OF PROPELLANT VAPORS ON THE GROUND CAN CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43DA); FLIGHT RULE 6-41 J, K AND 6-95.
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-137
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 236 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PROP TK PLENUM SCREEN CHECKOUT COUPLING
FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED)
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROP TK PLENUM SCREEN CHECKOUT COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
NOT SPECIFIED ON DRAWING
FU & OX: ME276-0032-0007,0005
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43DA).
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-138
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 2/IR
237 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PROP TK ENTRY SUMP BLEED COUPLING
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN), OR LEAKS EXTERNALLY
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROP TK ENTRY SUMP BLEED COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS : 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: OMS/RCS FUEL SERVICING PANEL
PART NUMBER: FU & OX: MC276-0018-3452,3402
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE (COUPLING OR COUPLING CAP) CANNOT BE DETECTED.
NEXT ASSOCIATED FAILURE WILL RESULT IN PROPELLANT LEAKING
OVERBOARD WHICH COULD IGNITE DURING ASCENT, ENTRY, OR ABORTS,
RESULTING IN LOSS OF VEHICLE. DURING ONORBIT, LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE FOLLOWING EVA
OPERATIONS IF EVA SUITS ARE CONTAMINATED BY LEAKING PROPELLANT.
INHALATION OF PROPELLANT VAPORS ON THE GROUND CAN CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43DA); FLIGHT RULE 6-41 J, K AND 6-95.
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-139
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 238 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PROP TK ENTRY SUMP BLEED COUPLING
FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED)
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROP TK ENTRY SUMP BLEED COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: OMS/RCS FUEL SERVICING PANEL
PART NUMBER: FU & OX: MC276-0018-3452,3402
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43DA).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-140
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 239 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
i/I
ITEM: GIMBAL BELLOWS
FAILURE MODE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE OR LEAK)
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
GIMBAL BELLOWS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: I/1 RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF: 1/1 TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: I/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: DOWNSTREAM OF PROPELLANT TANK
PART NUMBER: FU & OX: 73P550015-I006
CAUSES: HIGH PRESSURE, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ASSUME THIS IS A SINGLE BARRIER FAILURE, THAT IS, NO INTERNAL
LEAK PATH REDUNDANCY EXISTS. FAILURE RESULTS IN PROPELLANT
LEAKING INTO THE POD/VEHICLE. LOSS OF PROPELLANT CAN CAUSE
CORROSION, LEADING TO ELECTRICAL SHORTS AND PROPELLANT IGNITION.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43DA).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-141
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 240 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
I/i
1/1
ITEM: GIMBALBELLOWS
FAILURE MODE: RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
GIMBAL BELLOWS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : i/1
LIFTOFF: I/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: DOWNSTREAM OF PROPELLANT TANK
PART NUMBER: FU & OX: 73P550015-I006
CAUSES: VACUUM, CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE MAY CAUSE UNACCEPTABLE PROPELLANT MIXTURE RATIO,
RESULTING IN ZOTS AND/OR THRUSTER NOZZLE BURNTHROUGH AND LOSS OF
VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43DA); FLIGHT RULE 6-41 J, K AND 6-95.
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-142
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 241 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
211R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PRESSURE RELIEF ASSEMBLY
BURST DISK RUPTURES AT LOW PRESSURE, OR LEAKS
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PRESSURE RELIEF ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS: 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/ IR
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: OMS/RCS POD
PART NUMBER: FU & OX: MC284-0421-0012,0011
CAUSES: VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE (BURST DISC RUPTURE) CANNOT BE DETECTED. NEXT
ASSOCIATED FAILURE WILL RESULT IN PROPELLANT LEAKING OVERBOARD
WHICH COULD IGNITE DURING ASCENT, ENTRY, OR ABORTS, RESULTING IN
LOSS OF VEHICLE. DURING ONORBIT, LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL
CAUSE POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW FOLLOWING EVA OPERATIONS IF EVA SUITS
ARE CONTAMINATED BY LEAKING PROPELLANT. INHALATION OF PROPELLANT
VAPORS ON GROUND CAN CAUSE LOSS OF LIFE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43DA); FLIGHT RULE 6-41 G, H, I AND 6-
95.
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-143
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT: i/1
MDAC ID: 242 ABORT: i/i
ITEM: PRESSURE RELIEF ASSEMBLY
FAILURE MODE: BURST DISK FAILS TO RUPTURE, RUPTURES AT A HIGHER
THAN NOMINAL PRESSURE, OR POPPET VALVE FAILS CLOSED AFTER BURST
DISK RUPTURES AT NOMINAL PRESSURE.
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PRESSURE RELIEF ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: I/1 RTLS: I/1
LIFTOFF: i/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: OMS/RCS POD
PART NUMBER: FU & OX: MC284-0421-0012,0011
CAUSES: MATERIAL FLAW, CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OVERPRESSURIZATION OF PROPELLANT TANK AND LINES WILL CAUSE TANK
AND/OR LINE RUPTURE. LOSS OF PROPELLANT CAN CAUSE CORROSION,
LEADING TO ELECTRICAL SHORTS AND/OR PROPELLANT IGNITION.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43DA).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-144
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 243 ABORT: 3/1R
ITEM: RELIEF VALVE TEST PORT COUPLING
FAILURE MODE: PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE TEST PORT FAILS TO CLOSE
(FAILS OPEN) OR LEAKS OVERBOARD
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
RELIEF VALVE TEST PORT COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/ IR RTLS :
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
OMS/RCS FUEL/OXIDIZER CHECKOUT PANEL
FU & OX: ME276-0032
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE (BURST DISC RUPTURE) CANNOT BE DETECTED. NEXT
ASSOCIATED FAILURE WILL RESULT IN PROPELLANT LEAKING OVERBOARD
WHICH COULD IGNITE DURING ASCENT, ENTRY, OR ABORTS, RESULTING IN
LOSS OF VEHICLE. DURING DEORBIT, LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL
CAUSE POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW FOLLOWING EVA OPERATIONS IF EVA SUITS
ARE CONTAMINATED BY LEAKING PROPELLANT. INHALATION OF PROPELLANT
VAPORS ON GROUND CAN CAUSE LOSS OF LIFE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43DA); FLIGHT RULE 6-41 G, H, I AND 6-
95.
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-145
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 244 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
(FAILS CLOSED)
RELIEF VALVE TEST PORT COUPLING
PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE TEST PORT FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
S)
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
RELIEF VALVE TEST PORT COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c C ]
LOCATION: OMS/RCS FUEL/OXIDIZER CHECKOUT PANEL
PART NUMBER: FU & OX: ME276-0032
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43DA).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-146
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 245 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: GROUND MANUAL ISOLATION VALVE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN), OR LEAKS INTERNALLY
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
GROUND MANUAL ISOLATION VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: OMS/RCS POD
PART NUMBER: FU & OX: MC284-0480-0002,0001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
MECHANICAL SHOCK (GROUND HANDLING)
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43DA).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-147
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 246 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GROUND MANUAL ISOLATION VALVE
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN (FAILS CLOSED)
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
4) GROUND MANUAL ISOLATION VALVE
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH:
LI FTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: i/i
3/3 TAL: I/I
2/2 AOA: i/i
I/I ATO: I/i
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
LOCATION: OMS/RCS POD
PART NUMBER: FU & OX: MC284-0480-0002,0001
cc ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
MECHANICAL SHOCK (GROUND HANDLING)
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF HELIUM PRESSURIZATION (VALVE LOCATED
UPSTREAM OF PROPELLANT TANK). LOSS OF HELIUM PRESSURIZATION WILL
CAUSE THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY
BOUNDARIES TO BE EXCEEDED DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT'S WEIGHT.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43DA); FLIGHT RULE 6-41 G, H, I AND 6-
95.
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-148
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 247 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GROUND MANUAL ISOLATION VALVE
LEAKS EXTERNALLY
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
GROUND MANUAL ISOLATION VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: i/1 RTLS: i/1
LI FTOFF: 1/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBI T: 1/1 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: I/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: OMS/RCS POD
PART NUMBER: FU & OX: MC284-0480-0002,0001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
MECHANICAL SHOCK (GROUND HANDLING)
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF PROPELLANT AND HELIUM. PROPELLANT
WILL LEAK INTO THE POD. INHALATION OF PROPELLANT VAPORS ON THE
GROUND CAN CAUSE LOSS OF LIFE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43DA).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-149
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 248 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
i/i
ITEM: PROP TANK ISOL VLVS 1/2 & 3/4/5
FAILURE MODE: LEAKS EXTERNALLY
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
4) PROP TANK ISOL VLVS 1/2 & 3/4/5
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: i/1 RTLS : i/1
LIFTOFF: i/i TAL: i/I
ONORBI T: I/1 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: i/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [
LOCATION: OMS/RCS POD
PART NUMBER: FU & OX:
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE RESULTS IN PROPELLANT LEAKING INTO THE POD/VEHICLE,
CAUSING CORROSION, WHICH COULD RESULT IN ELECTRICAL SHORTS AND
PROPELLANT IGNITION.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43DC).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-150
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 249 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/l
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PROP TANK ISOL VLVS 1/2 & 3/4/5
RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROP TANK ISOL VLVS 1/2 & 3/4/5
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : i/1
LI FTO F F: 1/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: i/i
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: OMS/RCS POD
PART NUMBER: FU & OX:
CAUSES: VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE MAY CAUSE UNACCEPTABLE PROPELLANT MIXTURE RATIO,
RESULTING IN ZOTS AND/OR THRUSTER NOZZLE BURNTHROUGH AND LOSS OF
VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43DC).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-151
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
250 ABORT: i/I
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PROP TANK ISOL VLV 1/2
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN), OR LEAKS INTERNALLY
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROP TANK ISOL VLV 1/2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 1/1
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: OMS/RCS POD
PART NUMBER: FU & OX: MC284-0430-0012,0011
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
LOSS OF SIGNAL FROM MDM
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE 3/4/5 A & B ISOLATION VALVES. FAILURE
WILL AFFECT CROSSFEED OPERATIONS AND ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANTS DURING ENTRY OR ABORTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING
CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43DC).
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-152
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 251 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
i/i
ITEM: PROP TANK ISOL VLV 1/2
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED)
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROP TANK ISOL VLV 1/2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/1
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [ P]
LOCATION: OMS/RCS POD
PART NUMBER: FU & OX: MC284-0430-0012,0011
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
LOSS OF SIGNAL FROM MDM
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY DURING ALL PHASES EXCEPT RTLS IS PROVIDED BY THE 3/4/5
A & B ISOLATION VALVES. FIRST FAILURE WILL CAUSE LOSS OF SIX
PRIMARY JETS WHICH WILL AFFECT ONORBIT CROSSFEED OPERATIONS,
ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs, AND MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANT DURING RTLS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT
CONSTRAINTS, AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES. SIMILARLY, NEXT
ASSOCIATED FAILURE MAY RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE DURING ENTRY AND
OTHER ABORTS.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43DC); FLIGHT RULE 6-95.
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-153
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 2/2
252 ABORT: i/I
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PROP TANK ISOL VLV 3/4/5/ A & B
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN), OR LEAKS INTERNALLY
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
s)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROP TANK ISOL VLV 3/4/5/ A & B
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
1/1
211R
2/1R
2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
LOCATION: OMS/RCS POD
PART NUMBER: FU & OX: MC284-0430-0012,0011
c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
LOSS OF SIGNAL FROM MDM
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
FAILURE OF THE PARALLEL 3/4/5 VALVE WILL AFFECT CROSSFEED
OPERATIONS, AND MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANTS DURING ABORTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT
CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43DB).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-154
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
253 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PROP TANK ISOL VLV 3/4/5/ A & B
FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED)
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROP TANK ISOL VLV 3/4/5/ A & B
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: OMS/RCS POD
PART NUMBER: FU & OX: MC284-0430-0012,0011
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
LOSS OF SIGNAL FROM MDM
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE PARALLEL 3/4/5 ISOLATION VALVE AND THE
1/2 ISOLATION VALVE. FAILURE OF BOTH VALVES ONORBIT WILL AFFECT
CROSSFEED OPERATIONS AND ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs. FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE LOSS OF SIX PRIMARY JETS WHICH MAY
CAUSE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANT DURING RTLS TO MEET
THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES. SIMILARLY, FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY
MAY RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE DURING ENTRY AND OTHER ABORTS.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO B12 (43DB); FLIGHT RULE 6-95.
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-155
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 2/IR
254 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 1/2 GROUND PURGE COUPLING
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN), OR LEAKS EXTERNALLY
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 1/2 GROUND PURGE COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS: 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 2/ IR TAL: 2/ IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: OMS/RCS FUEL/OXIDIZER DRAIN PURGE PANEL
PART NUMBER: FU & OX: MC276-0018-3852,3802
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE (COUPLING OR COUPLING CAP) CANNOT BE DETECTED.
NEXT ASSOCIATED FAILURE WILL RESULT IN PROPELLANT LEAKING
OVERBOARD WHICH COULD IGNITE DURING ASCENT, ENTRY, OR ABORTS,
RESULTING IN LOSS OF VEHICLE. DURING ONORBIT, LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE FOLLOWING EVA
OPERATIONS IF EVA SUITS ARE CONTAMINATED BY LEAKING PROPELLANT.
INHALATION OF PROPELLANT VAPORS ON THE GROUND CAN CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43DD).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-156
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
255 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 1/2 GROUND PURGE COUPLING
FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED)
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 1/2 GROUND PURGE COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [
LOCATION: OMS/RCS FUEL/OXIDIZER DRAIN PURGE PANEL
PART NUMBER: FU & OX: MC276-0018-3852,3802
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43DD).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-157
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 2/IR
256 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 3/4/5 GROUND PURGE COUPLING
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN), OR LEAKS EXTERNALLY
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3/4/5 GROUND PURGE COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBI T: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: OMS/RCS FUEL/OXIDIZER DRAIN PURGE PANEL
PART NUMBER: FU & OX: MC276-0018-3852,3802
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE (COUPLING OR COUPLING CAP) CANNOT BE DETECTED.
NEXT ASSOCIATED FAILURE WILL RESULT IN PROPELLANT LEAKING
OVERBOARD WHICH COULD IGNITE DURING ASCENT, ENTRY, OR ABORTS,
RESULTING IN LOSS OF VEHICLE. DURING ONORBIT, LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE FOLLOWING EVA
OPERATIONS IF EVA SUITS ARE CONTAMINATED BY LEAKING PROPELLANT.
INHALATION OF PROPELLANT VAPORS ON THE GROUND CAN CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43DC).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-158
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 257 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 3/4/5 GROUND PURGE COUPLING
FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED)
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3/4/5 GROUND PURGE COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: OMS/RCS FUEL/OXIDIZER DRAIN PURGE PANEL
PART NUMBER: FU & OX: MC276-0018-3852,3802
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43DD).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-159
INDEPENDENT ORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 258 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
i/i
ITEM: RCS CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 OR 3/4/5
FAILURE MODE: RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
RCS CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 OR 3/4/5
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 1/1
LI FTO FF: 3/ 3 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO: I/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: OMS/RCS POD
PART NUMBER: FU & OX: MC284-0430-0012,0011
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
LOSS OF SIGNAL FROM MDM
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE MAY CAUSE UNACCEPTABLE PROPELLANT MIXTURE RATIO,
RESULTING IN ZOTS AND/OR THRUSTER NOZZLE BURNTHROUGH AND LOSS OF
VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43CD & 43DD); RCS 2102, FIG. 7-2 AND 8-
I. FLIGHT RULE 6-95.
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-160
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 259 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/1
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RCS CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 OR 3/4/5
LEAKS EXTERNALLY
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
RCS CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 OR 3/4/5
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 1/1 RTLS:
LI FTOFF: I/1 TAL:
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA:
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: i/i
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
1/1
1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
LOCATION: OMS/RCS POD
PART NUMBER: FU & OX: MC284-0430-0012,0011
c[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
LOSS OF SIGNAL FROM MDM
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE RESULTS IN PROPELLANT LEAKING INTO THE POD/VEHICLE,
CAUSING CORROSION, WHICH COULD RESULT IN ELECTRICAL SHORTS AND
PROPELLANT IGNITION.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO B12 (43CD & 43DD); RCS 2102, FIG. 7-2 AND 8-
i. FLIGHT RULE 6-95.
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-161
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 2/2
260 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RCS CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN), OR LEAKS INTERNALLY
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
RCS CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/ 3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
LOCATION: OMS/RCS POD
PART NUMBER: FU & OX: MC284-0430-0012,0011
c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
LOSS OF SIGNAL FROM MDM
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DURING ONORBIT, THIS MAY AFFECT CROSSFEED OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43CD & 43DD); RCS 2102, FIG. 7-2 AND 8-
i. FLIGHT RULE 6-95.
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-162
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 261 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
I/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RCS CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED)
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
RCS CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/1
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: OMS/RCS POD
PART NUMBER: FU & OX: MC284-0430-0012,0011
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
LOSS OF SIGNAL FROM MDM
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL AFFECT CROSSFEED OPERATIONS, AND MAY CAUSE THE
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANT DURING ABORTS TO MEET THE
TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES. THERE
IS NO REDUNDANCY TO CROSSFEED TO THE 1/2 THRUSTERS ONORBIT, AND
NO REDUNDANCY DURING RTLS BECAUSE OF THE FIXED RCS AND OMS DUMP
LENGTHS.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43CD & 43DD); RCS 2102, FIG. 7-2 AND 8-
I. FLIGHT RULE 6-95.
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-163
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 2/2
262 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RCSCROSSFEEDVLV 3/4/5
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN), OR LEAKS INTERNALLY
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
RCS CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: OMS/RCS POD
PART NUMBER: FU & OX: MC284-0430-0012,0011
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
LOSS OF SIGNAL FROM MDM
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DURING ONORBIT, THIS MAY AFFECT CROSSFEED OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43CD & 43DD); RCS 2102, FIG. 7-2 AND 8-
i. FLIGHT RULE 6-95.
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-164
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 263 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RCS CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED)
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
RCS CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/1
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 2/ IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: OMS/RCS POD
PART NUMBER: FU & OX: MC284-0430-0012,0011
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
LOSS OF SIGNAL FROM MDM
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL AFFECT CROSSFEED OPERATIONS, AND MAY CAUSE THE
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANT DURING ABORTS TO MEET THE
TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES. THERE
IS NO REDUNDANCY TO CROSSFEED TO THE 3/4/5 THRUSTERS ONORBIT, AND
NO REDUNDANCY DURING RTLS BECAUSE OF THE FIXED RCS AND OMS DUMP
LENGTHS.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43CD & 43DD); RCS 2102, FIG. 7-2 AND 8-
i. FLIGHT RULE 6-95.
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-165
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 264 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/1
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CROSSFEED LINES
RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
CROSSFEED LINES
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: I/1
DEORBIT: I/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ANY LINE BETWEEN PROPELLANT TANK AND THRUSTERS.
FU & OX:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE MAY CAUSE UNACCEPTABLE PROPELLANT MIXTURE RATIO, CAUSING
ZOTS AND/OR NOZZLE BURNTHROUGH, RESULTING IN LOSS OF VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43CD & 43DD).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-166
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 265 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/I
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CROSSFEED LINES
STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE OR LEAK)
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
CROSSFEED LINES
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: i/1 RTLS: i/1
LI FTOFF: I/1 TAL: I/1
ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ANY LINE BETWEEN PROPELLANT TANK AND THRUSTERS.
FU & OX:
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, HIGH PRESSURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PRESSURE IN TANK AND LINE WILL FORCE PROPELLANT OUT OF LINE INTO
POD/VEHICLE. LOSS OF PROPELLANT CAN CAUSE CORROSION, LEADING TO
ELECTRICAL SHORTS AND PROPELLANT IGNITION.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43CA & 43DA; 43CH & 43DH).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-167
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/3
266 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD i, ISOL VLV
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN), OR LEAKS INTERNALLY
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD I, ISOL VLV
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: OMS/RCS POD
PART NUMBER: FU & OX: MC284-0430-0006,0005
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
LOSS OF SIGNAL FROM MDM
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43DE).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-168
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 267 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
I/I
ITEM: MANIFOLD I, ISOL VLV
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED)
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, ISOL VLV
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/i
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
OMS/RCS POD
FU & OX: MC284-0430-0006,0005
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
LOSS OF SIGNAL FROM MDM
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY FOR ALL PHASES EXCEPT RTLS FOR THIS FUNCTION IS
PROVIDED BY THRUSTERS WHICH FIRE IN THE SAME DIRECTION FROM
DIFFERENT MANIFOLDS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY RESULT IN LOSS
OF VEHICLE DURING ENTRY DUE TO INABILITY TO CONTROL VEHICLE.
DURING RTLS, JETS ON OTHER MANIFOLDS FIRING IN THE SAME DIRECTION
AS THOSE ON THIS MANIFOLD ARE NOT CONSIDERED TO BE REDUNDANT,
SINCE LOSS OF THE THREE PRIMARY JETS ON THIS MANIFOLD MAY CAUSE
THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH RCS AND/OR OMS PROPELLANTS
TO MEET THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY
BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43DE); RCS SFOM, FIG. 3-4.
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-169
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 2/IR
268 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD I, GROUND PURGE/DRAIN COUPLING
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN), OR LEAKS EXTERNALLY
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D°J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, GROUND PURGE/DRAIN COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS: 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAF ING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: OMS/RCS THRUSTER ACCESS PANEL
PART NUMBER: FU & OX: MC276-0018-3851,3801
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE (COUPLING OR COUPLING CAP) CANNOT BE DETECTED.
NEXT ASSOCIATED FAILURE WILL RESULT IN PROPELLANT LEAKING
OVERBOARD WHICH COULD IGNITE DURING ASCENT, ENTRY, OR ABORTS,
RESULTING IN LOSS OF VEHICLE. DURING ONORBIT, LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE LOSS OF LIFE FOLLOWING EVA OPERATIONS IF
EVA SUITS ARE CONTAMINATED BY LEAKING PROPELLANT. LOSS OF THE
THREE PRIMARY JETS ON THIS MANIFOLD MAY CAUSE INABILITY TO EXPEL
ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS,
AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES. INHALATION OF PROPELLANT VAPORS
ON THE GROUND CAN CAUSE LOSS OF LIFE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43DH).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-170
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 269 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD i, GROUND PURGE/DRAIN COUPLING
FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED)
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD I, GROUND PURGE/DRAIN COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
LOCATION: OMS/RCS THRUSTER ACCESS PANEL
PART NUMBER: FU & OX: MC276-0018-3851,3801
c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43DH).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-171
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 270 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: MANIFOLD 2, ISOL VLV
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN), OR LEAKS INTERNALLY
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
1) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, ISOL VLV
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBI T: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO" 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: OMS/RCS POD
PART NUMBER: FU & OX: MC284-0430-0006,0005
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
LOSS OF SIGNAL FROM MDM
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43DE).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-172
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 271 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
i/I
ITEM: MANIFOLD 2, ISOL VLV
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED)
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, ISOL VLV
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/i
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: OMS/RCS POD
PART NUMBER: FU & OX: MC284-0430-0006,0005
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
LOSS OF SIGNAL FROM MDM
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY FOR ALL PHASES EXCEPT RTLS FOR THIS FUNCTION IS
PROVIDED BY THRUSTERS WHICH FIRE IN THE SAME DIRECTION FROM
DIFFERENT MANIFOLDS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY RESULT IN LOSS
OF VEHICLE DURING ENTRY DUE TO INABILITY TO CONTROL VEHICLE.
DURING RTLS, JETS ON OTHER MANIFOLDS FIRING IN THE SAME DIRECTION
AS THOSE ON THIS MANIFOLD ARE NOT CONSIDERED TO BE REDUNDANT,
SINCE LOSS OF THE THREE PRIMARY JETS ON THIS MANIFOLD MAY CAUSE
THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH RCS AND/OR OMS PROPELLANTS
TO MEET THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY
BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43DE); RCS SFOM, FIG. 3-4.
REPORT DATE C-173
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 2/1R
272 ABORT: 2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 2, GROUND PURGE/DRAIN COUPLING
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN), OR LEAKS EXTERNALLY
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, GROUND PURGE/DRAIN COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS :
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R
HDWIFUNC
2/1R
211R
2/1R
211R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: OMS/RCS THRUSTER ACCESS PANEL
PART NUMBER: FU & OX: MC276-0018-3851,3801
c[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE (COUPLING OR COUPLING CAP) CANNOT BE DETECTED.
NEXT ASSOCIATED FAILURE WILL RESULT IN PROPELLANT LEAKING
OVERBOARD WHICH COULD IGNITE DURING ASCENT, ENTRY, OR ABORTS,
RESULTING IN LOSS OF VEHICLE. DURING ONORBIT, LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE LOSS OF LIFE FOLLOWING EVA OPERATIONS IF
EVA SUITS ARE CONTAMINATED BY LEAKING PROPELLANT. LOSS OF THE
THREE PRIMARY JETS ON THIS MANIFOLD MAY CAUSE INABILITY TO EXPEL
ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS,
AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES. INHALATION OF PROPELLANT VAPORS
ON THE GROUND CAN CAUSE LOSS OF LIFE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43DH).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-174
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 273 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: MANIFOLD 2, GROUND PURGE/DRAIN COUPLING
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED)
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, GROUND PURGE/DRAIN COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: OMS/RCS THRUSTER ACCESS PANEL
PART NUMBER: FU & OX: MC276-0018-3851,3801
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43DH).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-175
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 274 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: MANIFOLD 3, ISOL VLV
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN), OR LEAKS INTERNALLY
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
4)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, ISOL VLV
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: OMS/RCS POD
PART NUMBER: FU & OX: MC284-0430-0006,0005
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
LOSS OF SIGNAL FROM MDM
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43DF).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-176
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 275 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
i/i
ITEM: MANIFOLD 3, ISOL VLV
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED)
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, ISOL VLV
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: OMS/RCS POD
PART NUMBER: FU & OX: MC284-0430-0006,0005
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
LOSS OF SIGNAL FROM MDM
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY FOR ALL PHASES EXCEPT RTLS FOR THIS FUNCTION IS
PROVIDED BY THRUSTERS WHICH FIRE IN THE SAME DIRECTION FROM
DIFFERENT MANIFOLDS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY RESULT IN LOSS
OF VEHICLE DURING ENTRY DUE TO INABILITY TO CONTROL VEHICLE.
DURING RTLS, JETS ON OTHER MANIFOLDS FIRING IN THE SAME DIRECTION
AS THOSE ON THIS MANIFOLD ARE NOT CONSIDERED TO BE REDUNDANT,
SINCE LOSS OF THE THREE PRIMARY JETS ON THIS MANIFOLD MAY CAUSE
THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH RCS AND/OR OMS PROPELLANTS
TO MEET THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY
BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43DF); RCS SFOM, FIG. 3-4.
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-177
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 2/IR
276 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 3, GROUND PURGE/DRAIN COUPLING
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN), OR LEAKS EXTERNALLY
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, GROUND PURGE/DRAIN COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRE LAUNCH: 2/ IR RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
2/IR
2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: OMS/RCS THRUSTER ACCESS PANEL
PART NUMBER: FU & OX: MC276-0018-3851,3801
c[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE (COUPLING OR COUPLING CAP) CANNOT BE DETECTED.
NEXT ASSOCIATED FAILURE WILL RESULT IN PROPELLANT LEAKING
OVERBOARD WHICH COULD IGNITE DURING ASCENT, ENTRY, OR ABORTS,
RESULTING IN LOSS OF VEHICLE. DURING ONORBIT, LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE LOSS OF LIFE FOLLOWING EVA OPERATIONS IF
EVA SUITS ARE CONTAMINATED BY LEAKING PROPELLANT. LOSS OF THE
THREE PRIMARY JETS ON THIS MANIFOLD MAY CAUSE INABILITY TO EXPEL
ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS,
AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES. INHALATION OF PROPELLANT VAPORS
ON THE GROUND CAN CAUSE LOSS OF LIFE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43DH).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-178
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/29/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 277 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: MANIFOLD 3, GROUND PURGE/DRAIN COUPLING
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED)
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, GROUND PURGE/DRAIN COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: OMS/RCS THRUSTER ACCESS PANEL
PART NUMBER: FU & OX: MC276-0018-3851,3801
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43DH).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-179
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/3
278 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 4, ISOL VLV
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN), OR LEAKS INTERNALLY
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
S)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, ISOL VLV
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
OMS/RCS POD
FU & OX: MC284-0430-0006,0005
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
LOSS OF SIGNAL FROM MDM
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43DF).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-180
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 279 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
i/i
ITEM: MANIFOLD 4, ISOL VLV
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED)
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, ISOL VLV
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS : I/1
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: OMS/RCS POD
PART NUMBER: FU & OX: MC284-0430-0006,0005
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
LOSS OF SIGNAL FROM MDM
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY FOR ALL PHASES EXCEPT RTLS FOR THIS FUNCTION IS
PROVIDED BY THRUSTERS WHICH FIRE IN THE SAME DIRECTION FROM
DIFFERENT MANIFOLDS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY RESULT IN LOSS
OF VEHICLE DURING ENTRY DUE TO INABILITY TO CONTROL VEHICLE.
DURING RTLS, JETS ON OTHER MANIFOLDS FIRING IN THE SAME DIRECTION
AS THOSE ON THIS MANIFOLD ARE NOT CONSIDERED TO BE REDUNDANT,
SINCE LOSS OF THE THREE PRIMARY JETS ON THIS MANIFOLD MAY CAUSE
THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH RCS AND/OR OMS PROPELLANTS
TO MEET THE TAN_ LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND OR THE CG SAFETY
BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43DF); RCS SFOM, FIG. 3-4.
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-181
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 2/IR
280 ABORT: 2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 4, GROUND PURGE/DRAIN COUPLING
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN), OR LEAKS EXTERNALLY
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, GROUND PURGE/DRAIN COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS:
LI FTOFF: 2/IR TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA:
DEORBIT" 2/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: OMS/RCS THRUSTER ACCESS PANEL
PART NUMBER: FU & OX: MC276-0018-3851,3801
c[p]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE (COUPLING OR COUPLING CAP) CANNOT BE DETECTED.
NEXT ASSOCIATED FAILURE WILL RESULT IN PROPELLANT LEAKING
OVERBOARD WHICH COULD IGNITE DURING ASCENT, ENTRY, OR ABORTS,
RESULTING IN LOSS OF VEHICLE. DURING ONORBIT, LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE LOSS OF LIFE FOLLOWING EVA OPERATIONS IF
EVA SUITS ARE CONTAMINATED BY LEAKING PROPELLANT. LOSS OF THE
THREE PRIMARY JETS ON THIS MANIFOLD MAY CAUSE INABILITY TO EXPEL
ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS,
AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES. INHALATION OF PROPELLANT VAPORS
ON THE GROUND CAN CAUSE LOSS OF LIFE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43DH).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-182
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 281 ABORT:
HDW/nmC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: MANIFOLD 4, GROUND PURGE/DRAIN COUPLING
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED)
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
_)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, GROUND PURGE/DRAIN COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: OMS/RCS THRUSTER ACCESS PANEL
PART NUMBER: FU & OX: MC276-0018-3851,3801
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43DH).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-183
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/3
282 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 5, ISOL VLV
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN), OR LEAKS INTERNALLY
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, ISOL VLV
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
LOCATION: OMS/RCS POD
PART NUMBER: FU & OX: MC284-0420-0012,0011
c C )
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
LOSS OF SIGNAL FROM MDM
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43DG).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-184
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 283 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM: MANIFOLD 5, ISOL VLV
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED)
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, ISOL VLV
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B C ] c [ ]
LOCATION: OMS/RCS POD
PART NUMBER: FU & OX: MC284-0420-0012,0011
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
LOSS OF SIGNAL FROM MDM
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF VRCS.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43DG).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-185
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 2/IR
284 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 5, GROUND PURGE/DRAIN COUPLING
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN), OR LEAKS EXTERNALLY
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, GROUND PURGE/DRAIN COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS :
LI FTOFF: 2/IR TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
HDWlFUNC
211R
211R
2/1R
211R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: OMS/RCS THRUSTER ACCESS PANEL
PART NUMBER: FU & OX: MC276-0018-3451,3401
c[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE (COUPLING OR COUPLING CAP) CANNOT BE DETECTED.
NEXT ASSOCIATED FAILURE WILL RESULT IN PROPELLANT LEAKING
OVERBOARD WHICH COULD IGNITE DURING ASCENT, ENTRY, OR ABORTS,
RESULTING IN LOSS OF VEHICLE. DURING ONORBIT, LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE LOSS OF LIFE FOLLOWING EVA OPERATIONS IF
EVA SUITS ARE CONTAMINATED BY LEAKING PROPELLANT. LOSS OF THE
THREE PRIMARY JETS ON THIS MANIFOLD MAY CAUSE INABILITY TO EXPEL
ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS,
AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES. INHALATION OF PROPELLANT VAPORS
ON THE GROUND CAN CAUSE LOSS OF LIFE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43DH).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-186
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 285 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: MANIFOLD 5, GROUND PURGE/DRAIN COUPLING
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED)
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, GROUND PURGE/DRAIN COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: OMS/RCS THRUSTER ACCESS PANEL
PART NUMBER: FU & OX: MC276-0018-3451,3401
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43DH).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-187
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 286 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
I/i
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD ISOL VLVS
LEAKS EXTERNALLY
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD ISOL VLVS, ALL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 1/1 RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF: i/1 TAL: I/1
ONORBIT: I/1 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: I/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: i/i
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: OMS/RCS POD
PART NUMBER: FU & OX:
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE RESULTS IN PROPELLANT LEAKING INTO POD/VEHICLE, CAUSING
CORROSION WHICH CAN RESULT IN ELECTRICAL SHORTS AND PROPELLANT
IGNITION.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43DE).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-188
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
287 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD ISOL VLVS
RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD ISOL VLVS, ALL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: i/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBI T: i/1 AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: OMS/RCS POD
PART NUMBER: FU & OX:
CAUSES: VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE MAY CAUSE UNACCEPTABLE PROPELLANT MIXTURE RATIO,
RESULTING IN ZOTS AND/OR THRUSTER NOZZLE BURNTHROUGH AND LOSS OF
VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43DE).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-189
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 288 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/I
I/i
ITEM: JET ALIGNMENT BELLOWS, PRIMARY, ALL AXES
FAILURE MODE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE OR LEAK)
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
JET ALIGNMENT BELLOWS, PRIMARY, ALL AXES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
i/1 RTLS : i/1
i/I TAL: i/i
I/1 AOA: I/1
i/1 ATO: i/1
1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: FUEL/OXIDIZER LINES LEADING INTO JET BIPROPELLANT
VALVE
PART NUMBER: FU & OX: 73P550003-I002,1001
CAUSES: HIGH PRESSURE, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE CAUSES PROPELLANT TO LEAK INTO THE POD/VEHICLE.
THERE ARE TWO ALIGNMENT BELLOWS PER PRCS JET. LOSS OF PROPELLANT
CAN CAUSE CORROSION, LEADING TO ELECTRICAL SHORTS AND PROPELLANT
IGNITION.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43DH).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-190
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 289 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/i
1/l
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
JET ALIGNMENT BELLOWS, PRIMARY, ALL AXES
RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
JET ALIGNMENT BELLOWS, PRIMARY, ALL AXES
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/i
LIFTOFF: 1/1 TAL: i/i
ONORBIT: i/i AOA: i/i
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: FUEL/OXIDIZER LINES LEADING INTO JET BIPROPELLANT
VALVE
PART NUMBER: FU & OX: 73P550003-I002,1001
CAUSES: VACUUM, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE MAY CAUSE UNACCEPTABLE PROPELLANT MIXTURE RATIO,
RESULTING IN ZOTS AND/OR THRUSTER NOZZLE BURNTHROUGH AND LOSS OF
VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43DH); FLIGHT RULE 6-95.
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-191
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: i/1
290 ABORT: i/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLVS, PRIMARY, ALL AXES
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN/ON)
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLVS, PRIMARY, ALL AXES
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: i/1 RTLS: I/1
LI FTOFF: i/1 TAL: I/1
ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: I/1
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: i/I
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: JET ASSEMBLY
PART NUMBER: FU & OX:
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A FAILED ON JET CAN CAUSE CONTACT WITH PAYLOADS DURING
RENDEZVOUS, RESULTING IN LOSS OF VEHICLE, AND/OR EVA CREW, AND
CAN CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE DURING ENTRY OR ABORTS. RM WILL NOT
DESELECT JET, MUST BE SECURED BY CREW CLOSING ITS MANIFOLD.
INHALATION OF PROPELLANT VAPORS ON THE GROUND CAN CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43DH); FLIGHT RULE 6-95.
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-192
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 1/1
291 ABORT: 1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLVS, PRIMARY, ALL AXES
LEAKS EXTERNALLY, ONE PROPELLANT
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLVS, PRIMARY, ALL AXES
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: i/1 RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF: I/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: I/1
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: JET ASSEMBLY
PART NUMBER: FU & OX:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE RESULTS IN PROPELLANT LEAKING INTO POD/VEHICLE, CAUSING
CORROSION WHICH COULD RESULT IN ELECTRICAL SHORTS AND PROPELLANT
IGNITION.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43DH); FLIGHT RULE 6-95.
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-193
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT: i/i
MDAC ID: 292 ABORT: i/I
ITEM: THRUSTERBIPROP SOLENOIDVLVS, PRIMARY, ALL AXES
FAILURE MODE: RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLVS, PRIMARY, ALL AXES
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: I/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: I/i
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: JET ASSEMBLY
PART NUMBER: FU & OX:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE MAY CAUSE UNACCEPTABLE PROPELLANT MIXTURE RATIO,
RESULTING IN ZOTS AND/OR THRUSTER NOZZLE BURNTHROUGH AND LOSS OF
VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43DH).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-194
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 293 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM: THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLVS, PRIMARY, +X AXIS
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED)
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLVS, PRIMARY, +X AXIS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: JET ASSEMBLY
PART NUMBER: FU & OX:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, LOSS OF
SIGNAL FROM MDM, LOW TEMPERATURE FREEZES PROPELLANT IN VALVE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY FOR THIS FUNCTION IS PROVIDED BY THRUSTERS WHICH FIRE
IN THE SAME DIRECTION. RM WILL DESELECT JET. FAILURE MAY AFFECT
ONORBIT OPERATIONS AND WILL AFFECT THE + X JET RCS DEORBIT
CAPABILITY. FAILURE MAY ALSO AFFECT RCS AND OMS DUMPS
DURING ABORTS.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43DH); FLIGHT RULE 6-95.
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-195
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: i/i
294 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLVS, PRIMARY, +X AXIS
LEAKS INTERNALLY, ONE PROPELLANT
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ASSEMBLIES
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLVS, PRIMARY, +X AXIS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 1/1 RTLS : 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/ 3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBI T: i/1 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: JET ASSEMBLY
PART NUMBER: FU & OX:
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE RESULTS IN PROPELLANT LEAKING INTO COMBUSTION CHAMBER,
WHERE IT CAN FREEZE, RESULTING IN LOSS OF THE JET. RM WILL
ANNOUNCE THE JET AS FAILED LEAKING AND DESELECT THE JET.
FAILURE WILL CAUSE LOSS OF RCS DEORBIT CAPABILITY. LEAKAGE
ONORBIT CAN CAUSE LOSS OF LIFE FOLLOWING EVA IF EVA CREW IS
CONTAMINATED BY PROP. PROPELLANTS WILL NOT HAVE ENOUGH TIME TO
FREEZE DURING ABORTS.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43DH); FLIGHT RULE 6-95.
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-196
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/IR
295 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLVS, PRIMARY, Y AXIS
FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED)
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLVS, PRIMARY, Y AXIS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/ 3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: JET ASSEMBLY
PART NUMBER: FU & OX:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, LOSS OF
SIGNAL FROM MDM, LOW TEMPERATURE FREEZES PROPELLANT IN VALVE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY FOR THIS FUNCTION IS PROVIDED BY THRUSTERS WHICH FIRE
IN THE SAME DIRECTION. RM WILL DESELECT JET. FAILURE MAY AFFECT
ONORBIT OPS AND MAY RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE CONTROL DURING
ENTRY. FAILURE MAY ALSO AFFECT RCS AND OMS DUMPS
DURING ABORTS.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43DH); FLIGHT RULE 6-95.
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-197
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 1/1
296 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLVS, PRIMARY, Y AXIS
LEAKS INTERNALLY, ONE PROPELLANT
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLVS, PRIMARY, Y AXIS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: i/1 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORB IT: i/1 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: I/i
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] c[ ]
LOCATION: JET ASSEMBLY
PART NUMBER: FU & OX:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE RESULTS IN PROPELLANT LEAKING INTO COMBUSTION CHAMBER,
WHERE IT CAN FREEZE, RESULTING IN LOSS OF THE JET. RM WILL
ANNOUNCE THE JET AS FAILED LEAKING AND DESELECT THE JET.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY RESULT IN LOSS OF CONTROL DURING
ENTRY. LEAKAGE ONORBIT CAN CAUSE LOSS OF LIFE FOLLOWING EVA IF
EVA CREW IS CONTAMINATED BY PROP. PROPELLANTS WILL NOT HAVE
ENOUGH TIME TO FREEZE DURING ABORTS.
PROPELLANTS WILL NOT HAVE ENOUGH TIME TO FREEZE DURING ABORTS.
INHALATION OF PROP VAPORS ON GROUND CAN CAUSE LOSS OF LIFE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43DH); FLIGHT RULE 6-95.
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-198
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/IR
297 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLVS, PRIMARY, Z AXIS
FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED)
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLVS, PRIMARY, Z AXIS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: JET ASSEMBLY
PART NUMBER: FU & OX:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, LOSS OF
SIGNAL FROM MDM, LOW TEMPERATURE FREEZES PROPELLANT IN VALVE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
REDUNDANCY FOR THIS FUNCTION IS PROVIDED BY THRUSTERS WHICH FIRE
IN THE SAME DIRECTION. RM WILL DESELECT JET. FAILURE MAY AFFECT
ONORBIT OPS AND MAY RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE CONTROL DURING
ENTRY. FAILURE MAY ALSO AFFECT RCS AND OMS DUMPS
DURING ABORTS.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43DH) ; FLIGHT RULE 6-95.
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-199
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: i/i
298 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLVS, PRIMARY, Z AXIS
LEAKS INTERNALLY, ONE PROPELLANT
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLVS, PRIMARY, Z AXIS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: i/1 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/ IR ATO: 3/ 3
LANDING/SAFING: i/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [
LOCATION: JET ASSEMBLY
PART NUMBER: FU & OX:
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE RESULTS IN PROPELLANT LEAKING INTO COMBUSTION CHAMBER,
WHERE IT CAN FREEZE, RESULTING IN LOSS OF THE JET. RM WILL
ANNOUNCE THE JET AS FAILED LEAKING AND DESELECT THE JET.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY RESULT IN LOSS OF CONTROL DURING
ENTRY. LEAKAGE ONORBIT CAN CAUSE LOSS OF LIFE FOLLOWING EVA IF
EVA CREW IS CONTAMINATED BY PROP. PROPELLANTS WILL NOT HAVE
ENOUGH TIME TO FREEZE DURING ABORTS.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43DH); FLIGHT RULE 6-95.
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-200
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 299 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
i/i
ITEM: JET ALIGNMENT BELLOWS, VERNIER, ALL AXES
FAILURE MODE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE OR LEAK)
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
JET ALIGNMENT BELLOWS, VERNIER, ALL AXES
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 1/1 RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF: 1/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: I/1
DEORBIT: I/1 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: i/i
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: FUEL/OXID LINES LEADING INTO JET BIPROP VALVE
PART NUMBER: FU & OX:
CAUSES: HIGH PRESSURE, VIBRATIOPN, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE CAUSES PROP TO LEAK INTO THE POD/VEHICLE. LOSS OF
PROP CAN CAUSE CORROSION, LEADING TO ELECTRICAL SHORTS AND PROP
IGNITION. FAILURE CAUSES HAZARD TO GROUND CREW.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43DH)
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-201
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 300 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/l
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
JET ALIGNMENT BELLOWS, VERNIER, ALL AXES
RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
JET ALIGNMENT BELLOWS, VERNIER, ALL AXES
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORB I T: I/1 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FUEL/OXID LINES LEADING INTO JET BIPROP VALVE
FU & OX:
CAUSES: VACUUM, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE MAY CAUSE UNACCEPTABLE PROPELLANT MIXTURE RATIO,
RESULTING IN ZOTS AND/OR THRUSTER NOZZLE BURNTHROUGH AND LOSS OF
VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43DH); FLIGHT RULE 6-95.
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-202
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT: 1/1
MDAC ID: 301 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLVS, VERNIERS, ALL AXES
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN/ON)
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLVS, VERNIERS, ALL AXES
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: JET ASSEMBLY
PART NUMBER: FU & OX:
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF VERNIER RCS. RM WILL NOT DESELECT
JET; MUST BE SECURED BY CREW CLOSING ITS MANIFOLD. A FAILED ON
JET CAN CAUSE CONTACT WITH PAYLOADS DURING RENDEZVOUS, RESULTING
IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND/OR EVA CREW.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43DH)
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-203
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/B7 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT: 2/2
MDAC ID: 302 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLVS, VERNIERS, ALL AXES
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED)
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLVS, VERNIERS, ALL AXES
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: JET ASSEMBLY
PART NUMBER: FU & OX:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, LOSS OF
SIGNAL FROM MDM, LOW TEMPERATURE FREEZES PROPELLANT IN VALVE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF VERNIER RCS. RM WILL DESELECT JET.
FAILURE CANNOT BE DETECTED UNTIL JET IS COMMANDED TO FIRE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43DH)
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-204
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: i/I
303 ABORT: i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLVS, VERNIERS, ALL AXES
LEAKS EXTERNALLY, ONE PROPELLANT
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3) THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLVS, VERNIERS, ALL AXES
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: i/1 RTLS: I/1
LI FTO FF: i/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: JET ASSEMBLY
PART NUMBER: FU & OX:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE RESULTS IN PROPELLANT LEAKING INTO POD/VEHICLE, CAUSING
CORROSION AND RESULTING IN ELECTRICAL SHORTS AND PROPELLANT
IGNITION.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43DH)
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-205
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 1/1
304 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLVS, VERNIERS, ALL AXES
LEAKS INTERNALLY, ONE PROPELLANT
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3) THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLVS, VERNIERS, ALL AXES
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: i/1 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBI T: 1/1 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: i/i
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] c[ ]
LOCATION: JET ASSEMBLY
PART NUMBER: FU & OX:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE RESULTS IN PROPELLANT LEAKING INTO INTO COMBUSTION
CHAMBER, WHERE IT CAN FREEZE, RESULTING IN LOSS OF THE VERNIER
RCS. LEAKAGE ONORBIT CAN CAUSE LOSS OF LIFE FOLLOWING EVA IF
CREW IS CONTAMINATED BY PROPELLANTS. INHALATION OF PROP VAPORS
ON GROUND CAN CAUSE LOSS OF LIFE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43DH)
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-206
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: i/i
305 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLVS, VERNIERS, ALL AXES
RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLVS, VERNIERS, ALL AXES
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORB I T: 1/1 AOA: 3 / 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: JET ASSEMBLY
PART NUMBER: FU & OX:
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE MAY CAUSE UNACCEPTABLE PROPELLANT MIXTURE RATIO,
RESULTING IN ZOTS AND/OR THRUSTER NOZZLE BURNTHROUGH AND LOSS OF
VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43DH)
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-207
INDEPENDENT ORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT: i/i
MDAC ID: 306 ABORT: i/i
ITEM: THRUSTER COMBUSTION CHAMBER OR NOZZLE EXTENSION,
PRIMARY, ALL AXES
FAILURE MODE: THRUSTER COMBUSTION CHAMBER OR NOZZLE EXTENSION
BURNTHROUGH
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3) THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
4) THRUSTER COMBUSTION CHAMBER OR NOZZLE EXTENSION, PRIMARY,
ALL AXES
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/1
LI FTOFF: i/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: I/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: JET ASSEMBLY
PART NUMBER: FU & OX:
CAUSES: IMPROPER MIXTURE RATIO, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
HOT, HIGH PRESSURE GAS VENTS INTO POD.
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43DH); FLIGHT RULE 6-95.
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-208
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT: i/i
MDAC ID: 307 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: THRUSTER COMBUSTION CHAMBER OR NOZZLE EXTENSION,
VERNIER, ALL AXES
FAILURE MODE: THRUSTER COMBUSTION CHAMBER OR NOZZLE EXTENSION
BURNTHROUGH
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3) THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
4) THRUSTER COMBUSTION CHAMBER OR NOZZLE EXTENSION, VERNIER,
ALL AXES
5)
6)
V)
8)
S)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3 / 3 RTLS: 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: JET ASSEMBLY
PART NUMBER: FU & OX:
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: IMPROPER MIXTURE RATIO, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF VRCS.
INTO POD.
HOT, HIGH PRESSURE GAS VENTS
REFERENCES: JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 11.5;
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2 (43DH).
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-209
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 308 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE OX & FU ISOL A & B VLVS
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
2/1R
2/IR
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
B [ P] C [ P ]
F BAY i, PCA i; F BAY 2, PCA 2
81V76A22R_C27; 82V76A23RPC27
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE GPC COMMAND SIGNAL TO OPEN FU & OX HE ISOL A/B VLV. VALVES
CAN STILL BE OPENED USING CREW SWITCH. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY,
WORST CASE, RESULTS IN BOTH A & B HE ISOL VLVs FAILED CLOSED CASE.
FOR THIS CASE, LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY TO THE VALVES
WILL AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS, AND MAY RESULT IN TRAPPED
PROPELLANTS CAUSING THE VEHICLE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES TO BE
EXCEEDED DURING ABORTS AND DEORBIT, LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-210
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 309 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
311R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE OX & FU ISOL A & B VLVS
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LO CAT I ON:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY I, PCA i; F BAY 2, PCA 2
81V76A22RPC27 ; 82V76A23RPC27
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE RESULTS IN THE FU & OX HE ISOL A/B VLVs BECOMING STUCK
INTO OPEN POSITION. THEREFORE THE HELIUM TK CANNOT BE ISOLATED
FROM THE PROPELLANT SYSTEM, NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO
OVERPRESSURIZATION AND RUPTURE OF PROP TANKS OR LINES,
FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD, AND HAZARD TO GROUND CREW. MAY ALSO CAUSE
ZOTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-211
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 310 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
_)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE OX & FU ISOL A & B VLVS
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
3/IR
3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: F BAY I, PCA i; F BAY 2, PCA 2
PART NUMBER: 81V76A22RPC40; 82V76A23RPC39
c[p]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO COMMAND FU & OX HE ISOL A/B VLVs CLOSED USING CREW
SWITCH OR GPC. WORST CASE RESULTS IN HE ISOLA/B VLVs BECOMING
STUCK IN THE OPEN POSITION. THEREFORE THE HE TK CANNOT BE
ISOLATED FROM THE PROPELLANT SYSTEM, NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO
OVERPRESSURIZATION AND RUPTURE OF PROP TANKS OR LINES,
FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD, AND HAZARD TO GROUND CREW. MAY ALSO CAUSE
ZOTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-212
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 311 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE OX & FU ISOL A & B VLVS
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2 R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LO CAT I ON:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY I, PCA I; F BAY 2, PCA 2
81V76A22RPC40; 82V76A23RPC39
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO COMMAND FU & OX HE ISOL A/B VLVs USING GPC.
CREW SWITCH CAN STILL OPEN OR CLOSE VLVs. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY,
WORST CASE, RESULTS IN FU & OX HE ISOL A/B VLVs BECOMING STUCK IN
THE CLOSED POSITION. FOR THIS CASE, LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY TO THE VALVES WILL AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS, AND MAY
RESULT IN PROPELLANTS CAUSING THE VEHICLE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES TO
BE EXCEEDED.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-213
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
312 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE OX & FU ISOL A & B VLVS
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
3/3 TAL: 2/IR
3/2R AOA: 2/IR
2/IR ATO: 2/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 2, PCA 2; F BAY 3, PCA 3
82V76A23RPC26; 83V76A24RPC27
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CREW SWITCH SIGNAL TO OPEN FU & OX HE ISOL A/B VLV. VALVES
CAN STILL BE OPENED USING CREW SWITCH. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY,
WORST CASE, RESULTS IN BOTH A & B HE ISOL VLVs FAILED CLOSED CASE.
FOR THIS CASE, LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY TO THE VALVES
WILL AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS, AND MAY RESULT IN TRAPPED
PROPELLANTS CAUSING THE VEHICLE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES TO BE
EXCEEDED DURING ABORTS AND DEORBIT, LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-214
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 313 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILURE MODE: FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2 ) CONTRO LS
3) HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE OX & FU ISOL A & B VLVS
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LO CAT I ON:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 2, PCA 2 ; F BAY 3, PCA 3
82V76A23RPC26; 83V76A24RPC27
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE RESULTS IN THE FU & OX HE ISOL A/B VLVs BECOMING STUCK
INTO OPEN POSITION. THEREFORE THE HELIUM TK CANNOT BE ISOLATED
FROM THE PROPELLANT SYSTEM, NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO
OVERPRESSURIZATION AND RUPTURE OF PROP TANKS OR LINES,
FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD, AND HAZARD TO GROUND CREW. MAY ALSO CAUSE
ZOTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-215
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 314 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
4) HE OX & FU ISOL A & B VLVS
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/ IR AOA: 3/ IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY I, PCA i; F BAY 2, PCA 2
81V76A22RPC41; 82V76A23CR7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO COMMAND FU & OX HE ISOL A/B VLVs CLOSED USING CREW
SWITCH OR GPC. WORST CASE RESULTS IN HE ISOL A/B VLVs BECOMING
STUCK IN THE OPEN POSITION. THEREFORE THE HE TK CANNOT BE
ISOLATED FROM THE PROPELLANT SYSTEM, NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO
OVERPRESSURIZATION AND RUPTURE OF PROP TANKS OR LINES,
FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD, AND HAZARD TO GROUND CREW. MAY ALSO CAUSE
ZOTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-216
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 315 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE OX & FU ISOL A & B VLVS
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
LOCATION: F BAY i, PCA i; F BAY 2, PCA 2
PART NUMBER: 81V76A22RPC41; 82V76A23CR7
c [ 3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO INHIBIT THE FU & OX HE ISOL A/B VLV "CLOSE"
CMD. THE INHIBIT FUNCTION IS USED FOR POWER SAVINGS AND IN CASE
OF A FAILURED ON COMMAND. NO EFFECT ON MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-217
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 316 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE OX & FU ISOL A & B VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/ IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ]
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
3/1R
3/1R
LO CAT ION:
PART NUMBER:
B [ P] C [ F ]
F BAY I, PCA i; F BAY 2, LCA 2
81V76AI6CR JI-85; 82V76AITCR Ji-85
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK,
OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO COMMAND FU & OX HE ISOL A/B VLVs CLOSED USING GPC.
CREW SWITCH CAN STILL OPEN OR CLOSE VLVS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY
IS POSSIBLE INABILITY TO ISOLATE HE SYSTEM LEADING TO
OVERPRESSURIZATION AND POSSIBLE RUPTURE OF PROP TANKS OR
LINES, FIRE/HAZARD, AND HAZARD TO GROUND CREW. MAY ALSO CAUSE
ZOTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-218
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
• DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 317 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM: DIODE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE OX & FU ISOL A & B VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P ] C [ F ]
LO CAT I ON:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, PCA i; F BAY 2, LCA 2
81V76AI6CR Ji-85; 82V76AI7CR Ji-85
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION,VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK,
OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ISOLATION BETWEEN GPC AND CREW SWITCH CLOSE COMMANDS. THE
FAILURE CAN RESULT IN LOSS OF THE GPC OR CREW SWITCH TO OPERATE
THE FU & OX HE ISOL A/B VLVs. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS POSSIBLE
INABILITY TO ISOLATE HE SYSTEM LEADING TO
OVERPRESSURIZATION AND POSSIBLE RUPTURE OF PROP TANKS OR LINES,
FIRE/HAZARD, AND HAZARD TO GROUND CREW. MAY ALSO CAUSE ZOTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-219
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 318 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
5)
6)
_)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
4) HE OX & FU ISOL A & B VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS:
LI FTOFF: 3/IR TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/ IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/ IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/ZR
3/IR
3/ZR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: F BAY i, PCA i; F BAY 2, LCA 2
PART NUMBER: 81V76AI6CR J2-79; 82V76AI7CR J2-79
C [ F ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION,VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK,
OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO COMMAND FU & OX HE ISOL A/B VLVs CLOSED USING CREW
SWITCH. GPC CAN STILL OPEN OR CLOSE VLVS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY
IS POSSIBLE INABILITY TO ISOLATE HE SYSTEM LEADING TO
OVERPRESSURIZATION AND POSSIBLE RUPTURE OF PROP TANKS OR
LINES, FIRE/HAZARD, AND HAZARD TO GROUND CREW. MAY ALSO CAUSE
ZOTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-220
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 319 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE OX & FU ISOL A & B VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P ] C [ F ]
LO CAT I ON:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY I, PCA I; F BAY 2, LCA 2
81V76AI6CR J2-79; 82V76AI7CR J2-79
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION,VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK,
OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ISOLATION BETWEEN GPC AND CREW SWITCH CLOSE COMMANDS. THE
FAILURE CAN RESULT IN LOSS OF THE GPC OR CREW SWITCH TO OPERATE
THE FU & OX HE ISOL A/B VLVs. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS POSSIBLE
INABILITY TO ISOLATE HE SYSTEM LEADING TO
OVERPRESSURIZATION OF PROP TANKS OR LINES, FIRE/HAZARD, AND HAZARD
TO GROUND CREW. MAY ALSO CAUSE ZOTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-221
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 320 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
211R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
_)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE OX & FU ISOL A & B VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LO CAT I ON:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY I, PCA I; F BAY 2, PCA 2
81V76A22CR37; 82V76A23CR8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK,
OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CREW SWITCH SIGNAL TO OPEN FU & OX HE ISOL A/B VLV. VALVES
CAN STILL BE OPENED USING CREW SWITCH. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY,
WORST CASE, RESULTS IN BOTH A & B HE ISOL VLVs FAILED CLOSED CASE.
FOR THIS CASE, LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY TO THE VALVES
WILL AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS, AND MAY RESULT IN TRAPPED
PROPELLANTS CAUSING THE VEHICLE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES TO BE
EXCEEDED DURING ABORTS AND DEORBIT, LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-222
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
321 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE OX & FU ISOL A & B VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, PCA i; F BAY 2, PCA 2
81V76A22CR37 ; 82V76A23CR8
CAUSES : CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK,
OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ISOLATION BETWEEN MAIN BUSES WHEN THE GPC CMDS THE FU & OX HE
ISOL A/B VLVs OPEN. THE WORST CASE EFFECT IS LOSS OF THE GPC OR
CREW SWITCH "OPEN" CMD. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY, WORST CASE,
RESULTS IN BOTH A & B HE ISOL VLVs BECOMING STUCK IN THE
CLOSED POSITION. FOR THIS CASE, LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY TO THE
VALVES WILL AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS, AND MAY RESULT IN TRAPPED
FRCS PROPELLANTS CAUSING THE VEHICLE SAFETY CG BOUNDARIES TO BE
EXCEEDED.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-223
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 322 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
211R
211R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
_)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE OX & FU ISOL A & B VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATI ON:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, PCA I; F BAY 2, PCA 2
81V76A22CRI3 ; 82V76A23RPC38
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK,
OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE GPC COMMAND SIGNAL TO OPEN FU & OX HE ISOLA/B VLV. VALVES
CAN STILL BE OPENED USING CREW SWITCH. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY,
WORST CASE, RESULTS IN BOTH A & B HE ISOL VLVs FAILED CLOSED CASE.
FOR THIS CASE, LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY TO THE VALVES
WILL AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS, AND MAY RESULT IN TRAPPED
PROPELLANTS CAUSING THE VEHICLE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES TO BE
EXCEEDED DURING ABORTS AND DEORBIT, LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-224
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
323 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/iS
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE OX & FU ISOL A & B VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 3/ 2R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY I, PCA I; F BAY 2, PCA 2
81V76A22CRI3; 82V76A23RPC38
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK,
OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ISOLATION BETWEEN MAIN BUSES WHEN THE CREW SWITCH CMDS THE FU
& OX HE ISOL A/B VLVs OPEN. THE WORST CASE EFFECT IS LOSS OF THE
GPC OR CREW SWITCH "OPEN" CMD. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY, WORST
CASE, RESULTS IN BOTH A & B HE ISOLVLVs BECOMING STUCK
IN THE CLOSED POSITION. FOR THIS CASE, LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY TO
THE VALVES WILL AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS, AND MAY RESULT IN
TRAPPED FRCS PROPELLANTS CAUSING THE VEHICLE SAFETY CG BOUNDARIES
TO BE EXCEEDED.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-225
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 324 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE OX & FU ISOL A & B VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 DS3
33V73A8CRI; 82V76AI7AR J4-55 TYPE II
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION,VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE THE FU & OX HE ISOL VLVs POSITION TALKBACK TO HARDWIRED CREW
INDICATOR. NO IMPACT, VALVE TALKBACK NOT MISSION CRITICAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO DO1
REPORT DATE 03/23/87 C-226
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 325 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE OX & FU ISOL A & B VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 DS3
33V73A8CRI; 82V76AITAR J4-55 TYPE II
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION,VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK,
OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, SWITCH TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-227
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 326 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE OX & FU ISOL A & B VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS :
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/ 3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] BC ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 DS3
33V73A8CR2; 33V73A8CR3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE THE FU HE ISOL VLVs POSITION TALKBACK TO HARDWIRED CREW
INDICATOR. NO IMPACT, VALVE TALKBACK NOT MISSION CRITICAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/23/87 C-228
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 327 ABORT:
ITEM: DIODE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE OX & FU ISOL A & B VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORB I T: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBI T: 3/ 3 ATO: 3/ 3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 DS3
33V73A8CR2; 33V73ASCR3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, SWITCH TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/23/87 C-229
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1127187
FRCS
328
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/IR
ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE OX & FU ISOL A & B VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: F BAY i, LCA i; F BAY 2, LCA 2
PART NUMBER: 81V76AI6AR J4-50 TYPE I; 82V76AI7AR J4-50 TYPE I
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO COMMAND FU & OX HE ISOL A/B VLVs CLOSED USING
CREW SWITCH OR GPC. WORST CASE RESULTS IN HE ISOL A/B VLVs
BECOMING STUCK IN THE OPEN POSITION. THEREFORE THE HE TK CANNOT
BE ISOLATED FROM THE PROPELLANT SYSTEM, NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO
OVERPRESSURIZATION AND RUPTURE OF PROP TANKS OR LINES,
FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD, AND HAZARD TO GROUND CREW. MAY ALSO CAUSE
ZOTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-230
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 329 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILURE MODE: FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE OX & FU ISOL A & B VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/ 2 R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/ 3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, LCA I; F BAY 2, LCA 2
81V76AI6AR J4-50 TYPE I; 82V76AI7AR J4-50 TYPE I
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO COMMAND FU & OX HE ISOL A/B VLVs USING GPC.
CREW SWITCH CAN STILL OPEN OR CLOSE VLVs. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY,
WORST CASE, RESULTS IN FU & OX HE ISOL A/B VLVs BECOMING STUCK IN
THE CLOSED POSITION. FOR THIS CASE, LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY TO THE VALVES WILL AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS, AND MAY
RESULT IN PROPELLANTS CAUSING THE VEHICLE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES TO
BE EXCEEDED.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-231
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 330 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
211R
2/1R
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2 ) CONTROLS
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE OX & FU ISOL A & B VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY I, LCA I; F BAY 2, LCA 2
81V76AI6AR J4-51 TYPE I; 82V76AI7AR J4-51 TYPE I
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE GPC COMMAND SIGNAL TO OPEN FU & OX HE ISOL A/B VLV. VALVES
CAN STILL BE OPENED USING CREW SWITCH. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY,
WORST CASE, RESULTS IN BOTH A & B HE ISOL VLVs FAILED CLOSED CASE.
FOR THIS CASE, LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY TO THE VALVES
WILL AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS, AND MAY RESULT IN TRAPPED
PROPELLANTS CAUSING THE VEHICLE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES TO BE
EXCEEDED DURING ABORTS AND DEORBIT, LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-232
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
331 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE OX & FU ISOL A & B VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A[ 2 ] B[P] C [P]
LO CAT I ON:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, LCA i; F BAY 2, LCA 2
81V76AI6AR J4-51 TYPE I; 82V76AI7AR J4-51 TYPE I
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE RESULTS IN THE FU & OX HE ISOLA/B VLVs BECOMING STUCK
INTO OPEN POSITION. THEREFORE THE HELIUM TK CANNOT BE ISOLATED
FROM THE PROPELLANT SYSTEM, NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO
OVERPRESSURIZATION AND RUPTURE OF PROP TANKS OR LINES,
FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD, AND HAZARD TO GROUND CREW. MAY ALSO CAUSE
ZOTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-233
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
332 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE OX & FU ISOL A & B VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 3/ 2R AOA: 2/ IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 2, LCA 2; F BAY 3, LCA 3
82V76AITAR J4-57 TYPE I; 83V76AI8R Ji-92 (A)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSE CREW SWITCH SIGNAL TO OPEN FU & OX HE ISOL A/B VLV. VALVES
CAN STILL BE OPENED USING CREW SWITCH. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY,
WORST CASE, RESULTS IN BOTH A & B HE ISOL VLVs FAILED CLOSED CASE.
FOR THIS CASE, LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY TO THE VALVES
WILL AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS, AND MAY RESULT IN TRAPPED
PROPELLANTS CAUSING THE VEHICLE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES TO BE
EXCEEDED DURING ABORTS AND DEORBIT, LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-234
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
333 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE OX & FU ISOL A & B VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: F BAY 2, LCA 2; F BAY 3, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 82V76AI7AR J4-57 TYPE I; 83V76AI8R Ji-92 (A)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE RESULTS IN THE FU & OX HE ISOL A/B VLVs BECOMING STUCK
INTO OPEN POSITION. THEREFORE THE HELIUM TK CANNOT BE ISOLATED
FROM THE PROPELLANT SYSTEM, NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO
OVERPRESSURIZATION AND RUPTURE OF PROP TANKS OR LINES,
FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD, AND HAZARD TO GROUND CREW. MAY ALSO CAUSE
ZOTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-235
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
334 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE OX & FU ISOL A & B VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] BC ] cc ]
LO CAT I ON:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, LCA i; F BAY 2, LCA 2
81V76AI6AR J4-53 TYPE II; 82V76AI7AR J4-53 TYPE II
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DUAL EFFECT: FIRST, FALSE INDICATION OF FU & OX HE ISOL A/B VLV
MISMATCH (GPC HAS CORRECT POSITION); TALKBACK NOT MISSION
CRTICAL. SECOND, LOSE CONTROL FEEDBACK TO REMOVE POWER FROM VLV
ONCE IT HAS LATCHED; VALVE CAN WITHSTAND CONTINUOUS ENERGIZATION.
REFERENCES:
SEQ 8
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; MC284-0420 REV C AMENDMENT
REPORT DATE 03/23/87 C-236
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 335 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE OX & FU ISOL A & B VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: F BAY i, LCA i; F BAY 2, LCA 2
PART NUMBER: 81V76AI6AR J4-53 TYPE II; 82V76AI7AR J4-53 TYPE II
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE RESULTS IN A FALSE CREW (BARBER POLE) INDICATION OF VLV
CLOSURE AND A FALSE CONTROL FEEDBACK WHICH INHIBITS ALL GPC AND
CREW SWITCH "CLOSE" COMMANDS. THE FAILURE CAN RESULT IN ONE OF THE
TWO FU & OX HE ISOL (A OR B) VLVtS BECOMING STUCK IN
THE OPEN POSITION. THEREFORE THE HE TK CANNOT BE ISOLATED FROM THE
PROPELLANT SYSTEM, NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS
POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO OVERPRESSURIZATION AND
POSSIBLE RUPPTURE OF PROP TANKS OR LINES,
FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD, AND HAZARD TO GROUND CREW. MAY ALSO CAUSE
ZOTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO DO1
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-237
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 336 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE OX & FU ISOL A & B VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [
LOCATION: PNL 08 DS4
PART NUMBER: 81V76AI6AR J4-55 TYPE II; 33V73A8CR4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DUAL EFFECT: FIRST, FALSE INDICATION OF FU & OX HE ISOL A/B VLV
MISMATCH (GPC HAS CORRECT POSITION); TALKBACK NOT MISSION
CRTICAL. SECOND, LOSE CONTROL FEEDBACK TO REMOVE POWER FROM VLV
ONCE IT HAS LATCHED; VALVE CAN WITHSTAND CONTINUOUS ENERGIZATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/23/87 C-238
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
337 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE OX & FU ISOL A & B VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
3/IR
3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ F ] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 DS4
81V76AI6AR J4-55 TYPE II; 33V73A8CR4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE RESULTS IN A FALSE CREW (BARBER POLE) INDICATION OF VLV
OPENING AND A FALSE CONTROL FEEDBACK WHICH INHIBITS ALL GPC AND
CREW SWITCH "OPEN" COMMANDS. THE FAILURE CAN RESULT IN ONE OF THE
TWO (A OR B) HE ISOL VALVES FAILING CLOSED CASE.
FOR THIS CASE, LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY TO THE VALVES WILL CAUSE
LOSS OF HE PRESSURIZATION CAPABILITY, WHICH WILL AFFECT ONORBIT
OPERATIONS AND MAY CAUSE THE VEHICLE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES TO BE
EXCEEDED DURING ENTRY OR ABORTS DUE TO THE TRAPPED
PROPELLANT'S WEIGHT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-239
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 338 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
_)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE OX & FU ISOL A & B VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITI CALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBI T: 3/1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 DS4
81V76AI6AR J4-52 TYPE I; 82V76AI7AR J4-52 TYPE I
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO COMMAND FU & OX HE ISOL A/B VLVs CLOSED USING CREW
SWITCH OR GPC. WORST CASE RESULTS IN HE ISOL A/B VLVs BECOMING
STUCK IN THE OPEN POSITION. THEREFORE THE HE TK CANNOT BE
ISOLATED FROM THE PROPELLANT SYSTEM, NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO
OVERPRESSURIZATION AND RUPTURE OF PROP TANKS OR LINES,
FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD, AND HAZARD TO GROUND CREW. MAY ALSO CAUSE
ZOTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-240
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
339 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE OX & FU ISOL A & B VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3 / 3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 DS4
81V76AI6AR J4-52 TYPE I; 82V76AI7AR J4-52 TYPE I
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO INHIBIT THE FU & OX HE ISOL A/B VLV "CLOSE"
CMD. THE INHIBIT FUNCTION IS USED FOR POWER SAVINGS AND IN CASE
OF A FAILURED ON COMMAND. NO EFFECT ON MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-241
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
340 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, IA
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE OX & FU ISOL A & B VLVS
FUSE, IA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B[P] C[F]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 S16; PNL 08 S17
33V73A8F4; 33V73A8F23
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION,VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK,
OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO COMMAND FU & OX HE ISOL A/B VLVs CLOSED USING CREW
SWITCH. GPC CAN STILL OPEN OR CLOSE VLVS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY
IS POSSIBLE INABILITY TO ISOLATE HE SYSTEM LEADING TO
OVERPRESSURIZATION AND POSSIBLE RUPTURE OF PROP TANKS OR
LINES, FIRE/HAZARD, AND HAZARD TO GROUND CREW. MAY ALSO CAUSE
ZOTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-242
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 341 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, IA
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE OX & FU ISOL A & B VLVS
FUSE, IA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/iR
3/IR
3/IR
3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 S16; PNL 08 S17
33V73A8FI3; 33V73A8F28
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK,
OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ALL BUT ONE COMMAND (A GPC OPEN CMD) TO OPERATE FU & OX HE
ISOL A/B VLVs. THE FAILURE RESULTS IN EITHER A OR B HE ISOL VALVE
FAILED OPEN. THE EFFECT IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO
OVERPRESSURIZATION AND POSSIBLE RUPTURE OF PROP TANKS
LINES, FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD, AND HAZARD TO GROUND CREW. MAY ALSO
CAUSE ZOTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-243
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSISWORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
342 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE OX & FU ISOL A & B VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/3
DEORB I T: 3/ 3 ATO: 3/ 3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
J2-79 (A)
F BAY i, LCA i; F BAY 2, LCA 2
81V76AI6R Ji-86 TO J2-79 (A); 82V76AI7R JI-86 TO
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE FRCS HE PRESS VLV A/B POSITION TALKBACK TO GPC.
VALVE POSITION TALKBACK NOT MISSION CRITICAL.
NO IMPACT,
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/23/87 C-244
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 343 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE OX & FU ISOL A & B VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] c[ ]
LO CAT I ON:
PART NUMBER:
79 (A)
F BAY i, LCA i; F BAY 2, LCA 2
81V76AI6R JI-86 TO J2-79 (A); 82V76AITR Ji-86 TO J2-
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION,VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK,
OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, SWITCH TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-245
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 344 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE OX & FU ISOL A & B VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
79 (B)
F BAY I, LCA I; F BAY 2, LCA 2
81V76AI6R Ji-86 TO J2-79 (B); 82V76AI7R Ji-86 TO J2-
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK,
OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, SWITCH TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-246
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 345 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
"I)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE OX & FU ISOL A & B VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
J2-79 (A)
F BAY i, LCA i; F BAY 2, LCA 2
81V76AI6R Ji-86 TO J2-79 (A); 82V76AI7R JI-86 TO
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION,VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE FRCS HE PRESS VLV A/B POSITION TALKBACK TO GPC. NO IMPACT,
VALVE POSITION TALKBACK NOT MISSION CRITICAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/23/87 C-247
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 346 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE OX & FU ISOL A & B VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/ 3 ATO: 3/ 3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: F BAY 2, LCA 2; F BAY 3, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 82V76AI7R JI-92 (A) ; 83V76AI8AR J4-57 TYPE I
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE FRCS HE PRESS VLV A/B POSITION TALKBACK TO GPC. NO IMPACT,
VALVE POSITION TALKBACK NOT MISSION CRITICAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/23/87 C-248
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 347 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
_)
4)
5)
6)
V)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE OX & FU ISOL A & B VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 2, LCA 2 ; F BAY 3, LCA 3
82V76AI7R Ji-92 (A) ; 83V76AI8AR J4-57 TYPE I
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION,VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK,
OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, SWITCH TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-249
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 348 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE OX & FU ISOL A & B VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY I, LCA i; F BAY 2, LCA 2
81V76AI6R Ji-88; 82V76AI7R Ji-88
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE THE FU HE ISOL VLVs POSITION TALKBACK TO GPC. NO IMPACT,
VALVE TALKBACK NOT MISSION CRITICAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/23/87 C-250
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 349 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE OX & FU ISOL A & B VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATI ON:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY I, LCA I; F BAY 2, LCA 2
81V76AI6R Ji-88; 82V76AI7R JI-88
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK,
OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, SWITCH TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-251
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 350 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE OX & FU ISOL A & B VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, LCA I; F BAY 2, LCA 2
81V76AI6R JI-90; 82V76AI7R Ji-90
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE THE FU HE ISOL VLVs POSITION TALKBACK TO GPC. NO IMPACT,
VALVE TALKBACK NOT MISSION CRITICAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/23/87 C-252
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 351 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE OX & FU ISOL A & B VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: F BAY i, LCA i; F BAY 2, LCA 2
PART NUMBER: 81V76AI6R JI-90; 82V76AI7R Ji-90
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK,
OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, SWITCH TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-253
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 352 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE OX & FU ISOL A & B VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DE ORB I T: 3/ 3 ATO • 3/ 3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, LCA I; F BAY 2, LCA 2
81V76AI6R Ji-91; 82V76AITR JI-91
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE THE OX HE ISOL VLVs POSITION TALKBACK TO GPC. NO IMPACT,
VALVE TALKBACK NOT MISSION CRITICAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/23/87 C-254
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 353 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE OX & FU ISOL A & B VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
B[ ] C[ ]
LO CAT I ON:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY I, LCA i; F BAY 2, LCA 2
81V76AI6R Ji-91; 82V76AI7R Ji-91
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION,VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK,
OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, SWITCH TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-255
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 354 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE OX & FU ISOL A & B VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B C ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, LCA i; F BAY 2, LCA 2
81V76AI6R JI-89; 82V76AI7R JI-89
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION,VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE THE OX HE ISOL VLVs POSITION TALKBACK TO GPC. NO IMPACT,
VALVE TALKBACK NOT MISSION CRITICAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/23/87 C-256
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
355 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE OX & FU ISOL A & B VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
LOCATION: F BAY I, LCA i; F BAY 2, LCA 2
PART NUMBER: 81V76AI6R Ji-89; 82V76A17R Ji-89
c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION,VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK,
OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, SWITCH TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO DO1
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-257
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 356 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE OX & FU ISOL A & B VLVS
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, LCA I; F BAY 2, LCA 2
81V76AI6R Jl-104; 82V76AITR J2-i04
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION,VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK,
OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DUAL EFFECT: FIRST, FALSE INDICATION: CREW HARDWARE TALKBACK WILL
INDICATE FU & OX HE ISOL VLV MISMATCH AND GPC WILL INDICATE BOTH
VALVES STUCK PARTIALLY OPEN/PARTIALLY CLOSED; VALVE TALKBACK NOT
MISSION CRITICAL..
SECOND, LOSE CONTROL FEEDBACK TO REMOVE POWER FROM VALVE ONCE IT
HAS LATCHED: VALVE CAN WITHSTAND CONTINUOUS ENERGIZATION.
REFERENCES:
SEQ 8
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; MC284-0420 REV C AMENDMENT
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-258
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
357 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE OX & FU ISOL A & B VLVS
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, LCA i; F BAY 2, LCA 2
81V76AI6R J2-I04; 82V76AI7R J2-I04
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK,
OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, SWITCH TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE TO HYBRID DRIVER LOGIC
CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-259
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 358 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS IN THE OPEN POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE OX & FU ISOL A & B VLVS
HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/ 1R AOA: 3/ IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 S16
33V73A8SI6; S17
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION,VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK,
OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE PRESSURE REGULATOR AND THE PRESSURE
RELIEF VALVE. IF THE SWITCH FAILS IN THE OPEN POSITION WHILE THE
VALVE IS IN ANY POSITION, THE VALVE WILL OPEN AND CANNOT BE CLOSED
BY MDM COMMAND.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN THE OVERPRESSURIZATION
AND RUPTURE OF THE PROPELLANT TANKS AND/OR LINES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV D EO DO1, CA, DA
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-260
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 359 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
311R
3/ZR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS IN THE CLOSED POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE OX & FU ISOL A & B VLVS
HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 S16
33V73A8SI6; S17
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION,VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK,
OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM OPEN COMMANDS AND THE PARALLEL ISOL
VALVE. IF THE SWITCH FAILS IN THE CLOSED POSITION WHILE THE VALVE
IS IN ANY POSITION, THE VALVE WILL CLOSE. IF THE MDM OPEN COMMAND
IS ALSO PRESENT, OR THE SWITCH OPEN COMMAND IS
ALSO PRESENT, THE VALVE WILL CYCLE OPEN AND CLOSED UNTIL THE MDM
OR SWITCH OPEN COMMAND IS REMOVED, ORUNTILTHE CONTROL BUS POWER
IS REMOVED FROM EITHER OF THE SWITCH'S CLOSE CONTACTS. TO OPEN
THE VALVE, CREW MUSTREMOVE POWER FROM EITHER OF THE
SWITCHIS CLOSE CONTACTS 5,6, AND THEN USE THE GPC READ/WRITE
PROCEDURES. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL AFFECT ONORBIT
OPREATIONS, AND WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANTS DURING ABORTS TO MEET THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV D EO D01, CA, DA
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-261
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 360 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM: HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FAILS IN THE GPC POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE OX & FU ISOL A & B VLVS
HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ IR RTLS: 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/ IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 S16
33V73A8SI6; S17
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION,VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK,
OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE PRESSURE REGULATOR AND THE PRESSURE
RELIEF VALVE. TO OPERATE THE VALVE, THE CREW MUST USE THE GPC
READ/WRITE PROCEDURES. IF THE VALVE IS CLOSED ANDTHE MDM OPEN
COMMAND PATH FAILS, THE VALVE CANNOT BE OPENED BY THE MDM
SWITCH COMMANDS. IF THE VALVE IS OPEN WHEN THE SWITCH FAILS, AND
ALL REDUNDANCY FAILS, THE RESULT WILL BE OVERPRESSURIZATION AND
RUPTURE OF THE PROPELLANT TANKS AND/OR LINES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV D EO D01, CA, DA
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-262
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 3/3
361 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
2
FAILURE MODE:
HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS i,
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE OX & FU ISOL A & B VLVS
HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS i, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 S16
33V73ASSI6; S17
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION,VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK,
OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THESE CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV D EO D01, CA, DA
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-263
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 3/3
362 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
2
FAILURE MODE:
HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS i,
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE OX & FU ISOL A & B VLVS
HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS i, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 S16
33V73A8SI6; S17
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK,
OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THESE CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV D EO D01, CA, DA
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-264
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 3/3
363 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 3, 4
SWITCH GPC CONTACTS FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE OX & FU ISOL A & B VLVS
HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 S16
33V73A8SI6; S17
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION,VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK,
OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THESE CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV D EO D01, CA, DA
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-265
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 364 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH GPC CONTACTS3, 4
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH GPC CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE OX & FU ISOL A & B VLVS
HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 S16
33V73A8SI6; S17
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK,
OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THESE CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV D EO D01, CA, DA
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-266
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 3/IR
365 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
6
FAILURE MODE:
HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS 5,
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE OX & FU ISOL A & B VLVS
HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS 5, 6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 S16
33V73A8SI6; S17
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION,VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK,
OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM CLOSE COMMAND, THE PRESSURE
REGULATOR, AND THE PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE. IF THE CLOSE CONTACTS
FAIL OPEN WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN ANY POSITION, THE VALVE WILL
REMAIN IN THAT POSITION, CAN BE OPENED BY THE SWITCH OR BY THE MDM
COMMAND, AND CANNOT BE CLOSED BY THE SWITCH COMMAND, ONLY BY THE
MDM COMMAND. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN
OVERPRESSURIZATION AND RUPTURE OF THE PROPELLANT TANKS AND/OR
LINES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV D EO D01, CA, DA
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-267
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 3/IR
366 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
5, 6
FAILURE MODE:
HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
s)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE OX & FU ISOL A & B VLVS
HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS 5, 6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 S16
33V73A8SI6; S17
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM OPEN COMMANDS, THE OTHER SWITCH
CLOSE CONTACTS, AND THE PARALLEL ISOL VALVE. IF THE CLOSE
CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN THE GPC OR CLOSED
POSITION, THE VALVE WILL CLOSE, AND CANNOT BE OPENED BY MDM
COMMAND, ONLY BY SWITCH COMMAND. IF THE CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED
WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN THE OPEN POSITION, THE VALVE WILL REMAIN
OPEN, AND CANNOT BE CLOSE BY MDM COMMAND, ONLY BY SWITCH COMMAND.
TO OPEN THE VALVE WITH THE MDM COMMAND, THE CREW MUST REMOVE
CONTROL BUS POWER FROM THE CLOSE CONTACTS 5,6, AND USE THE GPC
READ/WRITE PROCEDURES. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL AFFECT
ONORBIT OPERATIONS, AND MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROP DURING ENTRY AND ABORTS TO MEET THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV D EO D01, CA, DA
REPORT DATE 03/23/87 C-268
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 3/IR
367 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
8
FAILURE MODE:
HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS 7,
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE OX & FU ISOL A & B VLVS
HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS 7, 8
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 S16
33V73A8SI6; S17
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM OPEN COMMANDS AND THE PARALLEL
ISOL VALVE. IF THE OPEN CONTACTS FAIL OPEN WHILE THE SWITCH IS
IN ANY POSITION, THE VALVE WILL REMAIN IN THAT POSITION, CAN BE
CLOSED BY SWITCH OR MDM COMMAND, BUT CANNOT BE OPENED BY SWITCH
COMMAND, ONLY BY MDM COMMAND. FAILURE OF ALLREDUNDANCY WILL
AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS, AND MAY RESULT IN THE INABILITY TO
EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANT DURING ENTRY AND ABORTS TO MEET THE CG
SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV D EO D01, CA, DA
REPORT DATE 03/23/87 C-269
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 3/IR
368 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
8
FAILURE MODE:
HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS 7,
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE OX & FU ISOL A & B VLVS
HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS 7, 8
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PNL 08 S16
PART NUMBER: 33V73A8SI6; S17
B [ P] C [ P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION,VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK,
OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE PRESSURE REGULATOR AND THE PRESSURE
RELIEF VALVE . IF THE OPEN CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH
IS IN THE OPEN OR GPC POSITION, THE VALVE WILL OPEN. IF THE OPEN
CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN THE CLOSED
POSITION, OR IF THE MDM CLOSE COMMAND IS ALSO PRESENT, THE VALVE
WILL CYCLE OPEN AND CLOSED UNTIL CONTROL BUS POWER TO THE OPEN OR
CLOSE CONTACTS IS REMOVED, OR UNTIL THE MDM CLOSE COMMAND IS
REMOVED.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN THE OVERPRESSURIZATION
AND RUPTURE OF THE PROPELLANT TANKS AND/OR LINES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV D EO D01, CA, DA
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-270
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 3/3
369 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
i0
FAILURE MODE:
HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 9,
SWITCH GPC CONTACTS FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE OX & FU ISOL A & B VLVS
HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 9, i0
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 S16
33V73A8SI6; S17
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION,VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK,
OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM OPEN COMMAND AND THE PARALLEL
ISOLATION VALVE. IF THE GPC CONTACTS FAIL OPEN, THE VALVE CAN BE
OPENED BY SWITCH OR MDM COMMAND, CAN BE CLOSED BY SWITCH COMMAND,
AND CANNOT BE CLOSED BY MDM COMMAND UNLESS THE SWITCH IS IN
THE CLOSED POSITION. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN
LOSS OF GPC CONTROL OF THE HELIUM PRESSURE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV D EO D01, CA, DA
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-271
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 3/IR
370 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
i0
FAILURE MODE:
HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 9,
SWITCH GPC CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE OX & FU ISOL A & B VLVS
HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 9, i0
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LI FTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
3/3 TAL: 3/IR
3/2R AOA: 3/IR
3/IR ATO: 3/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 S16
33V73A8SI6; S17
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK,
OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE OTHER CLOSE CONTACTS AND THE SWITCH AND
MDM OPEN COMMAND. FIRST FAILURE WILL HAVE NO EFFECT. FAILURE OF
ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO THE OPEN VALVE, WHICH
WILL AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS AND MAY CAUSE THE
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS DURING ENTRY OR ABORTS TO
MEET THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV D EO D01, CA, DA
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-272
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 3/1R
371 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
ii, 12
FAILURE MODE:
HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE OX & FU ISOL A & B VLVS
HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS Ii, 12
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 S16
33V73A8SI6; SIT
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION,VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK,
OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE SWITCH GPC CONTACTS AND THE MDM CLOSE
COMMAND, AND BY THE PRESSURE REGULATORS AND THE PRESSURE RELIEF
VALVE. IF THE CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL OPEN WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN ANY
POSITION, THE VALVE WILL REMAIN IN THAT POSITION,
CAN BE OPENED BY THE SWITCH OR MDM COMMAND, BUT CANNOT BE CLOSED
BY THE SWITCH OR MDM CLOSE COMMAND. THE VALVE CAN BE CLOSED BY
PLACING THE SWITCH IN THE GPC POSITION, AND THEN USING THE GPC
READ/WRITE PROCEDURES.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN THE OVERPRESSURIZATION
AND RUPTURE OF THE PROPELLANT TANKS AND/OR LINES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV D EO D01, CA, DA
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-273
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 3/IR
372 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
Ii, 12
FAILURE MODE:
HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE OX & FU ISOL A & B VLVS
HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS ii, 12
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS : 3/1R
3/3 TAL: 3/1R
3/2R AOA: 3/IR
3/1R ATO: 3/1R
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ]
LOCATION: PNL 08 S16
PART NUMBER: 33V73A8SI6; S17
B [ F ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION,VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE OTHER SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS AND THE
PARALLEL ISOL VALVE. IF THE CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE
SWITCH IS IN ANY POSITION, THE VALVE WILL REMAIN IN THAT
POSITION, AND CAN BE CLOSED AND OPENED BY SWITCH OR MDM COMMAND.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS, AND MAY
CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS DURING ENTRY OR
ABORTS TO MEET THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV D EO D01, CA, DA
REPORT DATE 03/23/87 C-274
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 373 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: HE TK PRESS-2 PRESS SENSOR
FAILURE MODE: INDICATES LOWER PRESSURE THAN ACTUAL
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE TK
HE TK PRESS-2 PRESS SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/ 3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD FUSELAGE AREA 20
22V42MT6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
FAILURE OF TANK PRESSURE SENSORS WILL CAUSE GROUND AND FLIGHT
CREW DIFFICULTY IN DETECTING A TANK LEAK. CREW MAY MAKE BAD
DECISION BASED ON ERRONEOUS DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE 11.6
REPORT DATE 03/23/87 C-275
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 374 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: HE TK PRESS-2 PRESS SENSOR
FAILURE MODE: INDICATES HIGHER PRESSURE THAN ACTUAL
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE TK
HE TK PRESS-2 PRESS SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORB IT: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/ 3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD FUSELAGE AREA 20
22V42MT6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF TANK PRESSURE SENSORS WILL CAUSE GROUND AND FLIGHT
CREW DIFFICULTY IN DETECTING A TANK LEAK. CREW MAY MAKE BAD
DECISION BASED ON ERRONEOUS DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE ii.6
REPORT DATE 03/23/87 C-276
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 375 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: HE FU TK PRESS-I PRESS SENSOR
FAILURE MODE: INDICATES LOWER PRESSURE THAN ACTUAL
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE TK
HE FU TK PRESS-I PRESS SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: FWD FUSELAGE AREA 20
PART NUMBER: 22V42MT5
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF TANK PRESSURE SENSORS WILL CAUSE GROUND AND FLIGHT
CREW DIFFICULTY IN DETECTING A TANK LEAK. CREW MAY MAKE BAD
DECISION BASED ON ERRONEOUS DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE 11.6
REPORT DATE 03/23/87 C-277
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 376 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HE FU TK PRESS-I PRESS SENSOR
INDICATES HIGHER PRESSURE THAN ACTUAL
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE TK
HE FU TK PRESS-I PRESS SENSOR
SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD FUSELAGE AREA 20
22V42MT5
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF TANK PRESSURE SENSORS WILL CAUSE GROUND AND FLIGHT
CREW DIFFICULTY IN DETECTING A TANK LEAK. CREW MAY MAKE BAD
DECISION BASED ON ERRONEOUS DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE 11.6
REPORT DATE 03/23/87 C-278
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 377 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: HE OX TK PRESS-I PRESS SENSOR
FAILURE MODE: INDICATES LOWER PRESSURE THAN ACTUAL
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE TK
HE OX TK PRESS-I PRESS SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD FUSELAGE AREA 20
22V42MT3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF TANK PRESSURE SENSORS WILL CAUSE GROUND AND FLIGHT
CREW DIFFICULTY IN DETECTING A TANK LEAK. CREW MAY MAKE BAD
DECISION BASED ON ERRONEOUS DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE i1.6
REPORT DATE 03/23/87 C-279
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 378 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: HE OX TK PRESS-I PRESS SENSOR
FAILURE MODE: INDICATES HIGHER PRESSURE THAN ACTUAL
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE TK
HE OX TK PRESS-I PRESS SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBI T: 3/ 3 AOA: 3 / 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: FWD FUSELAGE AREA 20
PART NUMBER: 22V42MT3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
FAILURE OF TANK PRESSURE SENSORS WILL CAUSE GROUND AND FLIGHT
CREW DIFFICULTY IN DETECTING A TANK LEAK. CREW MAY MAKE BAD
DECISION BASED ON ERRONEOUS DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE ii.6
REPORT DATE 03/23/87 C-280
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
379 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HE OX TK PRESS-2 PRESS SENSOR
INDICATES LOWER PRESSURE THAN ACTUAL
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
INSTRUMENTATION
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE TK
HE OX TK PRESS-2 PRESS SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: FWD FUSELAGE AREA 20
PART NUMBER: 22V42MT4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF TANK PRESSURE SENSORS WILL CAUSE GROUND AND FLIGHT
CREW DIFFICULTY IN DETECTING A TANK LEAK. CREW MAY MAKE BAD
DECISION BASED ON ERRONEOUS DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE 11.6
REPORT DATE 03/23/87 C-281
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 380 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HE OX TK PRESS-2 PRESS SENSOR
INDICATES HIGHER PRESSURE THAN ACTUAL
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE TK
HE OX TK PRESS-2 PRESS SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD FUSELAGE AREA 20
22V42MT4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF TANK PRESSURE SENSORS WILL CAUSE GROUND AND FLIGHT
CREW DIFFICULTY IN DETECTING A TANK LEAK. CREW MAY MAKE BAD
DECISION BASED ON ERRONEOUS DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE 11.6
REPORT DATE 03/23/87 C-282
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 381 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HE OX TK TEMP-I TEMP SENSOR
INDICATES LOWER TEMPERATURE THAN ACTUAL
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE TK
HE OX TK TEMP-I TEMP SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: FWD FUSELAGE AREA 20
PART NUMBER: 22V42MTI5
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF TANK TEMPERATURE SENSOR AND REDUNDANT PRESSURE SENSORS
WILL CAUSE GROUND AND FLIGHT CREW DIFFICULTY IN DETECTING A TANK
LEAK. CREW MAY MAKE BAD DECISION BASED ON ERRONEOUS DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE 11.6
REPORT DATE 03/23/87 C-283
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 382 ABORT:
ITEM: HE OX TK TEMP-I TEMP SENSOR
FAILURE MODE: INDICATES HIGHER TEMPERATURE THANACTUAL
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2 ) INSTRUMENTATION
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE TK
HE OX TK TEMP-I TEMP SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: FWD FUSELAGE AREA 20
PART NUMBER: 22V42MTI5
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF TANK TEMPERATURE SENSOR AND REDUNDANT PRESSURE SENSORS
WILL CAUSE GROUND AND FLIGHT CREW DIFFICULTY IN DETECTING A TANK
LEAK. CREW MAY MAKE BAD DECISION BASED ON ERRONEOUS DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE 11.6
REPORT DATE 03/23/87 C-284
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 383 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HE OX TK TEMP-I TEMP SENSOR
INDICATES LOWER TEMPERATURE THANACTUAL
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
1) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) INSTRUMENTATION
3) HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE TK
HE OX TK TEMP-I TEMP SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: FWD FUSELAGE AREA 20
PART NUMBER: 22V42MTI
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF TANK TEMPERATURE SENSOR AND REDUNDANT PRESSURE SENSORS
WILL CAUSE GROUND AND FLIGHT CREW DIFFICULTY IN DETECTING A TANK
LEAK. CREW MAY MAKE BAD DECISION BASED ON ERRONEOUS DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE 11.6
REPORT DATE 03/23/87 C-285
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 384 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HE OX TK TEMP-I TEMP SENSOR
INDICATES HIGHER TEMPERATURE THAN ACTUAL
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE TK
HE OX TK TEMP-I TEMP SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: FWD FUSELAGE AREA 20
PART NUMBER: 22V42MTI
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF TANK TEMPERATURE SENSOR AND REDUNDANT PRESSURE SENSORS
WILL CAUSE GROUND AND FLIGHT CREW DIFFICULTY IN DETECTING A TANK
LEAK. CREW MAY MAKE BAD DECISION BASED ON ERRONEOUS DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE 11.6
REPORT DATE 03/23/87 C-286
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 385 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HE FU TK TEMP-I TEMP SENSOR
INDICATES LOWER TEMPERATURE THAN ACTUAL
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE TK
HE FU TK TEMP-I TEMP SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] c[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD FUSELAGE AREA 2O
22V42MT2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF TANK TEMPERATURE SENSOR AND REDUNDANT PRESSURE SENSORS
WILL CAUSE GROUND AND FLIGHT CREW DIFFICULTY IN DETECTING A TANK
LEAK. CREW MAY MAKE BAD DECISION BASED ON ERRONEOUS DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE 11.6
REPORT DATE 03/23/87 C-287
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/19/87 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 386 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HE FU TK TEMP-I TEMP SENSOR
INDICATES HIGHER TEMPERATURE THAN ACTUAL
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE TK
HE FU TK TEMP-I TEMP SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD FUSELAGE AREA 20
22V42MT2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF TANK TEMPERATURE SENSOR AND REDUNDANT PRESSURE SENSORS
WILL CAUSE GROUND AND FLIGHT CREW DIFFICULTY IN DETECTING A TANK
LEAK. CREW MAY MAKE BAD DECISION BASED ON ERRONEOUS DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE 11.6
REPORT DATE 03/23/87 C-288
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 3/IR
387 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MIDTRAVEL)
HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH TALKBACK
ERRONEOUS INDICATION (FAILS HIGH, FAILS LOW, FAILS
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE OX & FU ISOL A & B VLVS
HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH TALKBACK
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/ 1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/ 1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 DS3, DS4
33V73A8DS3 ; DS4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FWD RCS HE PRESS A/B POSITION INDICATION WOULD FALSELY SHOW A
BARBERPOLE INDICATING EITHER THE FU OR OX A OR B VALVES ARE STUCK
PARTIALLY OPEN/CLOSED OR THERE IS A POSITION MISMATCH BETWEEN THE
TWO VALVES. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT
IN LOSS OF DIRECT VALVE TALKBACK TO CREW. WORST CASE WOULD BE
FALSELY FAILING THE A OR B VALVE CLOSED RESULTING IN LOSS OF
MISSION DUE TO SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS (ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS
OF VEHICLE/LIFE) .
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE 11.6
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-289
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 388 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
v)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83V76AII3AICR4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CONTROL FEEDBACK FROM FUTK ISOL 1/2 VALVE TO DE-ENERGIZE
RELAY ONCE THE VALVE REACHES THE COMMANDED POSITION. NO EFFECT ON
MISSION, AC MOTOR VALVE DESIGNED TO WITHSTAND CONTINUOUS POWER.
REFERENCES:
SEQ. 7
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; MC482-0430 REV E AMENDMENT
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-290
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 389 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: DIODE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83V76AII3AICR4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE DIODE ISOLATION BETWEEN CONT BUS CA1 AND MNC WHEN THE CREW
SWITCH IS PLACED IN THE CLOSE POSITION. NO EFFECT ON MISSION, ANY
POSSIBLE CURRENT FLOW WILL BE LIMITED BY SERIES RESISTANCE.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-291
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 390 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
S)
9)
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
DIODE
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
3/3 TAL: 3/IR
3/1R AOA: 3/1R
3/1R ATO: 3/1R
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ]
LOCATION: F BAY 3A, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 83V76AII3AICR21
B [ P] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO OPEN FU ISOL 1/2 VALVE USING CREW SWITCH. THE
VALVE IS STILL FULLY OPERATIONAL USING GPC CMDS. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN TK ISOL 1/2 AND 3/4/5 VALVES FAILED CLOSE.
THE EFFECT IS AN INABILITY TO DEPLETE/USE PROPELLANTS
CONSEQUENTLY CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES WILL BE EXCEEDED DURING RTLS
ABORTS RESULTING IN LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-292
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 391 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
DIODE
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
3/3 TAL: 3/IR
3/IR AOA: 3/IR
3/1R ATO: 3/1R
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83V76AII3AICR21
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE DIODE ISOLATION BETWEEN GPC AND CREW SWITCH "OPEN" COMMANDS.
FAILURE COULD POSSIBLY RESULT IN LOSS OF GPC OR CREW SWITCH TO
CONTROL OX & FU TK ISOL 1/2 VALVE OPERATION. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY, WORST CASE, RESULTS IN TK ISOL 1/2 AND 3/4/5
VALVE FAILED CLOSED. THE EFFECT IS AN INABILITY TO DEPLETE/USE
PROPELLANTS CONSEQUENTLY CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES WILL BE EXCEEDED
DURING RTLS RESULTING IN LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-293
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 392 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
2/iR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/ IR AOA: 3/ IR
DEORBIT: 3/ 1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ]
LOCATION: F BAY 3A, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 83V76AII3AICR23
B [ P] C [ P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSE ABILITY TO OPEN FU ISOL 1/2 VALVE USING CREW SWITCH. THE
VALVE IS STILL FULLY OPERATIONAL USING GPC CMDS. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN TK ISOL 1/2 AND 3/4/5 VALVES FAILED CLOSE.
THE EFFECT IS AN INABILITY TO DEPLETE/USE PROPELLANTS
CONSEQUENTLY CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES WILL BE EXCEEDED DURING RTLS
ABORTS RESULTING IN LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-294
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 393 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
_)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83V76AII3AICR23
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE DIODE ISOLATION BETWEEN GPC AND CREW SWITCH "OPEN" COMMANDS.
FAILURE COULD POSSIBLY RESULT IN LOSS OF GPC OR CREW SWITCH TO
CONTROL OX & FU TK ISOL 1/2 VALVE OPERATION. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY, WORST CASE, RESULTS IN TK ISOL 1/2 AND 3/4/5
VALVE FAILED CLOSED. THE EFFECT IS AN INABILITY TO DEPLETE/USE
PROPELLANTS CONSEQUENTLY CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES WILL BE EXCEEDED
DURING RTLS RESULTING IN LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-295
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
394 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B ( ) C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83V76AII3AICR3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO OVERRIDE A GPC "OPEN" COMMAND AND CLOSE THE OX TK
ISOL 1/2 VALVE USING CREW SWITCH. NO EFFECT ON MISSION, GPC
COMMANDS STILL AVAILABLETO CLOSE VALVE.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-296
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 395 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
1/1
ITEM: DIODE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
_)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] S[F] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83V76AII3AICR3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE DIODE ISOLATION BETWEEN FU & OX CONTROL FEEDBACKS. CONTROL
FEEDBACKS INHIBIT VALVE OPERATION AFTER COMMAND HAS BEEN
COMPLETED. THE FAILURE CAN RESULT IN THE OX ISOL 1/2 VALVE
FAILING MIDTRAVEL WHEN COMMANDED OPEN. THE EFFECT WOULD BE LOSS
OF EIGHT PRIMARY JETS CAUSING AN INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME
CRITICAL DUMPS DURING RTLS OR AN INABILITY TO PERFORM FULL
MISSION OBJECTIVES ONORBIT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT
IN LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE SINCE TRAPPED PROPELLANTS WOULD EXCEED CG
SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/23/87 C-297
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 396 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
1) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83V76AII3AICRI
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO CLOSE FU & OX TK ISOL 1/2 VALVES USING CREW
SWITCH. GPC COMMANDS ARE STILL AVAILABLE. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY
RESULTS IN THE TK ISOL 1/2 AND MANIFOLD ISOL l&2 VALVES BECOMING
STUCK IN THE OPEN POSITION. THE EFFECT WOULD BE AN
INABILITY TO ISOLATE THE TANKS FROM MANIFOLDS 1 OR 2, NO MISSION
IMPACT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-298
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 397 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83V76AII3AICRI
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE DIODE ISOLATION BETWEEN GPC AND CREW SWITCH "CLOSE" COMMANDS.
FAILURE COULD POSSIBLY RESULT IN LOSS OF GPC OR CREW SWITCH TO
CONTROL OX & FU TK ISOL 1/2 VALVE OPERATION. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY, WORST CASE, RESULTS IN TK ISOL 1/2 AND 3/4/5
VALVE FAILED CLOSED. THE EFFECT IS AN INABILITY TO DEPLETE/USE
PROPELLANTS CONSEQUENTLY CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES WILL BE EXCEEDED
DURING RTLS RESULTING IN LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-299
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 398 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/ IR AOA: 3/ IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83V76AII3AICR22
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO OPEN FU ISOL 1/2 VALVE USING GPC CMDS. THE VALVE
IS STILL FULLY OPERATIONAL USING CREW SWITCH. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN TK ISOL 1/2 AND 3/4/5 VALVES FAILED CLOSE.
THE EFFECT IS AN INABILITY TO DEPLETE/USE PROPELLANTS
CONSEQUENTLY CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES WILL BE EXCEEDED DURING RTLS
ABORTS RESULTING IN LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO DO1
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-300
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
399 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
311R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
5)
6)
8)
9)
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
4) OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83V76AII3AICR22
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE DIODE ISOLATION BETWEEN GPC AND CREW SWITCH "OPEN" COMMANDS.
FAILURE COULD POSSIBLY RESULT IN LOSS OF GPC OR CREW SWITCH TO
CONTROL OX & FU TK ISOL 1/2 VALVE OPERATION. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY, WORST CASE, RESULTS IN TK ISOL 1/2 AND 3/4/5
VALVE FAILED CLOSED. THE EFFECT IS AN INABILITY TO DEPLETE/USE
PROPELLANTS CONSEQUENTLY CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES WILL BE EXCEEDED
DURING RTLS RESULTING IN LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-301
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 400 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/iR
2/IR
ITEM: DIODE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
DIODE
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
3/3 TAL: 3/IR
3/1R AOA: 3/1R
3/1R ATO: 3/1R
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ]
LOCATION: F BAY 3A, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 83V76AII3AICR24
B [ P] C [ P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO OPEN OX ISOL 1/2 VALVE USING GPC CMDS. THE VALVE
IS STILL FULLY OPERATIONAL USING CREW SWITCH. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN TK ISOL 1/2 AND 3/4/5 VALVES FAILED CLOSE.
THE EFFECT IS AN INABILITY TO DEPLETE/USE PROPELLANTS
CONSEQUENTLY CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES WILL BE EXCEEDED DURING RTLS
ABORTS RESULTING IN LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-302
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 401 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION: F BAY 3A, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 83V76AII3AICR24
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE DIODE ISOLATION BETWEEN GPC AND CREW SWITCH "OPEN" COMMANDS.
FAILURE COULD POSSIBLY RESULT IN LOSS OF GPC OR CREW SWITCH TO
CONTROL OX & FU TK ISOL 1/2 VALVE OPERATION. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY, WORST CASE, RESULTS IN TK ISOL 1/2 AND 3/4/5
VALVE FAILED CLOSED. THE EFFECT IS AN INABILITY TO DEPLETE/USE
PROPELLANTS CONSEQUENTLY CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES WILL BE EXCEEDED
DURING RTLS RESULTING IN LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO DO1
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-303
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 402 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: F BAY 3A, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 83V76AII3AICR2
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO CLOSE FU & OX TK ISOL 1/2 VALVES USING GPC
COMMANDS. GPC COMMANDS ARE STILL AVAILABLE. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN THE TK ISOL 1/2 AND MANIFOLD ISOL l&2 VALVES
BECOMING STUCK IN THE OPEN POSITION. THE EFFECT WOULD BE AN
INABILITY TO ISOLATE THE TANKS FROM MANIFOLDS 1 OR 2, NO MISSION
IMPACT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-304
INDEPENDENT ORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 403 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 2/ IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83V76AII3AICR2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSE DIODE ISOLATION BETWEEN GPC AND CREW SWITCH "CLOSE" COMMANDS.
FAILURE COULD POSSIBLY RESULT IN LOSS OF GPC OR CREW SWITCH TO
CONTROL OX & FU TK ISOL 1/2 VALVE OPERATION. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY, WORST CASE, RESULTS IN TK ISOL 1/2 AND 3/4/5
VALVE FAILED CLOSED. THE EFFECT IS AN INABILITY TO DEPLETE/USE
PROPELLANTS CONSEQUENTLY CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES WILL BE EXCEEDED
DURING RTLS RESULTING IN LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-305
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FI/IGHT:
MDAC ID: 404 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
DIODE
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83V76AII3AICRI8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO CLOSE FU TK ISOL 1/2 VALVES USING GPC COMMANDS.
GPC COMMANDS ARE STILL AVAILABLE. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS
IN THE TK ISOL 1/2 AND MANIFOLD ISOL 1&2 VALVES BECOMING STUCK IN
THE OPEN POSITION. THE EFFECT WOULD BE AN
INABILITY TO ISOLATE THE TANKS FROM MANIFOLDS 1 OR 2, NO MISSION
IMPACT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-306
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 405 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: F BAY 3A, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 83V76AII3AICRI8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE DIODE ISOLATION BETWEEN GPC AND CREW SWITCH "CLOSE" CMDS.
FAILURE COULD POSSIBLY RESULT IN LOSS OF ABILITY TO CLOSE FU & OX
TK ISOL 1/2 VALVES USING CREW SWITCH OR GPC. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN TK ISOL 1/2 AND MANIFOLD ISOL 1 OR 2
BECOMING STUCK IN THE OPEN POSITION. THE EFFECT WOULD BE AN
INABILITY TO ISOLATE THE TANKS FROM MANIFOLDS 1 OR 2, NO MISSION
IMPACT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-307
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 406 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
_)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83V76AII3AICR31
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CONTROL FEEDBACK FROM FU TK ISOL 1/2 VALVE TO DE-ENERGIZE
RELAY ONCE THE VALVE REACHES THE COMMANDED POSITION. NO EFFECT ON
MISSION, AC MOTOR VALVE DESIGNED TO WITHSTAND CONTINUOUS POWER.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-308
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 407 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: DIODE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
S)
9)
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83V76AII3AICR31
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE DIODE ISOLATION BETWEEN CONT BUS CA1 AND MNC WHEN THE CREW
SWITCH IS PLACED IN THE OPEN POSITION. NO EFFECT ON MISSION, ANY
POSSIBLE CURRENT FLOW WILL BE LIMITED BY SERIES RESISTANCE.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-309
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 408 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] c[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83V76AII3AICR25
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO OVERRIDE A GPC "CLOSE" COMMAND AND OPEN THE FU TK
ISOL 1/2 VALVE USING CREW SWITCH. NO EFFECT ON MISSION, GPC
COMMANDS STILL AVAILABLE TO CLOSE VALVE.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-310
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 409 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83V76AII3AICR25
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE DIODE ISOLATION BETWEEN FU & OX CONTROL FEEDBACKS. CONTROL
FEEDBACKS INHIBIT VALVE OPERATION AFTER COMMAND HAS BEEN
COMPLETED. THE FAILURE CAN RESULT IN THE OX ISOL 1/2 VALVE
FAILING MIDTRAVEL WHEN COMMANDED CLOSED. THE EFFECT COULD BE AN
INABILITY TO ISOLATE THE TANKS FROM MANIFOLDS 1 OR 2, NO MISSION
IMPACT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-311
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
410 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/ 3
ONORB I T: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: F BAY 3A, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 83V76AII3AICR6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CONTROL FEEDBACK FROM FUTK ISOL 1/2 VALVE TO DE-ENERGIZE
RELAY ONCE THE VALVE REACHES THE COMMANDED POSITION. NO EFFECT ON
MISSION, AC MOTOR VALVE DESIGNED TO WITHSTAND CONTINUOUS POWER.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-312
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 411 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: F BAY 3A, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 83V76AII3AICR6
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE DIODE ISOLATION BETWEEN CONT BUS CA1 AND MNC WHEN THE CREW
SWITCH IS PLACED IN THE CLOSE POSITION. NO EFFECT ON MISSION, ANY
POSSIBLE CURRENT FLOW WILL BE LIMITED BY SERIES RESISTANCE.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-313
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 412 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
5)
7)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] c[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83V76AII3AICR5
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO OVERRIDE A GPC "OPEN" COMMAND AND CLOSE THE FU TK
ISOL 1/2 VALVE USING CREW SWITCH. NO EFFECT ON MISSION, GPC
COMMANDS STILL AVAILABLE TO CLOSE VALVE.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-314
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 413 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
I/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: I/1
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
L_DING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B IF] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83V76AII3AICR5
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSE DIODE ISOLATION BETWEEN FU & OX CONTROL FEEDBACKS. CONTROL
FEEDBACKS INHIBIT VALVE OPERATION AFTER COMMAND HAS BEEN
COMPLETED. THE FAILURE CAN RESULT IN THE FU ISOL 1/2 VALVE
FAILING MIDTRAVEL WHEN COMMANDED OPEN. THE EFFECT WOULD BE LOSS
OF EIGHT PRIMARY JETS CAUSING AN INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME
CRITICAL DUMPS DURING RTLS OR AN INABILITY TO PERFORM FULL
MISSION OBJECTIVES ONORBIT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT
IN LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE SINCE TRAPPED PROPELLANTS WOULD EXCEED CG
SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/23/87 C-315
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 414 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83V76AII3AICRI7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO CLOSE FU TK ISOL 1/2 VALVES USING CREW SWITCH.
GPC COMMANDS ARE STILL AVAILABLE. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS
IN THE TK ISOL 1/2 AND MANIFOLD ISOL l&2 VALVES BECOMING STUCK IN
THE OPEN POSITION. THE EFFECT WOULD BE AN
INABILITY TO ISOLATE THE TANKS FROM MANIFOLDS 1 OR 2, NO MISSION
IMPACT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87
/
C-316
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 415 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: F BAY 3A, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 83V76AII3AICRI7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE DIODE ISOLATION BETWEEN GPC AND CREW SWITCH "CLOSE" CMDS.
FAILURE COULD POSSIBLY RESULT IN LOSS OF ABILITY TO CLOSE FU & OX
TK ISOL 1/2 VALVES USING CREW SWITCH OR GPC. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN TK ISOL 1/2 AND MANIFOLD ISOL 1 OR 2
BECOMING STUCK IN THE OPEN POSITION. THE EFFECT WOULD BE AN
INABILITY TO ISOLATE THE TANKS FROM MANIFOLDS 1 OR 2, NO MISSION
IMPACT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-317
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 416 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2 ) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] BC ] cc ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83V76AII3AICRI9
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO CLOSE OX TK ISOL 1/2 VALVES USING CREW SWITCH.
GPC COMMANDS ARE STILL AVAILABLE. LOSS OF ALLREDUNDANCY RESULTS
IN THE TK ISOL 1/2 AND MANIFOLD ISOL l&2 VALVES BECOMING STUCK IN
THE OPEN POSITION. THE EFFECT WOULD BE AN
INABILITY TO ISOLATE THE TANKS FROM MANIFOLDS 1 OR 2, NO MISSION
IMPACT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-318
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
417 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83V76AII3AICRI9
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE RESULTS IN THE FU TK ISOL 1/2 VALVE FAILING OPEN.
THE VALVE IS NORMALLY OPEN. REDUNDANCY FOR THIS FUNCTION IS
PROVIDED BY MANIFOLD 1 OR 2 ISOLATION VALVE. LOSS OF THESE
VALVES RESULTS IN AN INABILITY TO ISOLATE MANIFOLDS 1 OR 2, NO
MISSION IMPACT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-319
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 418 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] c[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83V76AII3AICR26
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO OVERRIDE A GPC "CLOSE" COMMAND AND OPEN THE OX TK
ISOL 1/2 VALVE USING CREW SWITCH. NO EFFECT ON MISSION, GPC
COMMANDS STILL AVAILABLE TO CLOSE VALVE.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-320
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 419 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: DIODE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83 V76AI 13AICR26
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE DIODE ISOLATION BETWEEN FU & OX CONTROL FEEDBACKS. CONTROL
FEEDBACKS INHIBIT VALVE OPERATION AFTER COMMAND HAS BEEN
COMPLETED. THE FAILURE CAN RESULT IN THE FU ISOL 1/2 VALVE
FAILING MIDTRAVEL WHEN COMMANDED CLOSED. THE EFFECT COULD BE AN
INABILITY TO ISOLATE THE TANKS FROM MANIFOLDS 1 OR 2, NO MISSION
IMPACT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-321
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 420 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBI T: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: F BAY 3A, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 83V76AII3AICR32
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CONTROL FEEDBACK FROM OX TK ISOL 1/2 VALVE TO DE-ENERGIZE
RELAY ONCE THE VALVE REACHES THE COMMANDED POSITION. NO EFFECT ON
MISSION, AC MOTOR VALVE DESIGNED TO WITHSTAND CONTINUOUS POWER.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-322
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 421 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: DIODE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83V76AII3AICR32
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE DIODE ISOLATION BETWEEN CONT BUS CA2 AND MNC WHEN THE CREW
SWITCH IS PLACED IN THE CLOSE POSITION. NO EFFECT ON MISSION, ANY
POSSIBLE CURRENT FLOW WILL BE LIMITED BY SERIES RESISTANCE.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-323
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
422 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: F BAY 3A, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 83V76AII3AICR20
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSE ABILITY TO CLOSE OX TK ISOL 1/2 VALVES USING GPC COMMANDS.
CREW SWITCH IS STILL AVAILABLE. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN
THE TK ISOL 1/2 AND MANIFOLD ISOL l&2 VALVES BECOMING STUCK IN THE
OPEN POSITION. THE EFFECT WOULD BE AN
INABILITY TO ISOLATE THE TANKS FROM MANIFOLDS 1 OR 2, NO MISSION
IMPACT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-324
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
423 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83V76AII3AICR20
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE DIODE ISOLATION BETWEEN GPC AND CREW SWITCH "OPEN" COMMANDS.
FAILURE COULD POSSIBLY RESULT IN LOSS OF GPC OR CREW SWITCH TO
CONTROL OX & FU TK ISOL 1/2 VALVE OPERATION. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY, WORST CASE, RESULTS IN TK ISOL 1/2 AND 3/4/5
VALVE FAILED CLOSED. THE EFFECT IS AN INABILITY TO DEPLETE/USE
PROPELLANTS CONSEQUENTLY CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES WILL BE EXCEEDED
DURING RTLS RESULTING IN LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-325
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 424 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
DIODE
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: F BAY i, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 81V76AIIIAICR25
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CONTROL FEEDBACK FROM FU TK ISOL 3/4/5 VALVE TO DE-ENERGIZE
RELAY ONCE THE VALVE REACHES THE COMMANDED POSITION. NO EFFECT ON
MISSION, AC MOTOR VALVE DESIGNED TO WITHSTAND CONTINUOUS POWER.
REFERENCES:
SEQ. 7
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; MC284-0430 REV E AMENDMENT
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-326
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
425 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, MCA 1
8 IV76AIIIAICR25
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE DIODE ISOLATION BETWEEEN CONT BUS ABI AND MNA WHEN THE CREW
SWITCH IS PLACED IN THE CLOSE POSITION. NO EFFECT ON MISSION, ANY
POSSIBLE CURRENT FLOW WILL BE LIMITED BY SERIES RESISTANCE.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-327
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 426 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
2/1R
ITEM: DIODE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DE ORBIT: 3/ IR ATO: 3 / 1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A[ 3 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, MCA 1
8 IV76All IAICR26
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO OPEN FU ISOL 3/4/5 VALVE USING CREW SWITCH. THE
VALVE IS STILL FULLY OPERATIONAL USING GPC CMDS. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN TK ISOL 1/2 AND 3/4/5 VALVES FAILED CLOSE.
THE EFFECT IS AN INABILITY TO DEPLETE/USE PROPELLANTS
CONSEQUENTLY CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES WILL BE EXCEEDED DURING RTLS
RESULTING IN LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-328
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 427 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
1) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY I, MCA 1
8 iV76AIIIAICR26
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE DIODE ISOLATION BETWEEN GPC AND CREW SWITCH "OPEN" COMMANDS.
FAILURE COULD POSSIBLY RESULT IN LOSS OF GPC OR CREW SWITCH TO
CONTROL OX & FU TK ISOL 3/4/5 VALVE OPERATION. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY, WORST CASE, RESULTS IN TK ISOL 1/2 AND 3/4/5
VALVES FAILED CLOSED. THE EFFECT IS AN INABILITY TO DEPLETE/USE
PROPELLANTS CONSEQUENTLY CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES WILL BE EXCEEDED
DURING RTLS RESULTING IN LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-329
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 428 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
2/iR
ITEM: DIODE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
_)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
DIODE
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITI CALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
3/3 TAL: 3/1R
3/1R AOA: 3/1R
3/IR ATO: 3/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ]
LOCATION: F BAY I, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 8 IV76AIIIAICR27
B [ P] C [ P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO OPEN FU ISOL 3/4/5 VALVE USING CREW SWITCH. THE
VALVE IS STILL FULLY OPERATIONAL USING GPC CMDS. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN TK ISOL 1/2 AND 3/4/5 VALVES FAILED CLOSE.
THE EFFECT IS AN INABILITY TO DEPLETE/USE PROPELLANTS
CONSEQUENTLY CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES WILL BE EXCEEDED DURING RTLS
RESULTING IN LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-330
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
429 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, MCA 1
81V76AIIIAICR27
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE DIODE ISOLATION BETWEEN GPC AND CREW SWITCH "OPEN" COMMANDS.
FAILURE COULD POSSIBLY RESULT IN LOSS OF GPC OR CREW SWITCH TO
CONTROL OX & FU TK ISOL 3/4/5 VALVE OPERATION. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY, WORST CASE, RESULTS IN TK ISOL 1/2 AND 3/4/5
VALVES FAILED CLOSED. THE EFFECT IS AN INABILITY TO DEPLETE/USE
PROPELLANTS CONSEQUENTLY CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES WILL BE EXCEEDED
DURING RTLS RESULTING IN LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-331
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 430 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, MCA 1
8IV76AIIIAICRI9
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO OVERRIDE A GPC "OPEN" COMMAND AND CLOSE THE OX TK
ISOL 3/4/5 VALVE USING CREW SWITCH. NO EFFECT ON MISSION, GPC
COMMANDS STILL AVAILABLE TO CLOSE VALVE.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO DO1
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-332
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 431 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
1/1
ITEM: DIODE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, MCA 1
8 IV76AI 1 IAICRI9
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE DIODE ISOLATION BETWEEN FU & OX CONTROL FEEDBACKS. CONTROL
FEEDBACKS INHIBIT VALVE OPERATION AFTER COMMAND HAS BEEN
COMPLETED. THE FAILURE CAN RESULT IN THE OX ISOL 3/4/5 VALVE
FAILING MIDTRAVEL WHEN COMMANDED OPEN. THE EFFECT WOULD BE LOSS
OF SIX PRIMARY JETS CAUSING AN INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME CRITICAL
DUMPS DURING RTLS OR AN INABILITY TO PERFORM FULL MISSION
OBJECTIVES ONORBIT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN LOSS
OF VEHICLE/LIFE SINCE TRAPPED PROPELLANTS WOULD EXCEED CG
SAFETY BOUNDARIES DURING DEORBIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-333
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
432 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
S)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, MCA 1
8 IV76AIIIAICR20
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO CLOSE FU & OX TK ISOL 3/4/5 VALVES USING CREW
SWITCH. GPC COMMANDS ARE STILL AVAILABLE. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY
RESULTS IN THE TK ISOL 3/4/5 AND MANIFOLD ISOL 3, 4 & 5 VALVES
BECOMING STUCK IN THE OPEN POSITION. THE EFFECT WOULD
BE AN INABILITY TO ISOLATE THE TANKS FROM MANIFOLDS 3, 4 AND 5, NO
MISSION IMPACT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-334
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 433 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
4) OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, M CA 1
8IV76AIIIAICR20
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE DIODE ISOLATION BETWEEN GPC AND CREW SWITCH "CLOSE" COMMANDS.
FAILURE COULD POSSIBLY RESULT IN LOSS OF GPC OR CREW SWITCH TO
CONTROL OX & FU TK ISOL 3/4/5 VALVE OPERATION. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY, WORST CASE, RESULTS IN TK ISOL 1/2 AND 3/4/5
VALVES FAILED CLOSED. THE EFFECT IS AN INABILITY TO DEPLETE/USE
PROPELLANTS CONSEQUENTLY CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES WILL BE EXCEEDED
DURING RTLS RESULTING IN LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO DO1
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-335
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 434 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
2/IR
ITEM: DIODE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
_)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
DIODE
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
3/3 TAL: 3/1R
3/1R AOA: 3/1R
3/1R ATO: 3/1R
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, MCA 1
8IV76AIIIAICR22
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO OPEN FU ISOL 3/4/5 VALVE USING GPC CMDS. THE
VALVE IS STILL FULLY OPERATIONAL USING CREW SWITCH. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN TK ISOL 1/2 AND 3/4/5 VALVES FAILED CLOSE.
THE EFFECT IS AN INABILITY TO DEPLETE/USE PROPELLANTS
CONSEQUENTLY CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES WILL BE EXCEEDED DURING RTLS
RESULTING IN LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-336
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 435 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/ 1R
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, MCA 1
8IV76AI 1IAICR22
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE DIODE ISOLATION BETWEEN GPC AND CREW SWITCH "OPEN" COMMANDS.
FAILURE COULD POSSIBLY RESULT IN LOSS OF GPC OR CREW SWITCH TO
CONTROL OX & FU TK ISOL 3/4/5 VALVE OPERATION. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY, WORST CASE, RESULTS IN TK ISOL 1/2 AND 3/4/5
VALVES FAILED CLOSED. THE EFFECT IS AN INABILITY TO DEPLETE/USE
PROPELLANTS CONSEQUENTLY CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES WILL BE EXCEEDED
DURING RTLS RESULTING IN LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-337
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 436 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/ 3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, MCA 1
8IV76AIIIAICR23
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSE ABILITY TO OPEN OX ISOL 3/4/5 VALVE USING GPC CMDS. THE
VALVE IS STILL FULLY OPERATIONAL USING CREW SWITCH. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN TK ISOL 1/2 AND 3/4/5 VALVES FAILED CLOSE.
THE EFFECT IS AN INABILITY TO DEPLETE/USE PROPELLANTS
CONSEQUENTLY CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES WILL BE EXCEEDED DURING RTLS
RESULTING IN LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-338
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
437 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/ IR
LI FTOFF: 3/ 3 TAL: 3/ IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, MCA 1
8 iV76AI IIAICR23
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE DIODE ISOLATION BETWEEN GPC AND CREW SWITCH "OPEN" COMMANDS.
FAILURE COULD POSSIBLY RESULT IN LOSS OF GPC OR CREW SWITCH TO
CONTROL OX & FU TK ISOL 3/4/5 VALVE OPERATION. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY, WORST CASE, RESULTS IN TK ISOL 1/2 AND 3/4/5
VALVES FAILED CLOSED. THE EFFECT IS AN INABILITY TO DEPLETE/USE
PROPELLANTS CONSEQUENTLY CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES WILL BE EXCEEDED
DURING RTLS RESULTING IN LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO DO1
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-339
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 438 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
4) OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/ 3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, MCA 1
8 IV76All IAICR21
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO CLOSE FU & OX TK ISOL 3/4/5 VALVES USING GPC
COMMANDS. GPC COMMANDS ARE STILL AVAILABLE. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN THE TK ISOL 3/4/5 AND MANIFOLD ISOL 3, 4, &
5 VALVES BECOMING STUCK IN THE OPEN POSITION. THE EFFECT WOULD BE
AN INABILITY TO ISOLATE THE TANKS FROM MANIFOLDS 3, 4, AND 5. NO
MISSION IMPACT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-340
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 439 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/ZR
2/IR
ITEM: DIODE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RT LS: 2 / 1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/ 3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, MCA 1
8 IV76AI 1 IAICR21
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE DIODE ISOLATION BETWEEN GPC AND CREW SWITCH "CLOSE" COMMANDS.
FAILURE COULD POSSIBLY RESULT IN LOSS OF GPC OR CREW SWITCH TO
CONTROL OX & FU TK ISOL 3/4/5 VALVE OPERATION. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY, WORST CASE, RESULTS IN TK ISOL 1/2 AND 3/4/5
VALVES FAILED CLOSED. THE EFFECT IS AN INABILITY TO DEPLETE/USE
PROPELLANTS CONSEQUENTLY CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES WILL BE EXCEEDED
DURING RTLS RESULTING IN LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-341
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 440 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC.
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
DIODE
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, MCA 1
8 IV76AI 1 IAICRI5
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO CLOSE FU TK ISOL 3/4/5 VALVES USING GPC COMMANDS.
GPC COMMANDS ARE STILL AVAILABLE. LOSS OF ALLREDUNDANCY RESULTS
IN THE TK ISOL 3/4/5 AND MANIFOLD ISOL 3, 4 & 5 VALVES BECOMING
STUCK IN THE OPEN POSITION. THE EFFECT WOULD BE AN
INABILITY TO ISOLATE THE TANKS FROM MANIFOLDS 3, 4, AND 5. NO
MISSION IMPACT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-342
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: I/27/87 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 441 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY I, M CA 1
8 IV76AI IIAICRI5
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE DIODE ISOLATION BETWEEN GPC AND CREW SWITCH CLOSE CMDS.
FAILURE COULD POSSIBLY RESULT IN LOSS OF ABILITY TO CLOSE FU & OX
TK ISOL 3/4/5 VALVES USING CREW SWITCH OR GPC. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN THE TK ISOL 3/4/5 AND MANIFOL ISOL
3, 4, OR 5 BECOMING STUCK IN THE OPEN POSITION. THE EFFECT WOULD
BE AN INABILITY TO ISOLATE THE TANKS FROM MANIFOLDS 3, 4, OR 5. NO
MISSION IMPACT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-343
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 442 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/ 3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY I, MCA 1
8IV76AI 1IAICR2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CONTROL FEEDBACK FROM FUTK ISOL 3/4/5 VALVE TO DE-ENERGIZE
RELAY ONCE THE VALVE REACHES THE COMMANDED POSITION. NO EFFECT ON
MISSION, AC MOTOR VALVE DESIGNED TO WITHSTAND CONTINUOUS POWER.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-344
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 443 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATI ON:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, M CA 1
8 IV76All IAICR2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE DIODE ISOLATION BETWEEN CONT BUS ABI AND MNA WHEN THE CREW
SWITCH IS PLACED IN THE OPEN POSITON. NO EFFECT ON MISSION, ANY
POSSIBLE CURRENT FLOW WILL BE LIMITED BY SERIES RESISTANCE.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-345
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 444 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: DIODE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, MCA 1
8 IV76AIIIAICRI
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO OVERRIDE A GPC "CLOSE" COMMAND AND OPEN THE FU TK
ISOL 3/4/5 VALVE USING CREW SWITCH. NO EFFECT ON MISSION, GPC
COMMANDS STILL AVAILABLE TO CLOSE VALVE.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-346
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 445 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: DIODE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] BE ] cc ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, MCA 1
81V76AIIIAICRI
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE DIODE ISOLATION BETWEEN FU & OX CONTROL FEEDBACKS. CONTROL
FEEDBACKS INHIBIT VALVE OPERATION AFTER COMMAND HAS BEEN
COMPLETED. THE FAILURE CAN RESULT IN THE OX ISOL 3/4/5 VALVE
FAILING MIDTRAVELWHEN COMMANDED CLOSED. THE EFFECT COULD BE AND
INABILITY TO ISOLATE THE TANKS FROM MANIFOLDS 3, 4, OR 5. NO
MISSION IMPACT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-347
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 446 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: DIODE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: F BAY i, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 8 IV76AIIIAICR24
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CONTROL FEEDBACK FROM FUTK ISOL 3/4/5 VALVE TO DE-ENERGIZE
RELAY ONCE THE VALVE REACHES THE COMMANDED POSITION. NO EFFECT ON
MISSION, AC MOTOR VALVE DESIGNED TO WITHSTAND CONTINUOUS POWER.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO DO1
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-348
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 447 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, M CA 1
8 IV76AIIIAICR24
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE DIODE ISOLATION BETWEEEN CONT BUS ABI AND MNA WHEN THE CREW
SWITCH IS PLACED IN THE CLOSE POSITION. NO EFFECT ON MISSION, ANY
POSSIBLE CURRENT FLOW WILL BE LIMITED BY SERIES RESISTANCE.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-349
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 448 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, MCA 1
8 iV76AI 1 IAICRI8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO OVERRIDE A GPC "OPEN" COMMAND AND CLOSE THE FU TK
ISOL 3/4/5 VALVE USING CREW SWITCH. NO EFFECT ON MISSION, GPC
COMMANDS STILL AVAILABLE TO CLOSE VALVE.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-350
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
449 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
I/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/1
LI FTOFF: 3/ 3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, MCA 1
81V76AIIIAICRI8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSE DIODE ISOLATION BETWEEN FU & OX CONTROL FEEDBACKS. CONTROL
FEEDBACKS INHIBIT VALVE OPERATION AFTER COMMAND HAS BEEN
COMPLETED. THE FAILURE CAN RESULT IN THE FU ISOL 3/4/5 VALVE
FAILING MIDTRAVEL WHEN COMMANDED OPEN. THE EFFECT WOULD BE LOSS
OF SIX PRIMARY JETS CAUSING AN INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME CRITICAL
DUMPS DURING RTLS OR AN INABILITY TO PERFORM FULL MISSION
OBJECTIVES ONORBIT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN LOSS
OF VEHICLE/LIFE SINCE TRAPPED PROPELLANTS WOULD EXCEED CG
SAFETY BOUNDARIES DURING DEORBIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-351
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 450 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: DIODE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: F BAY i, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 81V76AIIIAICRI4
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO CLOSE FU TK ISOL 3/4/5 VALVES USING CREW SWITCH.
GPC COMMANDS ARE STILL AVAILABLE. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS
IN THE TK ISOL 3/4/5 AND MANIFOLD ISOL 3, 4 & 5 VALVES BECOMING
STUCK IN THE OPEN POSITION. THE EFFECT WOULD BE AN
INABILITY TO ISOLATE THE TANKS FROM MANIFOLDS 3, 4, AND 5. NO
MISSION IMPACT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-352
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 451 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: F BAY i, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 81V76AIIIAICRI4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE DIODE ISOLATION BETWEEN GPC AND CREW SWITCH CLOSE CMDS.
FAILURE COULD POSSIBLY RESULT IN LOSS OF ABILITY TO CLOSE FU & OX
TK ISOL 3/4/5 VALVES USING CREW SWITCH OR GPC. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN THE TK ISOL 3/4/5 AND MANIFOL ISOL
3, 4, 5 BECOMING STUCK IN THE OPEN POSITION. THE EFFECT WOULD BE
AN INABILITY TO ISOLATE THE TANKS FROM MANIFOLDS 3, 4, OR 5. NO
MISSION IMPACT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-353
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 452 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, MCA 1
8 iV7 6AI 1 IAICRI 6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO CLOSE OX TK ISOL 3/4/5 VALVES USING CREW SWITCH.
GPC COMMANDS ARE STILL AVAILABLE. LOSS OF ALLREDUNDANCY RESULTS
IN THE TK ISOL 3/4/5 AND MANIFOLD ISOL 3, 4 & 5 VALVES BECOMING
STUCK IN THE OPEN POSITION. THE EFFECT WOULD BE AN
INABILITY TO ISOLATE THE TANKS FROM MANIFOLDS 3, 4, AND 5. NO
MISSION IMPACT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-354
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
453 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, M CA 1
81V76AIIIAICRI6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE DIODE ISOLATION BETWEEN GPC AND CREW SWITCH CLOSE CMDS.
FAILURE COULD POSSIBLY RESULT IN LOSS OF ABILITY TO CLOSE FU & OX
TK ISOL 3/4/5 VALVES USING CREW SWITCH OR GPC. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN THE TK ISOL 3/4/5 AND MANIFOL ISOL
3, 4, 5 BECOMING STUCK IN THE OPEN POSITION. THE EFFECT WOULD BE
AN INABILITY TO ISOLATE THE TANKS FROM MANIFOLDS 3, 4, OR 5. NO
MISSION IMPACT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-355
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 454 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: DIODE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBI T: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, MCA 1
8 IV76All IAICR3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO OVERRIDE A GPC "CLOSE" COMMAND AND OPEN THE OX TK
ISOL 3/4/5 VALVE USING CREW SWITCH. NO EFFECT ON MISSION, GPC
COMMANDS STILL AVAILABLE TO CLOSE VALVE.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-356
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 455 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
_)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY I, MCA 1
81V76AIIIAICR3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE DIODE ISOLATION BETWEEN FU & OX CONTROL FEEDBACKS. CONTROL
FEEDBACKS INHIBIT VALVE OPERATION AFTER COMMAND HAS BEEN
COMPLETED. THE FAILURE CAN RESULT IN THE FU ISOL 3/4/5 VALVE
FAILING MIDTRAVEL WHEN COMMANDED CLOSED. THE EFFECT COULD BE AN
INABILITY TO ISOLATE THE TANKS FROM MANIFOLDS 3, 4, OR 5. NO
MISSION IMPACT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-357
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 456 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: DIODE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, MCA 1
8 IV76AI 1 IAICR4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CONTROL FEEDBACK FROM OX TK ISOL 3/4/5 VALVE TO DE-ENERGIZE
RELAY ONCE THE VALVE REACHES THE COMMANDED POSITION. NO EFFECT ON
MISSION, AC MOTOR VALVE DESIGNED TO WITHSTAND CONTINUOUS POWER.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-358
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
457 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] c[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY I, MCA 1
81V76AIIIAICR4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE DIODE ISOLATION BETWEEEN CONT BUS AB2 AND MNA WHEN THE CREW
SWITCH IS PLACED IN THE CLOSE POSITION. NO EFFECT ON MISSION, ANY
POSSIBLE CURRENT FLOW WILL BE LIMITED BY SERIES RESISTANCE.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO DO1
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-359
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 458 ABORT:
HDWIFUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: DIODE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] c[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY I, MCA 1
8 IV76AIIIAICRI7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO CLOSE OX TK ISOL 3/4/5 VALVES USING GPC COMMANDS.
GPC COMMANDS ARE STILL AVAILABLE. LOSS OF ALL REDUNANCY RESULTS
IN THE TK ISOL 3/4/5 AND MANIFOLD ISOL 3, 4 & 5 VALVES BECOMING
STUCK IN THE OPEN POSITION. THE EFFECT WOULD BE AN
INABILITY TO ISOLATE THE TANKS FROM MANIFOLDS 3, 4, AND 5. NO
MISSION IMPACT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-360
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 459 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
2/1R
ITEM: DIODE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY I, MCA 1
8 IV76AI 1 IAICRI7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE DIODE ISOLATION BETWEEN GPC AND CREW SWITCH "OPEN" COMMANDS.
FAILURE COULD POSSIBLY RESULT IN LOSS OF GPC OR CREW SWITCH TO
CONTROL OX & FU TK ISOL 3/4/5 VALVE OPERATION. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY, WORST CASE, RESULTS IN TK ISOL 1/2 AND 3/4/5
VALVES FAILED CLOSED. THE EFFECT IS AN INABILITY TO DEPLETE/USE
PROPELLANTS CONSEQUENTLY CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES WILL BE EXCEEDED
DURING RTLS RESULTING IN LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO DO1
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-361
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
460 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
2)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: F BAY 3A, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 83V76AII3ARI
S[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
HARDWIRED TALKBACK (BARBER POLE) TO CREW WILL FALSELY INDICATE FU
& OX ISOL 1/2 VALVE MISMATCH WHEN VALVES ARECOMMANDED TO OPEN
POSITION. GPC WILL INDICATE CORRECT VALVE POSITION. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY HAS NO IMPACT SINCE VALVE TALKBACK IS NOT
MISSION CRITICAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-362
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 461 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILURE MODE: FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83V76All 3ARI
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
HARDWIRED TALKBACK (BARBER POLE) TO CREW WILL FALSELY INDICATE FU
& OX ISOL 1/2 VALVE MISMATCH WHEN VALVES ARE COMMANDED TO CLOSE
POSITION. GPC WILL INDICATE CORRECT VALVE POSITION. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY HAS NO IMPACT SINCE VALVE TALKBACK IS NOT
MISSION CRITICAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-363
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 462 ABORT:
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83V76AII3AR2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
HARDWIRED TALKBACK (BARBER POLE) TO CREW WILL FALSELY INDICATE FU
& OX ISOL 1/2 VALVE MISMATCH WHEN VALVES ARE COMMANDED TO CLOSE
POSITION. GPC WILL INDICATE CORRECT VALVE POSITION. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY HAS NO IMPACT SINCE VALVE TALKBACK IS NOT
MISSION CRITICAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-364
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 463 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83V76AII3AR2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
HARDWIRED TALKBACK (BARBER POLE) TO CREW WILL FALSELY INDICATE FU
& OX ISOL 1/2 VALVE MISMATCH WHEN VALVES ARE COMMANDED TO OPEN
POSITION. GPC WILL INDICATE CORRECT VALVE POSITION. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY HAS NO IMPACT SINCE VALVE TALKBACK IS NOT
MISSION CRITICAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-365
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
464 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY I, MCA 1
8IV76AI 1IAR3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
HARDWIRED TALKBACK (BARBER POLE) TO CREW WILL FALSELY INDICATE FU
& OX ISOL 3/4/5 VALVE MISMATCH WHEN VALVES ARE COMMANDED TO OPEN
POSITION. GPC WILL INDICATE CORRECT VALVE POSITION. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY HAS NO IMPACT SINCE VALVE TALKBACK IS NOT
MISSION CRITICAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-366
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 465 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILURE MODE: FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY I, MCA 1
8 IV 76AI 1 IAR3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
HARDWIRED TALKBACK (BARBER POLE) TO CREW WILL FALSELY INDICATE FU
& OX ISOL 3/4/5 VALVE MISMATCH WHEN VALVES ARE COMMANDED TO CLOSE
POSITION. GPC WILL INDICATE CORRECT VALVE POSITION. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY HAS NO IMPACT SINCE VALVE TALKBACK IS NOT
MISSION CRITICAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-367
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 466 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, MCA 1
8 iV 76AI 1 IAR4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
HARDWIRED TALKBACK (BARBER POLE) TO CREW WILL FALSELY INDICATE FU
& OX ISOL 3/4/5 VALVE MISMATCH WHEN VALVES ARE COMMANDED TO CLOSE
POSITION. GPC WILL INDICATE CORRECT VALVE POSITION. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY HAS NO IMPACT SINCE VALVE TALKBACK IS NOT
MISSION CRITICAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-368
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 467 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY I, MCA 1
8 IV76AI 1IAR4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
HARDWIRED TALKBACK (BARBER POLE) TO CREW WILL FALSELY INDICATE FU
& OX ISOL 3/4/5 VALVE MISMATCH WHEN VALVES ARE COMMANDED TO OPEN
POSITION. GPC WILL INDICATE CORRECT VALVE POSITION. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY HAS NO IMPACT SINCE VALVE TALKBACK IS NOT
MISSION CRITICAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO DO1
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-369
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 468 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: FUSE, IA
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
FUSE, IA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/ 3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 $23
33V73A8F41
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO CLOSE FU & OX TK ISOL 1/2 VALVES USING CREW
SWITCH. GPC COMMANDS ARE STILL AVAILABLE. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY
RESULTS IN THE TK ISOL 1/2 AND MANIFOLD ISOL l&2 VALVES BECOMING
STUCK IN THE OPEN POSITION. THE EFFECT WOULD BE
AN INABILITY TO ISOLATE THE TANKS FROM MANIFOLDS 1 OR 2. NO
MISSION IMPACT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-370
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 469 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
2/1R
ITEM: FUSE, IA
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
FUSE, IA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORB IT: 3/ IR AOA: 3/ IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 $23
33V73A8F36
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO OPEN OR CLOSE FU & OX ISOL 1/2 VALVE USING CREW
SWITCH. THE VALVES ARE STILL FULLY OPERATIONAL USING GPC CMDS.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN TK ISOL 1/2 & 3/4/5 VALVES
FAILED CLOSED. THE EFFECT IS AN INABILITY TO USE/DEPLETE
PROPELLANTS CONSEQUENTLY CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES WILL BE EXCEEDED
DURING RTLS RESULTING IN LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-371
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 470 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, IA
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
FUSE, IA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PNL 08 $24
PART NUMBER: 33V73A8FI6
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSE ABILITY TO CLOSE FU & OX TK ISOL 3/4/5 VALVES USING CREW
SWITCH. GPC COMMANDS ARE STILL AVAILABLE. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY
RESULTS IN THE TK ISOL 3/4/5 AND MANIFOLD ISOL 3, 4 & 5 VALVES
BECOMING STUCK IN THE OPEN POSITION. THE EFFECT WOULD BE
AN INABILITY TO ISOLATE THE TANKS FROM MANIFOLDS 3, 4, AND 5. NO
MISSION IMPACT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-372
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 471 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
2/1R
ITEM: FUSE, IA
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
FUSE, IA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/ IR AOA: 3 / IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/ 3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 $24
33V73A8F7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO OPEN OR CLOSE FU & OX ISOL 3/4/5 VALVES USING CREW
SWITCH. THE VALVES ARE STILL FULLY OPERATIONAL USING GPC CMDS.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN TK ISOL 1/2 & 3/4/5 VALVES
FAILED CLOSED. THE EFFECT IS AN INABILITY TO USE/DEPLETE
PROPELLANTS CONSEQUENTLY CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES WILL BE EXCEEDED
DURING RTLS RESULTING IN LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-373
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
472 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
_)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/1
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/ IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83V76AII3KI
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE CAN RESULT IN THE FU TK ISOL 1/2 VALVE BECOMING STUCK
IN THE CLOSED POSITION. THE EFFECT WOULD BE LOSS OF EIGHT PRIMARY
JETS CAUSING AN INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANT TO MEET THE
CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
DURING RTLS OR AN INABILITY TO PERFORM FULL MISSION OBJECTIVES
ONORBIT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE/LIFE SINCE TRAPPED PROPELLANTS WOULD EXCEED CG SAFETY
BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-374
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 473 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RELAY
FAILURE MODE: FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
RELAY
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83V76AII3KI
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE RESULTS IN THE FU TK ISOL 1/2 VALVE FAILING OPEN. THE
VALVE IS NORMALLY OPEN. REDUNDANCY FOR THIS FUNCTION IS PROVIDED
BY MANIFOLD 1 OR 2 ISOLATION VALVE. LOSS OF THESE VALVES RESULTS
IN AN INABILITY TO ISOLATE MANIFOLDS
1 OR 2. NO MISSION IMPACT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-375
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 474 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
"I)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: F BAY 3A, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 83V76AII3K2
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE RESULTS IN THE FU TK ISOL 1/2 VALVE FAILING OPEN. THE
VALVE IS NORMALLY OPEN. REDUNDANCY FOR THIS FUNCTION IS PROVIDED
BY MANIFOLD 1 OR 2 ISOLATION VALVE. LOSS OF THESE VALVES RESULTS
IN AN INABILITY TO ISOLATE MANIFOLDS
1 OR 2. NO MISSION IMPACT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-376
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 475 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
2/1R
ITEM: RELAY
FAILURE MODE: FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83V76AII3K2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT ON FU TK ISOLATION 1/2 VALVE OPERATION. WHAT WAS LOST
WAS A SAFEGUARD DESIGNED TO KEEP A SINGLE RELAY FAILURE FROM
CAUSING AN IMMEDIATE LOSS OF MISSION CAPABILITY BY FAILING THE FU
TK ISOL VALVE CLOSED. SECOND FAILURE (FAILURE OF
REDUNDANT RELAY) RESULTS IN THE LOSS OF EIGHT PRIMARY JETS CAUSING
AN INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANT TO MEET THE CG SAFETY
BOUNDARIES DURING RTLS OR AN INABILITY TO PERFORM FULL MISSION
OBJECTIVES ONORBIT. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE SINCE TRAPPED
PROPELLANTS WOULD EXCEED CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DURING DEORBIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-377
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 476 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RELAY
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
RELAY
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: F BAY 3A, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 83V76AII3K3
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE RESULTS IN THE FU TK ISOL 1/2 VALVE FAILING OPEN. THE
VALVE IS NORMALLY OPEN. REDUNDANCY FOR THIS FUNCTION IS PROVIDED
BY MANIFOLD 1 OR 2 ISOLATION VALVE. LOSS OF THESE VALVES RESULTS
IN AN INABILITY TO ISOLATE MANIFOLDS
1 OR 2. NO MISSION IMPACT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO DO1
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-378
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: I/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 477 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
I/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
"I)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83V76AII3K3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE CAN RESULT IN THE FU TK ISOL 1/2 VALVE BECOMING STUCK
IN THE CLOSED POSITION. THE EFFECT WOULD BE LOSS OF EIGHT PRIMARY
JETS CAUSING AN INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANT TO MEET THE
CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
DURING RTLS OR AN INABILITY TO PERFORM FULL MISSION OBJECTIVES
ONORBIT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE/LIFE SINCE TRAPPED PROPELLANTS WOULD EXCEED CG SAFETY
BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO DO1
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-379
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 478 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
_)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/1
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/ IR
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83V76AII3K4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE CAN RESULT IN THE OX TK ISOL 1/2 VALVE BECOMING STUCK
IN THE CLOSED POSITION. THE EFFECT WOULD BE LOSS OF EIGHT PRIMARY
JETS CAUSING AN INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANT TO MEET THE
CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
DURING RTLS OR AN INABILITY TO PERFORM FULL MISSION OBJECTIVES
ONORBIT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE/LIFE SINCE TRAPPED PROPELLANTS WOULD EXCEED CG SAFETY
BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-380
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
479 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83V76AII3K4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE RESULTS IN THE OX TK ISOL 1/2 VALVE FAILING OPEN. THE
VALVE IS NORMALLY OPEN. REDUNDANCY FOR THIS FUNCTION IS PROVIDED
BY MANIFOLD 1 OR 2 ISOLATION VALVE. LOSS OF THESE VALVES RESULTS
IN AN INABILITY TO ISOLATE MANIFOLDS
1 OR 2. NO MISSION IMPACT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-381
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
480 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/ 3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3 / 3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83V76AII3K5
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE RESULTS IN THE OX TK ISOL 1/2 VALVE FAILING OPEN. THE
VALVE IS NORMALLY OPEN. REDUNDANCY FOR THIS FUNCTION IS PROVIDED
BY MANIFOLD 1 OR 2 ISOLATION VALVE. LOSS OF THESE VALVES RESULTS
IN AN INABILITY TO ISOLATE MANIFOLDS
1 OR 2. NO MISSION IMPACT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-382
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
481 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBI T: 3/ 1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83V76AII3K5
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT ON OX TK ISOLATION 1/2 VALVE OPERATION. WHAT WAS LOST
WAS A SAFEGUARD DESIGNED TO KEEP A SINGLE RELAY FAILURE FROM
CAUSING AN IMMEDIATE LOSS OF MISSION CAPABILITY BY FAILING THE OX
TK ISOL VALVE CLOSED. SECOND FAILURE (FAILURE OF REDUNDANT
RELAY) RESULTS IN THE LOSS OF EIGHT PRIMARY JETS CAUSING AN
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANT TO MEET THE CG SAFETY
BOUNDARIES DURING RTLS OR AN INABILITY TO PERFORM FULL MISSION
OBJECTIVES ONORBIT° LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN LOSS
OF VEHICLE/LIFE SINCE TRAPPED PROPELLANTS WOULD EXCEED CG SAFETY
BOUNDARIES DURING DEORBIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-383
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 482 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RELAY
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PI_ELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] c[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83V76AII3K6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE RESULTS IN THE OX TK ISOL 1/2 VALVE FAILING OPEN. THE
VALVE IS NORMALLY OPEN. REDUNDANCY FOR THIS FUNCTION IS PROVIDED
BY MANIFOLD 1 OR 2 ISOLATION VALVE. LOSS OF THESE VALVES RESULTS
IN AN INABILITY TO ISOLATE MANIFOLDS
1 OR 2. NO MISSION IMPACT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-384
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 483 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
1/1
ITEM: RELAY
FAILURE MODE: FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : i/1
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B IF] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83V76AII3K6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE CAN RESULT IN THE OX TK ISOL 1/2 VALVE BECOMING STUCK
IN THE CLOSED POSITION. THE EFFECT WOULD BE LOSS OF EIGHT PRIMARY
JETS CAUSINGAN INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANT TO MEET THE
CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
DURING RTLS OR AN INABILITY TO PERFORM FULL MISSION OBJECTIVES
ONORBIT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE/LIFE SINCE TRAPPED PROPELLANTS WOULD EXCEED CG SAFETY
BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-385
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 484 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
1/l
ITEM: RELAY
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
s)
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: I/1
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, MCA 1
81V76AIIIK3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
THE FAILURE CAN RESULT IN THE FU TK ISOL 3/4/5 VALVE BECOMING
STUCK IN THE CLOSED POSITION. THE EFFECT WOULD BE LOSS OF SIX
PRIMARY JETS CAUSING AN INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANT TO
MEET THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DURING RTLS OR AN INABILITY TO
PERFORM FULL MISSION OBJECTIVES ONORBIT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY
WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE SINCE TRAPPED PROPELLANTS
WOULD EXCEED CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES AND STRUCTURAL CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-386
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
485 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, MCA 1
8 IV76AIIIK3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE RESULTS IN THE FU TK ISOL 3/4/5 VALVE FAILING OPEN.
THE VALVE IS NORMALLY OPEN. REDUNDANCY FOR THIS FUNCTION IS
PROVIDED BY MANIFOLD 3, 4 OR 5 ISOLATION VALVE. LOSS OF THESE
VALVES RESULTS IN AN INABILITY TO ISOLATE MANIFOLDS
FROM PROP TANKS. NO MISSION IMPACT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-387
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
486 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
S)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORB I T: 3 / 3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY I, M CA 1
8 IV76AI 1 IK4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE RESULTS IN THE FU TK ISOL 3/4/5 VALVE FAILING OPEN.
THE VALVE IS NORMALLY OPEN. REDUNDANCY FOR THIS FUNCTION IS
PROVIDED BY MANIFOLD 3, 4 OR 5 ISOLATION VALVE. LOSS OF THESE
VALVES RESULTS IN AN INABILITY TO ISOLATE MANIFOLDS
FROM PROP TANKS. NO MISSION IMPACT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-388
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 487 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
?)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, MCA 1
81V76AIIIK4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT ON FU TK ISOLATION 3/4/5 VALVE OPERATION. WHAT WAS LOST
WAS A SAFEGUARD DESIGNED TO KEEP A SINGLE RELAY FAILURE FROM
CAUSING AN IMMEDIATE LOSS OF MISSION CAPABILITY BY FAILING THE FU
TK ISOL VALVE CLOSED. SECOND FAILURE (FAILURE OF REDUNDANT
RELAY) RESULTS IN THE LOSS OF SIX PRIMARY JETS CAUSING AN
INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME CRITICAL PROPELLANT DUMPS DURING RTLS
OR AN INABILITY TO PERFORM FULL MISSION OBJECTIVES ONORBIT. LOSS
OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE SINCE
TRAPPED PROPELLANTS WOULD EXCEED CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DURING
DEORBIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-389
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
488 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBI T: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: F BAY i, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 81V76AIIIK5
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE RESULTS IN THE FU TK ISOL 3/4/5 VALVE FAILING OPEN.
THE VALVE IS NORMALLY OPEN. REDUNDANCY FOR THIS FUNCTION IS
PROVIDED BY MANIFOLD 3, 4 OR 5 ISOLATION VALVE. LOSS OF THESE
VALVES RESULTS IN AN INABILITY TO ISOLATE MANIFOLDS
FROM PROP TANKS. NO MISSION IMPACT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-390
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
489 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, MCA 1
8IV 76AI 1IK5
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
THE FAILURE CAN RESULT IN THE FU TK ISOL 3/4/5 VALVE BECOMING
STUCK IN THE CLOSED POSITION. THE EFFECT WOULD BE LOSS OF SIX
PRIMARY JETS CAUSING AN INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANT TO
MEET THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DURING RTLS OR AN INABILITY TO
PERFORM FULL MISSION OBJECTIVES ONORBIT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY
WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE SINCE TRAPPED PROPELLANTS
WOULD EXCEED CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES AND STRUCTURAL CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-391
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 490 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
i/I
ITEM: RELAY
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: I/1
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBI T: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/ 3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C [P]
LOCATION: F BAY I, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 81V76AIIIK6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE CAN RESULT IN THE OX TK ISOL 3/4/5 VALVE BECOMING
STUCK IN THE CLOSED POSITION. THE EFFECT WOULD BE LOSS OF SIX
PRIMARY JETS CAUSING AN INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANT TO
MEET THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DURING RTLS OR AN INABILITY TO
PERFORM FULL MISSION OBJECTIVES ONORBIT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY
WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE SINCE TRAPPED PROPELLANTS
WOULD EXCEED CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES AND STRUCTURAL CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-392
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 491 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEOREIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, MCA 1
8 iV76AIIIK6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE RESULTS IN THE OX TK ISOL 3/4/5 VALVE FAILING OPEN.
THE VALVE IS NORMALLY OPEN. REDUNDANCY FOR THIS FUNCTION IS
PROVIDED BY MANIFOLD 3, 4 OR 5 ISOLATION VALVE. LOSS OF THESE
VALVES RESULTS IN AN INABILITY TO ISOLATE MANIFOLDS
FROM PROP TANKS. NO MISSION IMPACT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-393
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 492 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RELAY
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
RELAY
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LI FTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: F BAY I, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 81V76AIIIK7
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE RESULTS IN THE OX TK ISOL 3/4/5 VALVE FAILING OPEN.
THE VALVE IS NORMALLY OPEN. REDUNDANCY FOR THIS FUNCTION IS
PROVIDED BY MANIFOLD 3, 4 OR 5 ISOLATION VALVE. LOSS OF THESE
VALVES RESULTS IN AN INABILITY TO ISOLATE MANIFOLDS
FROM PROP TANKS, NO MISSION IMPACT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-394
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 493 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, MCA 1
8 IV76AI 1IK7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT ON OX TK ISOLATION 3/4/5 VALVE OPERATION. WHAT WAS LOST
WAS A SAFEGUARD DESIGNED TO KEEP A SINGLE RELAY FAILURE FROM
CAUSING AN IMMEDIATE LOSS OF MISSION CAPABILITY BY FAILING THE FU
TK ISOL VALVE CLOSED. SECOND FAILURE (FAILURE OF
REDUNDANT (RELAY) RESULTS IN THE LOSS OF SIX PRIMARY JETS CAUSING
AN INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME CRITICAL PROPELLANT DUMPS DURING
RTLS OR AN INABILITY TO PERFORM FULL MISSION OBJECTIVES ONORBIT.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE/LIFE SINCE TRAPPED PROPELLANTS WOULD EXCEED CG SAFETY
BOUNDARIES DURING DEORBIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-395
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
494 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: F BAY i, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 81V76AIIIK8
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE RESULTS IN THE OX TK ISOL 3/4/5 VALVE FAILING OPEN.
THE VALVE IS NORMALLY OPEN. REDUNDANCY FOR THIS FUNCTION IS
PROVIDED BY MANIFOLD 3, 4 OR 5 ISOLATION VALVE. LOSS OF THESE
VALVES RESULTS IN AN INABILITY TO ISOLATE MANIFOLDS
FROM PROP TANKS. NO MISSION IMPACT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-396
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 495 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/ 3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: F BAY i, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 81V76AIIIK8
B [ F ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE CAN RESULT IN THE OX TK ISOL 3/4/5 VALVE BECOMING
STUCK IN THE CLOSED POSITION. THE EFFECT WOULD BE LOSS OF SIX
PRIMARY JETS CAUSING AN INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANT TO
MEET THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DURING RTLS OR AN INABILITY TO
PERFORM FULL MISSION OBJECTIVES ONORBIT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY
WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE SINCE TRAPPED PROPELLANTS
WOULD EXCEED CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES AND STRUCTURAL CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-397
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 496 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
_)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3
LI FTOFF: 3 / 3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: F BAY 3A, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 83V76AII3AIRII
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ONE OF THREE REDUNDANT RESISTORS WHICH PROVIDE ISOLATION
BETWEEN MAIN BUS AND VALVE POSITION TALKBACKS TO GPC. FAILURE OF
ALL THREE RESISTORS RESULTS IN LOSS OF ALL TALKBACK FOR BOTH THE
FU & OX ISOL 1/2 VALVE, NO EFFECT SINCE TALKBACKS ARE NOT
MISSION CRITICAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-398
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 497 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83V76AII3AIRII
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE TO HARDWIRED AND GPC TALKBACKS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-399
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 498 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83V76AII3AIRI2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ONE OF THREE REDUNDANT RESISTORS WHICH PROVIDE ISOLATION
BETWEEN MAIN BUS AND VALVE POSITION TALKBACKS TO GPC. FAILURE OF
ALL THREE RESISTORS RESULTS IN LOSS OF ALL TALKBACK FOR BOTH THE
FU & OX ISOL 1/2 VALVE, NO EFFECT SINCE TALKBACKS ARE NOT
MISSION CRITICAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-400
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 499 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: F BAY 3A, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 83V76AII3AIRI2
BC ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE TO HARDWIRED AND GPC TALKBACKS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-401
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 500 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: F BAY 3A, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 83V76AII3AIR3
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ONE OF THREE REDUNDANT RESISTORS WHICH PROVIDE ISOLATION
BETWEEN MAIN BUS AND VALVE POSITION TALKBACKS TO GPC. FAILURE OF
ALL THREE RESISTORS RESULTS IN LOSS OF ALL TALKBACK FOR BOTH THE
FU & OX ISOL 1/2 VALVE, NO EFFECT SINCE TALKBACKS ARE NOT
MISSION CRITICAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-402
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 501 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83V76AII3AIR3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE TO HARDWIRED AND GPC TALKBACKS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-403
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 502 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83V76AII3AIRI4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR THE FU TK ISOL 1/2 VALVE TO GPC (OPEN POSITION
ONLY). HARDWIRE TALKBACK TO CREW WILL INDICATE CORRECT POSITION.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY HAS NO IMPACT SINCE VALVE TALKBACK IS NOT
MISSION CRITICAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-404
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
503 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
_)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: F BAY 3A, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 83V76AII3AIRI4
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-405
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 504 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: F BAY 3A, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 83V76AII3AIRI8
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR CREW SWITCH POSITION TO GPC (OPEN POSITION
ONLY). NO EFFECT, SWITCH OPERATION CAN BE INDIRECTLY DETERMINED
BY VALVE OPERATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-406
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 505 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
S)
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83V76AII3AIRI8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-407
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
506 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
_)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83V76AII3AIR27
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR THE FU TK ISOL 1/2 VALVE TO GPC (CLOSE POSITION
ONLY). HARDWIRE TALKBACK TO CREW WILL INDICATE CORRECT POSITION.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY HAS NO IMPACT SINCE VALVE TALKBACK IS NOT
MISSION CRITICAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO DO1
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-408
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 507 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LO CAT I ON:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83V76AII3AIR27
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-409
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 508 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/ 3 TAL: 3/ 3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] c[ ]
LOCATION: F BAY 3A, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 83V76AII3AIRI3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR CREW SWITCH POSITION TO GPC (CLOSE POSITION
ONLY). NO EFFECT, SWITCH OPERATION CAN BE INDIRECTLY DETERMINED
BY VALVE OPERATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-410
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 509 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83V76AII3AIRI3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-411
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 510 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: F BAY 3A, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 83V76AII3AIRI5
B[ ] c[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR THE OX TK ISOL 1/2 VALVE TO GPC (OPEN POSITION
ONLY). HARDWIRE TALKBACK TO CREW WILL INDICATE CORRECT POSITION.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY HAS NO IMPACT SINCE VALVE TALKBACK IS NOT
MISSION CRITICAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-412
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
511 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83V76AII3AIRI5
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-413 <_ _....
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 512 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. B RKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3 / 3 TAL: 3/ 3
ONORBIT: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83V76AII3AIR28
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR THE OX TK ISOL 1/2 VALVE TO GPC (CLOSE POSITION
ONLY). HARDWIRE TALKBACK TO CREW WILL INDICATE CORRECT POSITION.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY HAS NO IMPACT SINCE VALVE TALKBACK IS NOT
MISSION CRITICAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-414
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 513 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83V76AII3AIR28
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-415
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
514 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, MCA 1
8 iV76AI 1IAIRI
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ONE OF THREE REDUNDANT RESISTORS WHICH PROVIDE ISOLATION
BETWEEN MAIN BUS AND VALVE POSITION TO GPC. FAILURE OF ALL THREE
RESISTORS RESULTS IN LOSS OF ALL TALKBACKS FOR BOTH FU & OX ISOL
3/4/5 VALVE, NO EFFECT SINCE TALKBACKS ARE NOT MISSION
CRI T ICAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-416
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 515 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY I, MCA 1
8 IV76AIIIAIRI
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE TO HARDWIRE AND GPC TALKBACKS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-417
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 516 ABORT:
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
4) OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C C ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, MCA 1
8 IV76AI 1 IAIR2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ONE OF THREE REDUNDANT RESISTORS WHICH PROVIDE ISOLATION
BETWEEN MAIN BUS AND VALVE POSITION TO GPC. FAILURE OF ALL THREE
RESISTORS RESULTS IN LOSS OF ALL TALKBACKS FOR BOTH FU & OX ISOL
3/4/5 VALVE, NO EFFECT SINCE TALKBACKS ARE NOT MISSION
CRITICAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-418
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 517 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: F BAY i, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 81V76AIIIAIR2
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE TO HARDWIRE AND GPC TALKBACKS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-419
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 518 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, M CA 1
8 IV76AIIIAIR3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ONE OF THREE REDUNDANT RESISTORS WHICH PROVIDE ISOLATION
BETWEEN MAIN BUS AND VALVE POSITION TO GPC. FAILURE OF ALL THREE
RESISTORS RESULTS IN LOSS OF ALL TALKBACKS FOR BOTH FU & OX ISOL
3/4/5 VALVE, NO EFFECT SINCE TALKBACKS ARE NOT MISSION
CRITICAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO DO1
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-420
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
519 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, MCA 1
8IV76All IAIR3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE TO HARDWIRE AND GPC TALKBACKS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-421
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 520 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY I, M CA 1
8 IV 76AI 1 IAIR23
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR THE FU TK ISOL 3/4/5 VALVE TO GPC (OPEN POSITION
ONLY). HARDWIRE TALKBACK (BARBER POLE) TO CREW WILL INDICATE
CORRECT POSITION. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY HAS NO IMPACT SINCE
VALVE TALKBACK IS NOT MISSION CRITICAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-422
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 521 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] c[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, M CA 1
8 IV76AI 1 IAIR23
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-423
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 522 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/ 3 TAL: 3/ 3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: F BAY i, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 81V76AIIIAIR24
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR CREW SWITCH POSITION TO GPC (OPEN POSITION
ONLY). NO EFFECT, SWITCH OPERATION CAN BE INDIRECTLY DETERMINED
BY VALVE OPERATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-424
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
523 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, MCA 1
81V76AIIIAIR24
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-425
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
524 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2 ) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
4) OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, MCA 1
8 iV76AIIIAIRI0
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR THE FU TK ISOL 3/4/5 VALVE TO GPC (CLOSE
POSITION ONLY). HARDWIRE TALKBACK (BARBER POLE) TO CREW WILL
INDICATE CORRECT POSITION. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY HAS NO IMPACT
SINCE VALVE TALKBACK IS NOT MISSION CRITICAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-426
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
525 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY I, M CA 1
8IV76AI 1IAIRI 0
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-427
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
526 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, M CA 1
8 IV76AIIIAIRI4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR CREW SWITCH POSITION TO GPC (CLOSE POSITION
ONLY). NO EFFECT, SWITCH OPERATION CAN BE INDIRECTLY DETERMINED
BY VALVE OPERATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-428
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 527 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: F BAY I, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 8 IV76AIIIAIRI4
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
NONE, TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-429
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 528 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: F BAY i, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 81V76AIIIAIR22
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR THE OX TK ISOL 3/4/5 VALVE TO GPC (OPEN POSITION
ONLY). HARDWIRE TALKBACK (BARBER POLE) TO CREW WILL INDICATE
CORRECT POSITION. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY HAS NO IMPACT SINCE
VALVE TALKBACK IS NOT MISSION CRITICAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-430
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 529 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY I, M CA 1
8 IV 76AI 1 IAIR22
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-431
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
530 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2 ) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: F BAY i, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 81V76AIIIAIRII
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR THE OX TK ISOL 3/4/5 VALVE TO GPC (CLOSE
POSITION ONLY). HARDWIRE TALKBACK (BARBER POLE) TO CREW WILL
INDICATE CORRECT POSITION. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY HAS NO IMPACT
SINCE VALVE TALKBACK IS NOT MISSION CRITICAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-432
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 531 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: F BAY i, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 81V76AIIIAIRII
S[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES:
SEQ. 7
VS70-942099 REV D EO DO1; MC284-0430 REV E AMENDMENT
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-433
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 532 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS IN THE OPEN POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/ 3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 $23
33V73A8S23
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM CLOSE COMMANDS. IF THE SWITCH
FAILS IN THE OPEN POSITION, THE VALVE WILL OPEN AND CANNOT BE
CLOSED BY THE SWITCH OR BY THE MDM COMMANDS. TO CLOSE THE VALVE,
THE CREW MUST REMOVE CONTROL BUS POWER FROM
CONTACTS SETS AND THEN USE THE GPC READ/WRITE PROCEDURES. FAILURE
OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CC, DC
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-434
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 533 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
2/1R
ITEM: OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FAILS IN THE CLOSED POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3 / 2R AOA: 3/ IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 $23
33V73A8S23
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM OPEN COMMANDS. IF THE SWITCH FAILS
IN THE CLOSED POSITION, THE VALVE WILL CLOSE AND CANNOT BE OPENED
BY THE SWITCH OR BY THE MDM COMMAND. TO OPEN THE VALVE, THE CREW
MUST REMOVE CONTROL BUS POWER FROM THE CLOSE CONTACTS,
AND THEN USE THE GPC READ/WRITE PROCEDURES. FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WILL AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS, PROPELLANT DUMP LENGTHS
DURING ABORTS AND ENTRY, AND MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL
ENOUGH PROPELLANTS DURING RTLS ABORTS TO MEET THE CG SAFETY
BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CC, DC
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-435
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 534 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS IN THE GPC POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
4) OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/ 3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 $23
33V73A8S23
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
VALVE CANNOT BE CONTROLLED BY SWITCH, ONLY BY MDM COMMANDS, TO
OPERATE THE VALVE, THE CREW MUST USE THE GPCREAD/WRITE
PROCEDURES. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WHILE THE VALVE IS IN THE
CLOSED POSITION WILL AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS, PROPELLANT DUMP
LENGTHS DURING ENTRY AND ABORTS, AND MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO
EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS DURING RTLS ABORTS TO MEET THE CG SAFETY
BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CC, DC
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-436
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 3/IR
535 ABORT: 2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS i, 2
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS i, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 $23
33V73A8S23
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM COMMANDS. IF THE OPEN CONTACTS
FAIL OPEN WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN ANY POSITION, THE VALVE WILL
REMAIN IN THAT POSITION, CANNOT BE OPENED BY THE SWITCH COMMANDS,
ONLY BY MDM COMMANDS, AND CAN BE CLOSED BY SWITCH OR MDM
COMMAND. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL AFFECT ONORBIT
OPERATIONS, PROPELLANT DUMP LENGTHS DURING ABORTS AND ENTRY, AND
MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO BURN ENOUGH PROPELLANT DURING RTLS
ABORTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG
SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CC, DC
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-437
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 536 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS i, 2
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS i, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 $23
33V73A8S23
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM COMMANDS. IF THE OPEN CONTACTS
FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN THE OPEN OR GPC POSITION, THE
VALVE WILL OPENAND CANNOT BE CLOSED BY MDM COMMAND, ONLY BY
SWITCH COMMAND. IF THE OPEN CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE
SWITCH IS IN THE CLOSED POSITION, THE VALVE WILL REMAIN CLOSED,
AND CANNOT BE OPENED BY MDM COMMANDS, ONLY BY SWITCH COMMANDS. TO
CLOSE THE VALVE, THE CREW MUST REMOVE CONTROL BUS POWER FROM THE
CONTACTS, AND THEN USE THE GPC READ/WRITE PROCEDURES.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO CLOSE THE
VALVE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CC, DC; FLIGHT RULE 6-95
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-438
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 537 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 3, 4
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH GPC CONTACTS FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PNL 08 $23
PART NUMBER: 33V73A8S23
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
NONE, THESE CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CC, DC
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-439
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 3/3
538 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 3, 4
SWITCH GPC CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2 ) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 $23
33V73A8S23
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THESE CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CC, DC
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-440
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 3/3
539 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS 5, 6
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
_)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS 5, 6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 $23
33V73ASS23
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY MDM COMMANDS. IF THE CLOSDE CONTACTS FAIL
OPEN WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN ANY POSTION, THE VALVE WILL REMAIN IN
THAT POSITION, CAN BE OPENED BY SWITCH OR MDM COMMANDS, AND CANNOT
BE CLOSED BY SWITCH COMMANDS,
ONLY BY MDM COMMANDS. FAILURE OF THE MDM CLOSE COMMANDS WILL
CAUSE THE INABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CC, DC
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-441
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 3/IR
540 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS 5, 6
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS 5, 6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 $23
33V73A8S23
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE OTHER SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS AND THE
MDM CLOSE COMMANDS. IF THE CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE
SWITCH IS IN ANY POSITION, THE VALVE WILL REMAIN IN THAT
POSITION, CAN BE CLOSED BY SWITCH OR MDM COMMAND, AND CANNOT BE
OPENED BY SWITCH OR MDM COMMANDS. TO OPEN THE VALVE, THE CREW
MUST REMOVE CONTROL BUS POWER FROM THE CONTACTS, AND THEN USE THE
GPC READ/WRITE PROCEDURES. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL AFFECT
ONORBIT OPERATIONS, PROPELLANT DUMP LENGTHS DURING ABORTS AND
ENTRY AND MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO BURN ENOUGH PROPELLANT
DURING RTLS ABORTS TO MEET THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CC, DC
REPORT DATE 03/23/87 C-442
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1113187 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 3/3
541 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS 7, 8
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS 7, 8
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 $23
33V73A8S23
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO REDUNDANCY PROVIDED PROVIDED TO INHIBIT THE CLOSE RELAYS. IF
THE OPEN CONTACTS FAIL OPEN WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN ANY POSITION,
THE VALVE WILLREMAIN IN THAT POSITION, AND CAN BE OPENED OR
CLOSED BY THE SWITCH OR MDM COMMANDS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CC, DC
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-443
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 3/3
542 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS 7, 8
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
1) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS 7, 8
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 $23
33V73A8S23
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO REDUNDANCY PROVIDED TO INHIBIT THE CLOSE RELAYS. IF THE OPEN
CONTACTS FAIL WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN ANY POSITION, THE VALVE WILL
REMAIN IN THAT POSITION, CANNOT BE CLOSED BY SWITCH OR MDM
COMMAND, AND CAN BE OPENED BY SWITCH OR MDM COMMANDS. TO
CLOSE THE VALVE WITH THE MDM COMMAND, THE CREW MUST REMOVE CONTROL
BUS POWER FROM THE OPEN CONTACTS, AND THEN USE THE GPC READ/WRITE
PROCEDURES. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO
CLOSE THE VALVE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CC, DC; FLIGHT RULE 6-95
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-444
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 3/3
543 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 9, i0
SWITCH GPC CONTACTS FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 9, i0
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 $23
33V73A8S23
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THESE CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CC, DC
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-445
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 544 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 9, i0
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH GPC CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 9, I0
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 $23
33V73A8S23
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THESE CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CC, DC
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-446
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 3/3
545 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
12
FAILURE MODE:
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS ii,
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS ii, 12
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORB IT: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 $23
33V73ASS23
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY MDM COMMANDS. IF THE CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL
OPEN WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN ANY POSTION, THE VALVE WILLREMAIN IN
THAT POSITION, CAN BE OPENED BY SWITCH OR MDM COMMANDS, AND CANNOT
BE CLOSED BY SWITCH COMMANDS,
ONLY BY MDM COMMANDS. FAILURE OF THE MDM CLOSE COMMANDS WILL
CAUSE THE INABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CC, DC
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-447
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 3/IR
546 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
12
FAILURE MODE:
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS ii,
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
4) OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
5) OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS ii, 12
6)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBI T: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 $23
33V73A8S23
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE OTHER SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS AND THE MDM
CLOSE COMMANDS. IF THE CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE
SWITCH IS IN ANY POSITION, THE VALVE WILL REMAIN IN THAT POSITION
AND CAN BE CLOSED BY SWITCH OR MDM COMMAND, BUT CANNOT
BE OPENED BY SWITCH OR MDM COMMAND. TO OPEN THE VALVE, THE CREW
MUST REMOVE CONTROL BUS POWER FROM THE CLOSE CONTACTS, AND USE THE
GPC READ/WRITE PROCEDURES. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL AFFECT
ONORBIT OPERATIONS, PROPELLANT DUMP LENGTHS
DURING ABORTS AND ENTRY, AND MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL
ENOUGH PROPELLANTS DURING ENTRY AND ABORTS TO MEET THE CG SAFETY
BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CC, DC
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-448
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 547 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS IN THE OPEN POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT z 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 $24
33V73A8S24
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM CLOSE COMMANDS. IF THE SWITCH
FAILS IN THE OPEN POSITION, THE VALVE WILL OPEN AND CANNOT BE
CLOSED BY THE SWITCH OR BY THE MDM COMMANDS. TO CLOSE THE VALVE,
THE CREW MUST REMOVE CONTROL BUS POWER FROM
CONTACTS SETS AND THEN USE THE GPC READ/WRITE PROCEDURES. FAILURE
OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CC, DC
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-449
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 548 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS IN THE CLOSED POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 $24
33V73A8S24
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM OPEN COMMANDS. IF THE SWITCH FAILS
IN THE CLOSED POSITION, THE VALVE WILL CLOSE AND CANNOT BE OPENED
BY THE SWITCH OR BY THE MDM COMMAND. TO OPEN THE VALVE, THE CREW
MUST REMOVE CONTROL BUS POWER FROM THE CLOSE CONTACTS,
AND THEN USE THE GPC READ/WRITE PROCEDURES. FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WILL AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS, PROPELLANT DUMP LENGTHS
DURING ABORTS AND ENTRY, AND MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL
ENOUGH PROPELLANTS DURING RTLS ABORTS TO MEET THE CG SAFETY
BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CC, DC
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-450
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 549 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
2/1R
ITEM: OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FAILS IN THE GPC POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 $24
33V73A8S24
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
VALVE CANNOT BE CONTROLLED BY SWITCH, ONLY BY MDM COMMANDS. TO
OPERATE THE VALVE, THE CREW MUST USE THE GPC READ/WRITE
PROCEDURES. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WHILE THE VALVE IS IN THE
CLOSED POSITION WILL AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS, PROPELLANT DUMP
LENGTHS DURING ENTRY AND ABORTS, AND MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO
EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS DURING RTLS ABORTS TO MEET THE CG SAFETY
BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CC, DC
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-451
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 3/IR
550 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS i, 2
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS i, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 $24
33V73A8S24
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM COMMANDS. IF THE OPEN CONTACTS
FAIL OPEN WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN ANY POSITION, THE VALVE WILL
REMAIN IN THAT POSITION, CANNOT BE OPENED BY THE SWITCH COMMANDS,
ONLY BY MDM COMMANDS, AND CAN BE CLOSED BY SWITCH OR MDM
COMMAND. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL AFFECT ONORBIT
OPERATIONS, PROPELLANT DUMP LENGTHS DURING ABORTS AND ENTRY, AND
MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO BURN ENOUGH PROPELLANT DURING RTLS
ABORTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG
SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CC, DC
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-452
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 3/3
551 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS i, 2
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS I, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PNL 08 $24
PART NUMBER: 33V73A8S24
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM COMMANDS. IF THE OPEN CONTACTS
FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN THE OPEN OR GPC POSITION, THE
VALVE WILL OPEN AND CANNOT BE CLOSED BY MDM COMMAND, ONLY BY
SWITCH COMMAND. IF THE OPEN CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE
SWITCH IS IN THE CLOSED POSITION, THE VALVE WILL REMAIN CLOSED,
AND CANNOT BE OPENED BY MDM COMMANDS, ONLY BY SWITCH COMMANDS. TO
CLOSE THE VALVE, THE CREW MUST REMOVE CONTROL BUS POWER FROM THE
CONTACTS, AND THEN USE THE GPC READ/WRITE PROCEDURES.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO CLOSE THE
VALVE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CC, DC; FLIGHT RULE 6-95
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-453
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 3/3
552 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 3, 4
SWITCH GPC CONTACTS FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3 / 3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PNL 08 $24
PART NUMBER: 33V73A8S24
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THESE CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CC, DC
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-454
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 3/3
553 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 3, 4
SWITCH GPC CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOF F: 3/ 3 TAL: 3/ 3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 $24
33V73A8S24
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THESE CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CC, DC
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-455
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 3/3
554 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
6
FAILURE MODE:
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS 5,
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS 5, 6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 $24
33V73A8S24
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY MDM COMMANDS. IF THE CLOSDE CONTACTS FAIL
OPEN WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN ANY POSTION, THE VALVE WILL REMAIN IN
THAT POSITION, CAN BE OPENED BY SWITCH OR MDM COMMANDS, AND CANNOT
BE CLOSED BY SWITCH COMMANDS,
ONLY BY MDM COMMANDS. FAILURE OF THE MDM CLOSE COMMANDS WILL
CAUSE THE INABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CC, DC
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-456
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 3/IR
555 ABORT: 3/1R
ITEM:
6
FAILURE MODE:
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS 5,
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
4) OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS 5, 6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[ F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 $24
33V73A8S24
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE OTHER SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS AND THE
MDM CLOSE COMMANDS. IF THE CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE
SWITCH IS IN ANY POSITION, THE VALVE WILLREMAIN IN THAT
POSITION, CAN BE CLOSED BY SWITCH OR MDM COMMAND, AND CANNOT BE
OPENED BY SWITCH OR MDM COMMANDS. TO OPEN THE VALVE, THE CREW
MUST REMOVE CONTROL BUS POWER FROM THE CONTACTS, AND THEN USE THE
GPC READ/WRITE PROCEDURES. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL AFFECT
ONORBIT OPERATIONS, PROPELLANT DUMP LENGTHS DURING ABORTS AND
ENTRY AND MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO BURN ENOUGH PROPELLANT
DURING RTLS ABORTS TO MEET THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CC, DC
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-457
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 3/3
556 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS 7, 8
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS 7, 8
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH:
LI FTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 $24
33V73A8S24
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO REDUNDANCY PROVIDED PROVIDED TO INHIBIT THE CLOSE RELAYS. IF
THE OPEN CONTACTS FAIL OPEN WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN ANY POSITION,
THE VALVE WILL REMAIN IN THAT POSITION, AND CAN BE OPENED OR
CLOSED BY THE SWITCH OR MDM COMMANDS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CC, DC
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-458
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 557 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS 7, 8
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS 7, 8
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 $24
33V73A8S24
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO REDUNDANCY PROVIDED TO INHIBIT THE CLOSE RELAYS. IF THE OPEN
CONTACTS FAIL WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN ANY POSITION, THE VALVE WILL
REMAIN IN THAT POSITION, CANNOT BE CLOSED BY SWITCH OR MDM
COMMAND, AND CAN BE OPENED BY SWITCH OR MDM COMMANDS. TO
CLOSE THE VALVE WITH THE MDM COMMAND, THE CREW MUST REMOVE CONTROL
BUS POWER FROM THE OPEN CONTACTS, AND THEN USE THE GPC READ/WRITE
PROCEDURES. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO
CLOSE THE VALVE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CC, DC; FLIGHT RULE 6-95
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-459
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 558 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 9, 10
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH GPC CONTACTS FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 9, I0
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 $24
33V73A8S24
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THESE CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CC, DC
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-460
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 559 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 9, 10
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH GPC CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 9, I0
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] c[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 $24
33V73A8S24
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THESE CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CC, DC
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-461
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 3/3
560 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
12
FAILURE MODE:
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS 11,
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
"I)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS ii, 12
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/ 3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PNL 08 $24
PART NUMBER: 33V73A8S24
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY MDM COMMANDS. IF THE CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL
OPEN WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN ANY POSTION, THE VALVE WILL REMAIN IN
THAT POSITION, CAN BE OPENED BY SWITCH OR MDM COMMANDS, AND CANNOT
BE CLOSED BY SWITCH COMMANDS,
ONLY BY MDM COMMANDS. FAILURE OF THE MDM CLOSE COMMANDS WILL
CAUSE THE INABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CC, DC
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-462
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 3/IR
561 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
12
FAILURE MODE:
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS II,
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS ii, 12
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 $24
33V73ASS24
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE OTHER SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS AND THE MDM
CLOSE COMMANDS. IF THE CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE
SWITCH IS IN ANY POSITION, THE VALVE WILL REMAIN IN THAT POSITION
AND CAN BE CLOSED BY SWITCH OR MDM COMMAND, BUT CANNOT
BE OPENED BY SWITCH OR MDM COMMAND. TO OPEN THE VALVE, THE CREW
MUST REMOVE CONTROL BUS POWER FROM THE CLOSE CONTACTS, AND USE THE
GPC READ/WRITE PROCEDURES. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL AFFECT
ONORBIT OPERATIONS, PROPELLANT DUMP LENGTHS
DURING ABORTS AND ENTRY, AND MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL
ENOUGH PROPELLANTS DURING ENTRY AND ABORTS TO MEET THE CG SAFETY
BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CC, DC
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-463
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 562 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, PCA 3
83V76A24RPC29
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE GPC COMMAND SIGNAL TO OPEN MANIFOLD 5 FU & OX ISOL VLVs.
VALVES CAN STILL BE OPENED USING CREW SWITCH. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY, WORST CASE, RESULTS IN MANIFOLD 5 FU & OX ISOL VLVs
FAILED CLOSED RESULTING IN LOSS OF VRCS CONTROL.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-464
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 563 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, PCA 3
83V76A24RPC29
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE RESULTS IN THE MANIFOLD 5 FU & OX ISOL VLVs BECOMING
STUCK IN THE OPEN POSITION. NO MISSION EFFECT, PROPELLANT CAN BE
ISOLATED FROM THRUSTERS BY THE TK ISOL 3/4/5 VLVs. VERNIER
THRUSTERS ARE NOT USED DURING ENTRY OR ABORTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-465
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 564 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, PCA 3
83V76A24RPC28
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO COMMAND MANIFOLD 5 FU & OX ISOL VLVs CLOSE USING
CREW SWITCH OR GPC. WORST CASE RESULTS IN MANIFOLD 5 FU & OX VLVs
BECOMING STUCK IN THE OPEN POSITION. NO MISSION EFFECT,
PROPELLANT CAN BE ISOLATED FROM THRUSTERS BY THE TK ISOL 3/4/5
VLVs. VERNIER THRUSTERS ARE NOT USED DURING ENTRY OR ABORTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-466
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
565 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2 ) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: F BAY 3A, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 83V76A24RPC28
B[P] C[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO COMMAND MANIFOLD 5 FU & OX ISOL VLVs USING GPC.
CREW SWITCH CAN STILL OPEN OR CLOSE VLVs. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY
(CREW SWITCH), WORST CASE, RESULTS IN MANIFOLD 5 FU & OX ISOL VLVs
BECOMING STUCK IN THE CLOSED POSITION RESULTING IN
LOSS OF VRCS CONTROL, THEREFORE LOSS OF MISSION CAPABILITY.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-467
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 566 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY I, PCA 1
81V76A22RPC28
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CREW SWITCH COMMAND SIGNAL TO OPEN MANIFOLD 5 FU & OX ISOL
VLVs. VALVES CAN STILL BE OPENED USING GPC. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY, WORST CASE, RESULTS IN MANIFOLD 5 FU & OX ISOL VLVs
FAILED CLOSED RESULTING IN LOSS OF VRCS CONTROL.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-468
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
567 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
a)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY I, PCA 1
81V76A22RPC28
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE RESULTS IN THE MANIFOLD 5 FU & OX ISOL VLVs BECOMING
STUCK IN THE OPEN POSITION. NO MISSION EFFECT, PROPELLANT CAN BE
ISOLATED FROM THRUSTERS BY THE TK ISOL 3/4/5 VLVS. VERNIER
THRUSTERS ARE NOT USED DURING ENTRY OR ABORTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-469
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 568 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: F BAY I, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 81V76AIIIAICRI3
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO OVERRIDE A GPC "OPEN" COMMAND AND CLOSE THE
MANIFOLD ISOL 1 VALVE USING CREW SWITCH. NO EFFECT ON MISSION,
GPC COMMANDS STILL AVAILABLE TO CLOSE VALVE.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-470
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
569 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
S)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, M CA 1
8 IV76AIIIAICRI3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE DIODE ISOLATION BETWEEN VALVE CONTROL FEEDBACK AND CREW
SWITCH CLOSE COMMANDS WHEN THE MANIFOLD ISOL 1 VALVES ARE IN THE
OPEN POSITION. THE EFFECT WOULD BEAN INTERMITTENT CLOSE COMMAND
CAUSING THE VALVES TO FAIL PARTIALLY CLOSED WHEN COMMANDED
OPEN BY GPC. NO MISSION EFFECT, VALVES ARE FULLY OPERATIONAL
UTILIZING CREW SWITCH.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-471
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
570 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, MCA 1
8IV76AIIIAICR8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSE ABILITY TO OPEN FU & OX MANIFOLD ISOL 1 VALVE USING CREW
SWITCH. GPC COMMANDS ARE STILL AVAILABLE FOR VALVE OPERATION.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN MANIFOLD ISOL 1 VALVE FAILING
CLOSED. THE EFFECT WOULD BE AN INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME
CRITICAL PROPELLANT DUMPS DURING RTLS (LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE) OR AN
INABILITY TO COMPLETE FULL MISSION OBJECTIVES ON ORBIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-472
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 571 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/ 3 TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ]
LOCATION: F BAY i, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 81V76AIIIAICR8
B[P] C[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE DIODE ISOLATION BETWEEN CREW SWITCH AND GPC "OPEN" COMMAND.
FAILURE COULD POSSIBLY RESULT IN LOSS OF GPC OR SWITCH TO CONTROL
OX & FU MANIFOLD ISOL 1 VALVE OPERATION. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY,
WORST CASE, CANRESULT IN THE MANIFOLD ISOL VALVE
FAILED CLOSED. THE EFFECT WOULD BE AN INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME
CRITICAL PROPELLANT DUMPS DURING RTLS OR AN INABILITY TO PERFORM
FULL MISSION OBJECTIVES ON ORBIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-473
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
572 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY I, M CA 1
8 IV76AI IIAICRI2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CONTROL FEEDBACK FROM FU & OX MANIFOLD 2 ISOL VALVE TO DE-
ENERGIZE RELAY ONCE THE VALVE REACHES THE COMMANDED POSITION. NO
EFFECT ON MISSION, AC MOTOR VALVE DESIGNED TO WITHSTAND
CONTINUOUS POWER.
REFERENCES:
SEQ. 8
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; MC284-0420 REV C AMENDMENT
REPORT DATE 03/23/87 C-474
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
573 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, M CA 1
8IV76All IAICRI 2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE DIODE ISOLATION BETWEEN CREW SWITCH (CLOSE POSITION) AND
VALVE TALKBACK FROM HYBRID DRIVER. THE FAILURE WILL RESULT IN A
FALSE INDICATION OF A VALVE MISCOMPARE WHEN THE CREW SWITCH IS
PLACED IN THE CLOSE POSITION.
CORRECT VALVE POSITIONS AVAILABLE THROUGH GPC. NO IMPACT. VALVE
POSITION TALKBACKS ARE NOT MISSION CRITICAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-475
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 574 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD I, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: F BAY i, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 81V76AIIIAICR9
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO OPEN FU & OX MANIFOLD ISOL 1 VALVE USING GPC
COMMANDS. CREW SWITCH IS STILL AVAILABLE FOR VALVE OPERATION.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN MANIFOLD ISOL 1 VALVE FAILING
CLOSED. THE EFFECT WOULD BE AN INABILITY TO COMPLETE
TIME CRITICAL PROPELLANT DUMPS DURING RTLS (LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE)
OR AN INABILITY TO COMPLETE FULL MISSION OBJECTIVES ON ORBIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-476
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
575 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
311R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD I, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, MCA 1
8 IV76AIIIAICR9
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE DIODE ISOLATION BETWEEN CREW SWITCH AND GPC "OPEN" COMMAND.
FAILURE COULD POSSIBLY RESULT IN LOSS OF GPC OR SWITCH TO CONTROL
OX & FU MANIFOLD ISOL 1 VALVE OPERATION. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY,
WORST CASE, CAN RESULT IN THE MANIFOLD ISOL VALVE
FAILED CLOSED. THE EFFECT WOULD BE AN INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME
CRITICAL PROPELLANT DUMPS DURING RTLS OR AN INABILITY TO PERFORM
FULL MISSION OBJECTIVES ON ORBIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-477
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
576 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: F BAY i, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 8 IV76AIIIAICR5
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO OVERRIDE A GPC "CLOSE" COMMAND AND OPEN THE
MANIFOLD ISOL 1 VALVE USING CREW SWITCH. NO EFFECT ON MISSION,
GPC COMMANDS STILL AVAILABLE TO CLOSE VALVE.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-478
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
577 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: F BAY i, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 81V76AIIIAICR5
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE DIODE ISOLATION BETWEEN VALVE CONTROL FEEDBACK AND CREW
SWITCH OPEN COMMANDS WHEN THE MANIFOLD ISOL 1 VALVES ARE IN THE
CLOSE POSITION. THE EFFECT WOULD BE AN INTERMITTENT OPEN COMMAND
CAUSING THE VALVES TO FAIL PARTIALLY OPEN WHEN COMMANDED
CLOSED BY GPC. NO MISSION EFFECT, VALVES ARE FULLY OPERATIONAL
UTILIZING CREW SWITCH.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-479
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
578 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD I, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, MCA 1
8 IV76AI 1 IAI CR6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CONTROL FEEDBACK FROM FU & OX MANIFOLD 2 ISOL VALVE TO DE-
ENERGIZE RELAY ONCE THE VALVE REACHES THE COMMANDED POSITION. NO
EFFECT ON MISSION, AC MOTOR VALVE DESIGNED TO WITHSTAND
CONTINUOUS POWER.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/23/87 C-480
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 579 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: DIODE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: F BAY i, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 8 IV76AIIIAICR6
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE DIODE ISOLATION BETWEEN CREW SWITCH (OPEN POSITION) AND
VALVE TALKBACK FROM HYBRID DRIVER. THE FAILURE WILL RESULT IN A
FALSE INDICATION OF A VALVE MISCOMPARE WHEN THE CREW SWITCH IS
PLACED IN THE OPEN POSITION.
CORRECT VALVE POSITIONS AVAILABLE THROUGH GPC. NO IMPACT, VALVE
POSITION TALKBACKS ARE NOT MISSION CRITICAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/23/87 C-481
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 580 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD I, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 DSI6
33V73A8CR5
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE WILL RESULT IN A FALSE INDICATION OF A VALVE
MISCOMPAREWHEN THE MANIFOLD ISOL 1 VALVES ARE COMMANDED OPEN.
CORRECT VALVE POSITION AVAILABLE GPC. NO IMPACT, VALVE POSITION
TALKBACKS ARE NOT MISSION CRITICAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/23/87 C-482
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
581 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 DSI6
33V73A8CR5
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, VALVE POSITION TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC & CREW.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-483
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 582 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATI ON:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 DSI6
33V73A8CR6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE WILL RESULT IN A FALSE INDICATION OF A VALVE
MISCOMPAREWHEN THE MANIFOLD ISOL 1 VALVES ARE COMMANDED CLOSED.
CORRECT VALVE POSITION AVAILABLE GPC. NO IMPACT, VALVE POSITION
TALKBACKS ARE NOT MISSION CRITICAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/23/87 C-484
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
583 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PNL 08 DSI6
PART NUMBER: 33V73A8CR6
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, VALVE POSITION TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC & CREW.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-485
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 584 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD I, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, M CA 1
8 IV76AI 1 IAICRI 0
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO CLOSE THE FU & OX MANIFOLD ISOL 1 VALVE USING ONE
OF TWO GPC COMMANDS. OTHER GPC COMMAND AND CREW SWITCH STILL
AVAILABLE TO CLOSE VALVE. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN
MANIFOLD ISOL 1 AND TK ISOL 1/2 VALVES FAILING OPEN. THE
EFFECT WOULD BE AN INABILITY TO ISOLATE TANK FROM MANIFOLD, NO
MISSION IMPACT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-486
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 585 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
4) MANIFOLD i, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, M CA 1
8IV76All IAICRI 0
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSE DIODE ISOLATION BETWEEN CREW SWITCH AND GPC "CLOSE" COMMAND.
FAILURE COULD POSSIBLY RESULT IN LOSS OF GPC OR SWITCH TO CONTROL
OX & FU MANIFOLD ISOL 1 VALVE OPERATION. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY,
WORST CASE, CAN RESULT IN THE MANIFOLD ISOL VALVE
FAILED CLOSED. THE EFFECT WOULD BE AN INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME
CRITICAL PROPELLANT DUMPS DURING RTLS OR AN INABILITY TO PERFORM
FULL MISSION OBJECTIVES ON ORBIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-487
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
586 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD I, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: F BAY i, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 81V76AIIIAICR7
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO CLOSE THE FU & OX MANIFOLD ISOL 1 VALVE USING ONE
OF TWO GPC COMMANDS. OTHER GPC COMMANDAND CREW SWITCH STILL
AVAILABLE TO CLOSE VALVE. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCYRESULTS IN
MANIFOLD ISOL 1 AND TK ISOL 1/2 VALVES FAILING OPEN.
THE EFFECT WOULD BE AN INABILITY TO ISOLATE TANK FROM MANIFOLD, NO
MISSION IMPACT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO DO1
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-488
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 587 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
2/iR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
6)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, MCA 1
8 IV76AI 1IAICR7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE DIODE ISOLATION BETWEEN CREW SWITCH AND GPC "CLOSE" COMMAND.
FAILURE COULD POSSIBLY RESULT IN LOSS OF GPC OR SWITCH TO CONTROL
OX & FU MANIFOLD ISOL 1 VALVE OPERATION. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY,
WORST CASE, CAN RESULT IN THE MANIFOLD ISOL VALVE
FAILED CLOSED. THE EFFECT WOULD BE AN INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME
CRITICAL PROPELLANT DUMPS DURING RTLS OR AN INABILITY TO PERFORM
FULL MISSION OBJECTIVES ON ORBIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-489
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 588 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORB IT: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, MCA 1
8IV7 6AI 1 IAICRI 1
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO CLOSE THE FU & OX MANIFOLD ISOL 1 VALVE USING CREW
SWITCH. GPC COMMANDS ARE STILL AVAILABLE TO CLOSE VALVE. LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN MANIFOLD ISOL 1 AND TK ISOL 1/2 VALVES
FAILING OPEN. THE EFFECT WOULD BE AN INABILITY TO
ISOLATE TANK FROM MANIFOLD, NO MISSION IMPACT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-490
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
589 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD I, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2 R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ]
LOCATION: F BAY i, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 81V76AIIIAICRII
B [ P ] C [ P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE DIODE ISOLATION BETWEEN CREW SWITCH AND GPC "CLOSE" COMMAND.
FAILURE COULD POSSIBLY RESULT IN LOSS OF GPC OR SWITCH TO CONTROL
OX & FU MANIFOLD ISOL 1 VALVE OPERATION. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY,
WORST CASE, CAN RESULT IN THE MANIFOLD ISOL VALVE
FAILED CLOSED. THE EFFECT WOULD BE AN INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME
CRITICAL PROPELLANT DUMPS DURING RTLS OR AN INABILITY TO PERFORM
FULL MISSION OBJECTIVES ON ORBIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-491
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 590 ABORT:
ITEM: DIODE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 2, MCA 2
82V76AII2AICRI
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO OVERRIDE A GPC "OPEN" COMMAND AND CLOSE THE
MANIFOLD ISOL 2 VALVE USING CREW SWITCH. NO EFFECT ON MISSION,
GPC COMMANDS STILL AVAILABLE TO CLOSE VALVE.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO DO1
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-492
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 591 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
e)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 2; MCA 2
82V76AII2AICRI
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE DIODE ISOLATION BETWEEN VALVE CONTROL FEEDBACK AND CREW
SWITCH CLOSE COMMANDS WHEN THE MANIFOLD ISOL 2 VALVES ARE IN THE
OPEN POSITION. THE EFFECT WOULD BEAN INTERMITTENT CLOSE COMMAND
CAUSING THE VALVES TO FAIL PARTIALLY CLOSED WHEN COMMANDED
OPEN BY GPC. NO MISSION EFFECT, VALVES ARE FULLY OPERATIONAL
UTILIZING CREW SWITCH.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-493
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
592 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
2/1R
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: F BAY 2, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 82V76AII2AICR9
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO OPEN FU & OX MANIFOLD ISOL 2 VALVE USING CREW
SWITCH. GPC COMMANDS ARE STILL AVAILABLE FOR VALVE OPERATION.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN MANIFOLD ISOL 2 VALVE FAILING
CLOSED. THE EFFECT WOULD BE AN INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME
CRITICAL PROPELLANT DUMPS DURING RTLS (LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE) OR AN
INABILITY TO COMPLETE FULL MISSION OBJECTIVES ON ORBIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-494
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
593 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
"I)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 2, MCA 2
82V76AII2AICR9
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE DIODE ISOLATION BETWEEN CREW SWITCH AND GPC "OPEN" COMMAND.
FAILURE COULD POSSIBLY RESULT IN LOSS OF GPC OR SWITCH TO CONTROL
OX & FU MANIFOLD ISOL 2 VALVE OPERATION. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY,
WORST CASE, CAN RESULT IN THE MANIFOLD ISOL VALVE
FAILED CLOSED. THE EFFECT WOULD BE AN INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME
CRITICAL PROPELLANT DUMPS DURING RTLS ORAN INABILITY TO PERFORM
FULL MISSION OBJECTIVES ON ORBIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-495
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 594 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: F BAY 2, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 82V76AII2AICR2
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CONTROL FEEDBACK FROM FU & OX MANIFOLD 2 ISOL VALVE TO DE-
ENERGIZE RELAY ONCE THE VALVE REACHES THE COMMANDED POSITION. NO
EFFECT ON MISSION, AC MOTOR VALVE DESIGNED TO WITHSTAND
CONTINUOUS POWER.
REFERENCES :
SEQ. 8
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; MC284-0420 REV C AMENDMENT
REPORT DATE 03/23/87 C-496
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 595 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 2, MCA 2
82V76AII2AICR2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE DIODE ISOLATION BETWEEN CREW SWITCH (CLOSE POSITION) AND
VALVE TALKBACK FROM HYBRID DRIVER. THE FAILURE WILLRESULT IN A
FALSE INDICATION OF A VALVE MISCOMPARE WHEN THE CREW SWITCH IS
PLACED IN THE CLOSE POSITION.
CORRECT VALVE POSITIONS AVAILABLE THROUGH GPC. NO IMPACT. VALVE
POSITION TALKBACKS ARE NOT MISSION CRITICAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-497
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 596 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 2/ IR
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 2, MCA 2
82V76AII2AICR8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO OPEN FU & OX MANIFOLD ISOL 2 VALVE USING GPC
COMMANDS. CREW SWITCH IS STILL AVAILABLE FOR VALVE OPERATION.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN MANIFOLD ISOL 2 VALVE FAILING
CLOSED. THE EFFECT WOULD BE AN INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME
CRITICAL PROPELLANT DUMPS DURING RTLS (LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE) OR AN
INABILITY TO COMPLETE FULL MISSION OBJECTIVES ON ORBIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-498
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
597 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 2, MCA 2
82V76AII2AICR8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE DIODE ISOLATION BETWEEN CREW SWITCH AND GPC "OPEN" COMMAND.
FAILURE COULD POSSIBLY RESULT IN LOSS OF GPC OR SWITCH TO CONTROL
OX & FU MANIFOLD ISOL 2 VALVE OPERATION. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY,
WORST CASE, CAN RESULT IN THE MANIFOLD ISOL VALVE
FAILED CLOSED. THE EFFECT WOULD BE AN INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME
CRITICAL PROPELLANT DUMPS DURING RTLS OR AN INABILITY TO PERFORM
FULL MISSION OBJECTIVES ON ORBIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-499
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 598 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBI T: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 2, MCA 2
82V76AII2AICR6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO OVERRIDE A GPC "CLOSE" COMMAND AND OPEN THE
MANIFOLD ISOL 2 VALVE USING CREW SWITCH. NO EFFECT ON MISSION,
GPC COMMANDS STILL AVAILABLE TO CLOSE VALVE.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-500
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 599 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
S)
9)
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 2, MCA 2
82V76AII2AICR6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE DIODE ISOLATION BETWEEN VALVE CONTROL FEEDBACK AND CREW
SWITCH OPEN COMMANDS WHEN THE MANIFOLD ISOL 2 VALVES ARE IN THE
CLOSE POSITION. THE EFFECT WOULD BE AN INTERMITTENT OPEN COMMAND
CAUSING THE VALVES TO FAIL PARTIALLY OPEN WHEN COMMANDED
CLOSED BY GPC. NO MISSION EFFECT, VALVES ARE FULLY OPERATIONAL
UTILIZING CREW SWITCH.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-501
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 600 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
S)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: F BAY 2, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 82V76AII2AICR5
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CONTROL FEEDBACK FROM FU & OX MANIFOLD 2 ISOL VALVE TO DE-
ENERGIZE RELAY ONCE THE VALVE REACHES THE COMMANDED POSITION. NO
EFFECT ON MISSION, AC MOTOR VALVE DESIGNED TO WITHSTAND
CONTINUOUS POWER.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/23/87 C-502
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 601 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTO FF: 3/ 3 TAL: 3/ 3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 2, MCA 2
82V76AII2AICR5
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE DIODE ISOLATION BETWEEN CREW SWITCH (OPEN POSITION) AND VALVE
TALKBACK FROM HYBRID DRIVER. THE FAILURE WILL RESULT IN A FALSE
INDICATION OF A VALVE MISCOMPARE WHEN THE CREW SWITCH IS PLACED IN
THE OPEN POSITION.
CORRECT VALVE POSITIONS AVAILABLE THROUGH GPC. NO IMPACT. VALVE
POSITION TALKBACKS ARE NOT MISSION CRITICAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-503
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 602 ABORT:
HDW/Fb-NC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: DIODE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 DSI7
33V73A8CR7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE WILL RESULT IN A FALSE INDICATION OF A VALVE
MISCOMPARE WHEN THE MANIFOLD ISOL 2 VALVES ARE COMMANDED OPEN.
CORRECT VALVE POSITION AVAILABLE GPC. NO IMPACT, VALVE POSITION
TALKBACKS ARE NOT MISSION CRITICAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/23/87 C-504
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 603 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
_)
v)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LO CAT I ON:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 DSI7
33V73A8CR7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, VALVE POSITION TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC & CREW.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-505
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 604 ABORT:
ITEM: DIODE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 DSI7
33V73A8CR8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE WILL RESULT IN A FALSE INDICATION OF A VALVE
MISCOMPAREWHEN THE MANIFOLD ISOL 2 VALVES ARE COMMANDED CLOSED.
CORRECT VALVE POSITION AVAILABLE GPC. NO IMPACT, VALVE POSITION
TALKBACKS ARE NOT MISSION CRITICAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/23/87 C-506
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 605 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 DSI7
33V73A8CR8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, VALVE POSITION TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC & CREW.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-507
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 606 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: DIODE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] S[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 2, MCA 2
82V76AII2AICR7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO CLOSE THE FU & OX MANIFOLD ISOL 2 VALVE USING ONE
OF TWO GPC COMMANDS. OTHER GPC COMMAND AND CREW SWITCH STILL
AVAILABLE TO CLOSE VALVE. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN
MANIFOLD ISOL 2 AND TK ISOL 1/2 VALVES FAILING OPEN. THE
EFFECT WOULD BE AN INABILITY TO ISOLATE TANK FROM MANIFOLD, NO
MISSION IMPACT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-508
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 607 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
1) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 2, MCA 2
82V76AII2AICR7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE DIODE ISOLATION BETWEEN CREW SWITCH AND GPC "CLOSE" COMMAND.
FAILURE COULD POSSIBLY RESULT IN LOSS OF GPC OR SWITCH TO CONTROL
OX & FU MANIFOLD ISOL 2 VALVE OPERATION. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY,
WORST CASE, CAN RESULT IN THE MANIFOLD ISOL VALVE
FAILED CLOSED. THE EFFECT WOULD BE AN INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME
CRITICAL PROPELLANT DUMPS DURING RTLS OR AN INABILITY TO PERFORM
FULL MISSION OBJECTIVES ON ORBIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-509
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
608 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 2, MCA 2
82V76AII2AICR4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO CLOSE THE FU & OX MANIFOLD ISOL 2 VALVE USING ONE
OF TWO GPC COMMANDS. OTHER GPC COMMAND AND CREW SWITCH STILL
AVAILABLE TO CLOSE VALVE. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN
MANIFOLD ISOL 2 AND TK ISOL 1/2 VALVES FAILING OPEN.
THE EFFECT WOULD BE AN INABILITY TO ISOLATE TANK FROM MANIFOLD, NO
MISSION IMPACT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 609 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
2/IR
ITEM: DIODE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 2, MCA 2
82V76AII2AICR4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE DIODE ISOLATION BETWEEN CREW SWITCH AND GPC "CLOSE" COMMAND.
FAILURE COULD POSSIBLY RESULT IN LOSS OF GPC OR SWITCH TO CONTROL
OX & FU MANIFOLD ISOL 2 VALVE OPERATION. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY,
WORST CASE, CAN RESULT IN THE MANIFOLD ISOL VALVE
FAILED CLOSED. THE EFFECT WOULD BE AN INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME
CRITICAL PROPELLANT DUMPS DURING RTLS OR AN INABILITY TO PERFORM
FULL MISSION OBJECTIVES ON ORBIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-511
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 610 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
"I)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: F BAY 2, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 82V76AII2AICR3
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO CLOSE THE FU & OX MANIFOLD ISOL 2 VALVE USING CREW
SWITCH. GPC COMMANDS ARE STILL AVAILABLE TO CLOSE VALVE. LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN MANIFOLD ISOL 2 AND TK ISOL 1/2 VALVES
FAILING OPEN. THE EFFECT WOULD BE AN INABILITY TO
ISOLATE TANK FROM MANIFOLD, NO MISSION IMPACT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-512
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 611 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
2/IR
ITEM: DIODE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A[ 3 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 2, MCA 2
82V76AII2AICR3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE DIODE ISOLATION BETWEEN CREW SWITCH AND GPC "CLOSE" COMMAND.
FAILURE COULD POSSIBLY RESULT IN LOSS OF GPC OR SWITCH TO CONTROL
OX & FU MANIFOLD ISOL 2 VALVE OPERATION. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY,
WORST CASE, CAN RESULT IN THE MANIFOLD ISOL VALVE
FAILED CLOSED. THE EFFECT WOULD BE AN INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME
CRITICAL PROPELLANT DUMPS DURING RTLS OR AN INABILITY TO PERFORM
FULL MISSION OBJECTIVES ON ORBIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-513
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 612 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
4) MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83V76AII3AICR7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO OVERRIDE A GPC "OPEN" COMMAND AND CLOSE THE
MANIFOLD ISOL 3 VALVE USING CREW SWITCH. NO EFFECT ON MISSION,
GPC COMMANDS STILL AVAILABLETO CLOSE VALVE.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-514
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 613 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83V76AI 13AI CR7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE DIODE ISOLATION BETWEEN VALVE CONTROL FEEDBACK AND CREW
SWITCH CLOSE COMMANDS WHEN THE MANIFOLD ISOL 3 VALVES ARE IN THE
OPEN POSITION. THE EFFECT WOULD BEAN INTERMITTENT CLOSE COMMAND
CAUSING THE VALVES TO FAIL PARTIALLY CLOSED WHEN COMMANDED
OPEN BY GPC. NO MISSION EFFECT, VALVES ARE FULLY OPERATIONAL
UTILIZING CREW SWITCH.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO DO1
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-515
INDEPENDENT ORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 614 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
211R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
3/3 TAL: 3/1R
3/2R AOA: 3/IR
3/1R ATO: 3/1R
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83 V76AI 13AICR33
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO OPEN FU & OX MANIFOLD ISOL 3 VALVE USING CREW
SWITCH. GPC COMMANDS ARE STILL AVAILABLE FOR VALVE OPERATION.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN MANIFOLD ISOL 3 VALVE FAILING
CLOSED CASE. THE EFFECT WOULD BE AN INABILITY TO COMPLETE
TIME CRITICAL PROPELLANT DUMPS DURING RTLS (LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE)
OR AN INABILITY TO PERFORM FULL MISSION OBJECTIVES ON ORBIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-516
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
615 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
7)
s)
9)
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2 R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/ IR ATO: 3/ IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83V76AII3AICR33
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE DIODE ISOLATION BETWEEN CREW SWITCH AND GPC "OPEN" COMMAND.
FAILURE COULD POSSIBLY RESULT IN LOSS OF GPC OR SWITCH TO CONTROL
OX & FU MANIFOLD ISOL 3 VALVE OPERATION. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY,
WORST CASE, CAN RESULT IN THE MANIFOLD ISOL VALVE
FAILED CLOSED. THE EFFECT WOULD BE AN INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME
CRITICAL PROPELLANT DUMPS DURING RTLS OR AN INABILITY TO PERFORM
FULL MISSION OBJECTIVES ON ORBIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-517
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 616 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: DIODE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: F BAY 3A, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 83V76AII3AICR8
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CONTROL FEEDBACK FROM FU & OX MANIFOLD 4 ISOL VALVE TO DE-
ENERGIZE RELAY ONCE THE VALVE REACHES THE COMMANDED POSITION. NO
EFFECT ON MISSION, AC MOTOR VALVE DESIGNED TO WITHSTAND
CONTINUOUS POWER.
REFERENCES:
SEQ. 8
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; MC284-0420 REV C AMENDMENT
REPORT DATE 03/23/87 C-518
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 617 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5_
6)
V)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: F BAY 3A, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 83V76AII3AICR8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE DIODE ISOLATION BETWEEN CREW SWITCH (CLOSE POSITION) AND
VALVE TALKBACK FROM HYBRID DRIVER. THE FAILURE WILLRESULT IN A
FALSE INDICATION OF A VALVE MISCOMPARE WHEN THE CREW SWITCH IS
PLACED IN THE CLOSE POSITION.
CORRECT VALVE POSITIONS AVAILABLE THROUGH GPC. NO IMPACT, VALVE
POSITION TALKBACKS ARE NOT MISSION CRITICAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/23/87 C-519
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 618 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83 V76AII3AICR37
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO OPEN FU & OX MANIFOLD ISOL 3 VALVE USING GPC
COMMANDS. CREW SWITCH IS STILL AVAILABLE FOR VALVE OPERATION.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN MANIFOLD ISOL 3 VALVE FAILING
CLOSED. THE EFFECT WOULD BE AN INABILITY TO COMPLETE
TIME CRITICAL PROPELLANT DUMPS DURING RTLS (LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE)
OR AN INABILITY TO COMPLETE FULL MISSION OBJECTIVES ON ORBIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-520
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 619 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/ 2R AOA: 3/ IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83V76AII3AICR37
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE DIODE ISOLATION BETWEEN CREW SWITCH AND GPC "OPEN" COMMAND.
FAILURE COULD POSSIBLY RESULT IN LOSS OF GPC OR SWITCH TO CONTROL
OX & FU MANIFOLD ISOL 3 VALVE OPERATION. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY,
WORST CASE, CAN RESULT IN THE MANIFOLD ISOL VALVE
FAILED CLOSED. THE EFFECT WOULD BE AN INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME
CRITICAL PROPELLANT DUMPS DURING RTLS OR AN INABILITY TO PERFORM
FULL MISSION OBJECTIVES ON ORBIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO DO1
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-521
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 620 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83V76AII3AICR34
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO OVERRIDE A GPC "CLOSE" COMMAND AND OPEN THE
MANIFOLD ISOL 3 VALVE USING CREW SWITCH. NO EFFECT ON MISSION,
GPC COMMANDS STILL AVAILABLE TO CLOSE VALVE.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-522
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 621 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83V76AII3AICR34
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE DIODE ISOLATION BETWEEN VALVE CONTROL FEEDBACK AND CREW
SWITCH OPEN COMMANDS WHEN THE MANIFOLD ISOL 3 VALVES ARE IN THE
CLOSE POSITION. THE EFFECT WOULD BE AN INTERMITTENT OPEN COMMAND
CAUSING THE VALVES TO FAIL PARTIALLY OPEN WHEN COMMANDED
CLOSED BY GPC. NO MISSION EFFECT, VALVES ARE FULLY OPERATIONAL
UTILIZING CREW SWITCH.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-523
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 622 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: DIODE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83V76All 3AI CR38
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CONTROL FEEDBACK FROM FU & OX MANIFOLD 4 ISOL VALVE TO DE-
ENERGIZE RELAY ONCE THE VALVE REACHES THE COMMANDED POSITION. NO
EFFECT ON MISSION, AC MOTOR VALVE DESIGNED TO WITHSTAND
CONTINUOUS POWER.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/23/87 C-524
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 623 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
SAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
6)
"I)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] BC ] cc ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83V76AII3AICR38
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE DIODE ISOLATION BETWEEN CREW SWITCH (OPEN POSITION) AND
VALVE TALKBACK FROM HYBRID DRIVER. THE FAILURE WILL RESULT IN A
FALSE INDICATION OF A VALVE MISCOMPARE WHEN THE CREW SWITCH IS
PLACED IN THE OPEN POSITION.
CORRECT VALVE POSITIONS AVAILABLE THROUGH GPC. NO IMPACT, VALVE
POSITION TALKBACKS ARE NOT MISSION CRITICAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/23/87 C-525
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
624 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
"I)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 DSI8
33V73A8CR9
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE WILL RESULT IN A FALSE INDICATION OF A VALVE
MISCOMPARE WHEN THE MANIFOLD ISOL 3 VALVES ARE COMMANDED OPEN.
CORRECT VALVE POSITION AVAILABLE GPC. NO IMPACT VALVE POSITION
TALKBACKS ARE NOT MISSION CRITICAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-526
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
625 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 DSI8
33 V73A8 CR9
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, VALVE POSITION TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC & CREW.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-527
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 626 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
e)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 DSI8
33V73A8CRI0
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE WILL RESULT IN A FALSE INDICATION OF A VALVE
MISCOMPARE WHEN THE MANIFOLD ISOL 3 VALVES ARE COMMANDED CLOSED.
CORRECT VALVE POSITION AVAILABLE GPC. NO IMPACT, VALVE POSITION
TALKBACKS ARE NOT MISSION CRITICAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/23/87 C-528
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
627 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 DSI8
33V73A8CRI0
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
NONE, VALVE POSITION TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC & CREW.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-529
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 628 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: F BAY 3A, MCA 3,
PART NUMBER: 83V76AII3AICRI4
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO CLOSE THE FU & OX MANIFOLD ISOL 3 VALVE USING ONE
OF TWO GPC COMMANDS. OTHER GPC COMMANDAND CREW SWITCH STILL
AVAILABLE TO CLOSE VALVE. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCYRESULTS IN
MANIFOLD ISOL 3 AND TK ISO 3/4/5 VALVES FAILING OPEN. THE
EFFECT WOULD BE AN INABILITY TO ISOLATE TANK FROM MANIFOLD, NO
MISSION IMPACT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-530
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 629 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
a)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3,
83V76AII3AICRI4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE DIODE ISOLATION BETWEEN CREW SWITCH AND GPC "CLOSE" COMMAND.
FAILURE COULD POSSIBLY RESULT IN LOSS OF GPC OR SWITCH TO CONTROL
OX & FU MANIFOLD ISOL 3 VALVE OPERATION. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY,
WORST CASE, CAN RESULT IN THE MANIFOLD ISOL VALVE
FAILED CLOSED. THE EFFECT WOULD BE AN INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME
CRITICAL PROPELLANT DUMPS DURING RTLS ORAN INABILITY TO PERFORM
FULL MISSION OBJECTIVES ON ORBIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-531
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
630 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: F BAY 3A, MCA 3,
PART NUMBER: 83V76AII3AICRII
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO CLOSE THE FU & OX MANIFOLD ISOL 3 VALVE USING ONE
OF TWO GPC COMMANDS. OTHER GPC COMMAND AND CREW SWITCH STILL
AVAILABLE TO CLOSE VALVE. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN
MANIFOLD ISOL 3 AND TK ISO 3/4/5 VALVES FAILING OPEN.
THE EFFECT WOULD BE AN INABILITY TO ISOLATE TANK FROM MANIFOLD, NO
MISSION IMPACT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-532
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 631 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ]
LOCATION: F BAY 3A, MCA 3,
PART NUMBER: 83V76AII3AICRII
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE DIODE ISOLATION BETWEEN CREW SWITCH AND GPC "CLOSE" COMMAND.
FAILURE COULD POSSIBLY RESULT IN LOSS OF GPC OR SWITCH TO CONTROL
OX & FU MANIFOLD ISOL 3 VALVE OPERATION. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY,
WORST CASE, CAN RESULT IN THE MANIFOLD ISOL VALVE
FAILED CLOSED. THE EFFECT WOULD BE AN INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME
CRITICAL PROPELLANT DUMPS DURING RTLS OR AN INABILITY TO PERFORM
FULL MISSION OBJECTIVES ON ORBIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-533
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 632 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: F BAY 3A, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 83V76AII3AICRI0
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSE ABILITY TO CLOSE THE FU & OX MANIFOLD ISOL 3 VALVE USING CREW
SWITCH. GPC COMMANDS ARE STILL AVAILABLE TO CLOSE VALVE. LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN MANIFOLD ISOL 3 AND TK ISO 3/4/5 VALVES
FAILING OPEN. THE EFFECT WOULD BE AN INABILITY TO
ISOLATE TANK FROM MANIFOLD, NO MISSION IMPACT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-534
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
633 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
67
v7
8)
97
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBI T: 3/2R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/ IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83V76AII3AICRI0
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS RATIONALE:
LOSE DIODE ISOLATION BETWEEN CREW SWITCH AND GPC "CLOSE" COMMAND.
FAILURE COULD POSSIBLY RESULT IN LOSS OF GPC OR SWITCH TO CONTROL
OX & FU MANIFOLD ISOL 3 VALVE OPERATION. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY,
WORST CASE, CAN RESULT IN THE MANIFOLD ISOL VALVE
FAILED CLOSED. THE EFFECT WOULD BE AN INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME
CRITICAL PROPELLANT DUMPS DURING RTLS OR AN INABILITY TO PERFORM
FULL MISSION OBJECTIVES ON ORBIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-535
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 634 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PP_ELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORB IT: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ]
LOCATION: F BAY 3A, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 83V76AII3AICRI6
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO OVERRIDE A GPC "OPEN" COMMAND AND CLOSE THE
MANIFOLD ISOL 4 VALVE USING CREW SWITCH. NO EFFECT ON MISSION,
GPC COMMANDS STILL AVAILABLE TO CLOSE VALVE.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-536
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 635 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83V76AII3AICRI6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE DIODE ISOLATION BETWEEN VALVE CONTROL FEEDBACK AND CREW
SWITCH CLOSE COMMANDS WHEN THE MANIFOLD ISOL 4 VALVES ARE IN THE
OPEN POSITION. THE EFFECT WOULD BE AN INTERMITTENT CLOSE COMMAND
CAUSING THE VALVES TO FAIL PARTIALLY CLOSED WHEN COMMANDED
OPEN BY GPC. NO MISSION EFFECT, VALVES ARE FULLY OPERATIONAL
UTILIZING CREW SWITCH.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-537
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 636 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
2/IR
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[ P] C [ P]
LOCATION: F BAY 3A, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 83V76AII3AICR36
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO OPEN FU & OX MANIFOLD ISOL 4 VALVE USING CREW
SWITCH. GPC COMMANDS ARE STILL AVAILABLE FOR VALVE OPERATION.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN MANIFOLD ISOL 4 VALVE FAILING
CLOSED. THE EFFECT WOULD BE AN INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME
CRITICAL PROPELLANT DUMPS DURING RTLS OR AN INABILITY TO PERFORM
FULL MISSION OBJECTIVES ON ORBIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-538
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 637 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LO CAT I ON:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83V76AII3AICR36
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS RATIONALE:
LOSE DIODE ISOLATION BETWEEN CREW SWITCH AND GPC "OPEN" COMMAND.
FAILURE COULD POSSIBLY RESULT IN LOSS OF GPC OR SWITCH TO CONTROL
OX & FU MANIFOLD ISOL 4 VALVE OPERATION. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY,
WORST CASE, CAN RESULT IN THE MANIFOLD ISOL VALVE
FAILED CLOSED. THE EFFECT WOULD BE AN INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME
CRITICAL PROPELLANT DUMPS DURING RTLS OR AN INABILITY TO PERFORM
FULL MISSION OBJECTIVES ON ORBIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-539
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
638 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: F BAY 3A, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 83V76AII3AICRI5
B[ ] c[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CONTROL FEEDBACK FROM FU & OX MANIFOLD 1 ISOL VALVE TO DE-
ENERGIZE RELAY ONCE THE VALVE REACHES THE COMMANDED POSITION. NO
EFFECT ON MISSION, AC MOTOR VALVE DESIGNED TO WITHSTAND
CONTINUOUS POWER.
REFERENCES:
SEQ. 8
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; MC284-0420 REV C AMENDMENT
REPORT DATE 03/23/87 C-540
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
639 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83V76AII3AICRI5
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE DIODE ISOLATION BETWEEN CREW SWITCH (CLOSE POSITION) AND
VALVE TALKBACK FROM HYBRID DRIVER. THE FAILURE WILL RESULT IN A
FALSE INDICATION OF A VALVE MISCOMPARE WHEN THE CREW SWITCH IS
PLACED IN THE CLOSE POSITION.
CORRECT VALVE POSITIONS AVAILABLE THROUGH GPC. NO IMPACT, VALVE
POSITION TALKBACKS ARE NOT MISSION CRITICAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/23/87 C-541
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 640 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83V76AII3AICR30
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO OPEN FU & OX MANIFOLD ISOL 4 VALVE USING GPC
COMMANDS. CREW SWITCH IS STILL AVAILABLE FOR VALVE OPERATION.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN MANIFOLD ISOL 4 VALVE FAILING
CLOSED. THE EFFECT WOULD BE AN INABILITY TO COMPLETE
TIME CRITICAL PROPELLANT DUMPS DURING RTLS (LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE)
OR AN INABILITY TO COMPLETE FULL MISSION OBJECTIVES ON ORBIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-542
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 641 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
2/IR
ITEM: DIODE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 2/1R
TAL: 3/1R
AOA: 3/1R
ATO: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ]
LOCATION: F BAY 3A, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 83V76AII3AICR30
B[P] C[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE DIODE ISOLATION BETWEEN CREW SWITCH AND GPC "OPEN" COMMAND.
FAILURE COULD POSSIBLY RESULT IN LOSS OF GPC OR SWITCH TO CONTROL
OX & FU MANIFOLD ISOL 4 VALVE OPERATION. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY,
WORST CASE, CAN RESULT IN THE MANIFOLD ISOL VALVE
FAILED CLOSED. THE EFFECT WOULD BE AN INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME
CRITICAL PROPELLANT DUMPS DURING RTLS OR AN INABILITY TO PERFORM
FULL MISSION OBJECTIVES ON ORBIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-543
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 642 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: F BAY 3A, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 83V76AII3AICR35
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO OVERRIDE A GPC "CLOSE"COMMAND AND OPEN THE
MANIFOLD ISOL 4 VALVE USING CREW SWITCH. NO EFFECT ON MISSION,
GPC COMMANDS STILL AVAILABLE TO CLOSE VALVE.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-544
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 643 ABORT:
HDW/FUN.C
3/3
3/3
ITEM: DIODE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: F BAY 3A, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 83V76AII3AICR35
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS RATIONALE:
LOSE DIODE ISOLATION BETWEEN VALVE CONTROL FEEDBACK AND CREW
SWITCH OPEN COMMANDS WHEN THE MANIFOLD ISOL 4 VALVES ARE IN THE
CLOSE POSITION. THE EFFECT WOULD BEAN INTERMITTENT OPEN COMMAND
CAUSING THE VALVES TO FAIL PARTIALLY OPEN WHEN COMMANDED
CLOSED BY GPC. NO MISSION EFFECT, VALVES ARE FULLY OPERATIONAL
UTILIZING CREW SWITCH.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-545
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 644 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83V76AII3AICR29
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CONTROL FEEDBACK FROM FU & OX MANIFOLD 1 ISOL VALVE TO DE-
ENERGIZE RELAY ONCE THE VALVE REACHES THE COMMANDED POSITION. NO
EFFECT ON MISSION, AC MOTOR VALVE DESIGNED TO WITHSTAND
CONTINUOUS POWER.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/23/87 C-546
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
645 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83 V76AI 13AICR29
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE DIODE ISOLATION BETWEEN CREW SWITCH (OPEN POSITION) AND
VALVE TALKBACK FROM HYBRID DRIVER. THE FAILURE WILL RESULT IN A
FALSE INDICATION OF A VALVE MISCOMPARE WHEN THE CREW SWITCH IS
PLACED IN THE OPEN POSITION.
CORRECT VALVE POSITIONS AVAILABLE THROUGH GPC. NO IMPACT, VALVE
POSITION TALKBACKS ARE NOT MISSION CRITICAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/23/87 C-547
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 646 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: DIODE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
_)
v)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PNL 08 DSI9
PART NUMBER: 33V73A8CRII
] B[ ] c[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE WILL RESULT IN A FALSE INDICATION OF A VALVE
MISCOMPAREWHEN THE MANIFOLD ISOL 4 VALVES ARE COMMANDED OPEN.
CORRECT VALVE POSITION AVAILABLE GPC. NO IMPACT, VALVE POSITION
TALKBACKS ARE NOT MISSION CRITICAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/23/87 C-548
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 647 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
4)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS : 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/ 3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 DSI9
33V73A8CRII
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, VALVE POSITION TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC & CREW.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO DO1
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-549
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
648 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PREI_UNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 DSI9
33V73A8CRI2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE WILL RESULT IN A FALSE INDICATION OF A VALVE
MISCOMPAREWHEN THE MANIFOLD ISOL 4 VALVES ARE COMMANDED CLOSED.
CORRECT VALVE POSITION AVAILABLE GPC. NO IMPACT, VALVE POSITION
TALKBACKS ARE NOT MISSION CRITICAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/23/87 C-550
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 649 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: DIODE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] S[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 DSI9
33V73A8CRI2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, VALVE POSITION TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC & CREW.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-551
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 650 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83V76AII3AICR9
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO CLOSE THE FU & OX MANIFOLD ISOL 4 VALVE USING ONE
OF TWO GPC COMMANDS. OTHER GPC COMMANDAND CREW SWITCH STILL
AVAILABLE TO CLOSE VALVE. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN
MANIFOLD ISOL 4 AND TK ISOL 1/2 VALVES FAILING OPEN. THE
EFFECT WOULD BE AN INABILITY TO ISOLATE TANK FROM MANIFOLD, NO
MISSION IMPACT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-552
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 651 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83V76AII3AICR9
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE DIODE ISOLATION BETWEEN CREW SWITCH AND GPC "CLOSE" COMMAND.
FAILURE COULD POSSIBLY RESULT IN LOSS OF GPC OR SWITCH TO CONTROL
OX & FU MANIFOLD ISOL 4 VALVE OPERATION. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY,
WORST CASE, CAN RESULT IN THE MANIFOLD ISOL VALVE
FAILED CLOSED. THE EFFECT WOULD BE AN INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME
CRITICAL PROPELLANT DUMPS DURING RTLS OR AN INABILITY TO PERFORM
FULL MISSION OBJECTIVES ON ORBIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-553
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 652 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: DIODE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83V76AII3AICRI2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO CLOSE THE FU & OX MANIFOLD ISOL 4 VALVE USING ONE
OF TWO GPC COMMANDS. OTHER GPC COMMANDAND CREW SWITCH STILL
AVAILABLE TO CLOSE VALVE. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCYRESULTS IN
MANIFOLD ISOL 4 AND TK ISOL 1/2 VALVES FAILING OPEN.
THE EFFECT WOULD BE AN INABILITY TO ISOLATE TANK FROM MANIFOLD, NO
MISSION IMPACT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-554
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 653 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LO CAT ION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83V76AII3AICRI2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE DIODE ISOLATION BETWEEN CREW SWITCH AND GPC "CLOSE" COMMAND.
FAILURE COULD POSSIBLY RESULT IN LOSS OF GPC OR SWITCH TO CONTROL
OX & FU MANIFOLD ISOL 4 VALVE OPERATION. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY,
WORST CASE, CAN RESULT IN THE MANIFOLD ISOL VALVE
FAILED CLOSED. THE EFFECT WOULD BE AN INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME
CRITICAL PROPELLANT DUMPS DURING RTLS OR AN INABILITY TO PERFORM
FULL MISSION OBJECTIVES ON ORBIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-555
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 654 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
313 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] BC ] cc ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83V76AII3AICRI3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO CLOSE THE FU & OX MANIFOLD ISOL 4 VALVE USING CREW
SWITCH. GPC COMMANDS ARE STILL AVAILABLE TO CLOSE VALVE. LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN MANIFOLD ISOL 4 AND TK ISO 3/4/5 VALVES
FAILING OPEN. THE EFFECT WOULD BE AN INABILITY TO
ISOLATE TANK FROM MANIFOLD, NO MISSION IMPACT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-556
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 655 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 2/ IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBI T: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83V76AII3AICRI3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE DIODE ISOLATION BETWEEN CREW SWITCH AND GPC "CLOSE" COMMAND.
FAILURE COULD POSSIBLY RESULT IN LOSS OF GPC OR SWITCH TO CONTROL
OX & FU MANIFOLD ISOL 4 VALVE OPERATION. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY,
WORST CASE, CAN RESULT IN THE MANIFOLD ISOL VALVE
FAILED CLOSED. THE EFFECT WOULD BE AN INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME
CRITICAL PROPELLANT DUMPS DURING RTLS OR AN INABILITY TO PERFORM
FULL MISSION OBJECTIVES ON ORBIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-557
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 656 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
l) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: F BAY 3A, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 83V76AI8CR Ji-93
BC ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO COMMAND MANIFOLD 5 FU & OX ISOL VLVs CLOSE USING
GPC. CREW SWITCH CAN STILL OPEN OR CLOSE VLVs. WORST CASE
RESULTS IN MANIFOLD 5 FU & OX VLVs BECOMING STUCK IN THE OPEN
POSITION. NO MISSION EFFECT, PROPELLANT CAN BE ISOLATED FROM
THRUSTERS BY THE TK ISOL 3/4/5 VLVs. VERNIER THRUSTERS ARE NOT
USED DURING ENTRY OR ABORTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-558
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
657 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, LCA 3
83V76AI8CR JI-93
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ISOLATION BETWEEN CREW SWITCH AND GPC CLOSE COMMANDS. THE
FAILURE CAN RESULT IN LOSS OF GPC OR CREW SWITCH TO OPERATE THE
MANIFOLD 5 FU & OX ISOL VLVs. WORST CASE RESULTS IN MANIFOLD 5 FU
& OX VLVs BECOMING STUCK IN THE OPEN POSITION.
NO MISSION EFFECT, PROPELLANT CAN BE ISOLATED FROM THRUSTERS BY
THE TK ISOL 3/4/5 VLVs. VERNIER THRUSTERS ARE NOT USED DURING
ENTRY OR ABORTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-559
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 658 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
_)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PI_ELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] S[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, LCA 3
83V76AI8CR J2-87
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ISOLATION BETWEEN CREW SWITCH AND GPC CLOSE COMMANDS. THE
FAILURE CAN RESULT IN LOSS OF GPC OR CREW SWITCH TO OPERATE THE
MANIFOLD 5 FU & OX ISOL VLVs. WORST CASE RESULTS IN MANIFOLD 5 FU
& OX VLVs BECOMING STUCK IN THE OPEN POSITION.
NO MISSION EFFECT, PROPELLANT CAN BE ISOLATED FROM THRUSTERS BY
THE TK ISOL 3/4/5 VLVs. VERNIER THRUSTERS ARE NOT USED DURING
ENTRY OR ABORTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-560
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 659 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: DIODE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, LCA 3
83V76AISCR J2-87
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ISOLATION BETWEEN CREW SWITCH AND GPC CLOSE COMMANDS. THE
FAILURE CAN RESULT IN LOSS OF GPC OR CREW SWITCH TO OPERATE THE
MANIFOLD 5 FU & OX ISOL VLVS. WORST CASE RESULTS IN MANIFOLD 5 FU
& OX VLVs BECOMING STUCK IN THE OPEN POSITION.
NO MISSION EFFECT, PROPELLANT CAN BE ISOLATED FROM THRUSTERS BY
THE TK ISOL 3/4/5 VLVs. VERNIER THRUSTERS ARE NOT USED DURING
ENTRY OR ABORTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-561
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 660 ABORT:
HDW/ NC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LO CAT I ON:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, PCA 1
8 iV76A22 CRI4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CREW SWITCH COMMAND SIGNAL TO OPEN MANIFOLD 5 FU & OX ISOL
VLVs. VALVES CAN STILL BE OPENED USING GPC. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY, WORST CASE, RESULTS IN MANIFOLD 5 FU & OX ISOL VLVs
FAILED CLOSED RESULTING IN LOSS OF VRCS CONTROL.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-562
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 661 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, PCA 1
81V76A22CRI4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ISOLATION BETWEEN MAIN BUSES WHEN THE GPC CMDS THE MANIFOLD 5
FU & OX ISOL VLVs OPEN. THE WORST CASE EFFECT IS LOSS OF THE GPC
OR CREW SWITCH "OPEN" CMD. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY, WORST CASE,
RESULTS IN THE MANIFOLD 5 FU & OX ISOL VLVs BECOMING
STUCK IN THE CLOSE POSITION RESULTING IN LOSS OF VRCS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-563
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 662 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM: DIODE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, PCA 1
8IV 76A22 CR38
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE GPC COMMAND SIGNAL TO OPEN MANIFOLD 5 FU & OX ISOL VLVs.
VALVES CAN STILL BE OPENED USING CREW SWITCH. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY, WORST CASE, RESULTS IN MANIFOLD 5 FU & OX ISOL VLVs
FAILED CLOSED RESULTING IN LOSS OF VRCS CONTROL.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-564
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 663 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, PCA 1
81V76A22CR38
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ISOLATION BETWEEN MAIN BUSES WHEN THE CREW SWITCH CMDS THE
MANIFOLD 5 FU & OX ISOL VLVs OPEN. THE WORST CASE EFFECT IS LOSS
OF THE GPC OR CREW SWITCH "OPEN" CMD. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY,
WORST CASE, RESULTS IN THE MANIFOLD 5 FU & OX ISOL VLVs
BECOMING STUCK IN THE CLOSE POSITION RESULTING IN LOSS OF VRCS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-565
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 664 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PNL 08 DS20
PART NUMBER: 33V73A8CRI3
] B C ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE MANIFOLD 5 FU & OX VLV POSITION (OPEN) TALKBACK TO GPC.
VALVE POSITION TALKBACK NOT MISSION CRITICAL. THIS IS HARDWIRED
TO CREW INDICATOR.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/23/87 C-566
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 665 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PNL 08 DS20
PART NUMBER: 33V73A8CRI3
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, SWITCH TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-567
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: I/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 666 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
_)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PNL 08 DS20
PART NUMBER: 33V73A8CRI4
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE MANIFOLD 5 FU & OX VLV POSITION (CLOSED) TALKBACK TO GPC.
VALVE POSITION TALKBACK NOT MISSION CRITICAL. THIS IS HARDWIRED TO
CREW INDICATOR.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-568
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
667 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
7)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PNL 08 DS20
PART NUMBER: 33V73A8CRI4
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, SWITCH TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-569
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 668 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, M CA 1
81V76AIIIAR2 TYPE I
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CONTROL FEEDBACK FROM THE FU & OX MANIFOLD ISOL 1 VALVES
(OPEN POSITION). DUAL EFFECT: FIRST THE RELAY WILL NOT
AUTOMATICALLY BE DE-ENERGIZED ONCE THE VALVES REACH THEIR
COMMANDED POSITION AND SECOND THE CREW INDICATOR WILL FALSELY
INDICATE A VALVE MISMATCH WHEN THE VALVES ARE COMMANDED OPEN.
IMPACT ON MISSION, VALVE'S AC MOTOR CAN WITHSTAND CONTINUOUS
POWER AND VALVE TALKBACKS ARE NOT MISSION CRITICAL.
NO
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO DO1
REPORT DATE 03/23/87 C-570
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 669 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
i/1
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILURE MODE: FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
"I)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: i/I
TAL: 2/IR
AOA: 2/IR
ATO: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: F BAY i, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 81V76AIIIAR2 TYPE I
B [ F ] C [ P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE CONTROL FEEDBACK FROM MANIFOLD ISOL 1 VALVES (OPEN POSITION)
CONTINUALLY HIGH CAUSING LOSS OF ALL VALVE OPEN COMMANDS. THE
FINAL RESULT WOULD BE THE ISOL VALVES STUCK IN CLOSED POSITION.
THE EFFECT, AN INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME CRITICAL
PROPELLANT DUMPS DURING RTLS OR AN INABILITY TO COMPLETE FULL
MISSION OBJECTIVES ON ORBIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-571
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 670 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD I, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBI T: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY I, MCA 1
81V76AIIIARI TYPE I
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CONTROL FEEDBACK FROM THE FU & OX MANIFOLD ISOL 1 VALVES
(CLOSE POSITION). DUAL EFFECT: FIRST THE RELAY WILL NOT
AUTOMATICALLY BE DE-ENERGIZED ONCE THE VALVES REACH THEIR
COMMANDED POSITION AND SECOND THE CREW INDICATOR WILL FALSELY
INDICATE A VALVE MISMATCH WHEN THE VALVES ARE COMMANDED CLOSED.
NO IMPACT ON MISSION, VALVEIS AC MOTOR CAN WITHSTAND CONTINUOUS
POWER AND VALVE TALKBACKS ARE NOT MISSION CRITICAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/23/87 C-572
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 671 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILURE MODE: FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: F BAY i, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 81V76AIIIARI TYPE I
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE CONTROL FEEDBACK FROM MANIFOLD ISOL 1 VALVES (CLOSE POSITION)
CONTINUALLY HIGH CAUSING LOSS OF ALL VALVE CLOSE COMMANDS. THE
FINAL RESULT WOULD BE THE ISOL VALVES STUCK IN OPEN POSITION. NO
MISSION EFFECT, VALVES ARE NORMALLOY OPEN. LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN AN INABILITY TO ISOLATE MANIFOLD 1 FROM
THE PROPELLANT TANKS, NO IMPACT ON MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-573
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: I/26/87 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 672 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] BC ] cc ]
LO CAT ION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 2, MCA 2
82V76AII2ARI TYPE I
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CONTROL FEEDBACK FROM THE FU & OX MANIFOLD ISOL 2 VALVES
(OPEN POSITION). DUAL EFFECT: FIRST THE RELAY WILL NOT
AUTOMATICALLY BE DE-ENERGIZED ONCE THE VALVES REACH THEIR
COMMANDED POSITION AND SECOND THE CREW INDICATOR WILL FALSELY
INDICATE A VALVE MISMATCH WHEN THE VALVES ARE COMMANDED OPEN.
IMPACT ON MISSION. VALVE'S AC MOTOR CAN WITHSTAND CONTINUOUS
POWER AND VALVE TALKBACKS ARE NOT MISSION CRITICAL.
NO
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-574
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 673 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
1/1
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILURE MODE: FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 2, M CA 2
82V76AII2ARI TYPE I
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
THE CONTROL FEEDBACK FROM MANIFOLD ISOL 2 VALVES (OPEN POSITION)
CONTINUALLY HIGH CAUSING LOSS OF ALL VALVE OPEN COMMANDS. THE
FINAL RESULT WOULD BE THE ISOL VALVES STUCK IN CLOSED POSITION.
THE EFFECT, AN INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME CRITICAL
PROPELLANT DUMPS DURING RTLS OR AN INABILITY TO COMPLETE FULL
MISSION OBJECTIVES ON ORBIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-575
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
674 ABORT:
HDW/nmC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
V)
8)
9)
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: F BAY 2, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 82V76AII2AR2 TYPE I
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CONTROL FEEDBACK FROM THE FU & OX MANIFOLD ISOL 2 VALVES
(CLOSE POSITION). DUAL EFFECT: FIRST THE RELAY WILL NOT
AUTOMATICALLY BE DE-ENERGIZED ONCE THE VALVES REACH THEIR
COMMANDED POSITION AND SECOND THE CREW INDICATOR WILL FALSELY
INDICATE A VALVE MISMATCH WHENTHE VALVES ARECOMMANDED CLOSED.
NO IMPACT ON MISSION. VALVE'S AC MOTOR CAN WITHSTAND CONTINUOUS
POWER AND VALVE TALKBACKS ARE NOT MISSION CRITICAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-576
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
675 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 2, MCA 2
82V76AII2AR2 TYPE I
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE CONTROL FEEDBACK FROM MANIFOLD ISOL 2 VALVES (CLOSE POSITION)
CONTINUALLY HIGH CAUSING LOSS OF ALL VALVE CLOSE COMMANDS. THE
FINAL RESULT WOULD BE THE ISOL VALVES STUCK IN OPEN POSITION. NO
MISSION EFFECT, VALVES ARE NORMALLOY OPEN. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN AN INABILITY TO ISOLATE MANIFOLD 2 FROM THE
PROPELLANT TANKS, NO IMPACT ON MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-577
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 676 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: F BAY 3A, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 83V76AII3AR4 TYPE I
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSE CONTROL FEEDBACK FROM THE FU & OX MANIFOLD ISOL 3 VALVES
(OPEN POSITION). DUAL EFFECT: FIRST THE RELAY WILL NOT
AUTOMATICALLY BE DE-ENERGIZED ONCE THE VALVES REACH THEIR
COMMANDED POSITION AND SECOND THE CREW INDICATOR WILL FALSELY
INDICATE A VALVE MISMATCH WHEN THE VALVES ARE COMMANDED OPEN.
IMPACT ON MISSION, VALVE'S AC MOTOR CAN WITHSTAND CONTINUOUS
POWER AND VALVE TALKBACKS ARE NOT MISSION CRITICAL.
NO
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/23/87 C-578
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 677 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
I/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/I
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83V76AII3AR4 TYPE I
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE CONTROL FEEDBACK FROM MANIFOLD ISOL 3 VALVES (OPEN POSITION)
CONTINUALLY HIGH CAUSING LOSS OF ALL VALVE OPEN COMMANDS. THE
FINAL RESULT WOULD BE THE ISOL VALVES STUCK IN CLOSED POSITION.
THE EFFECT, AN INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME CRITICAL
PROPELLANT DUMPS DURING RTLS ORAN INABILITY TO PERFORM FULL
MISSION OBJECTIVES ON ORBIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-579
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 678 ABORT:
HDW/I_UNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83V76AII3AR3 TYPE I
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CONTROL FEEDBACK FROM THE FU & OXMANIFOLD ISOL 3 VALVES
(CLOSE POSITION). DUAL EFFECT: FIRST THE RELAY WILL NOT
AUTOMATICALLY BE DE-ENERGIZED ONCE THE VALVES REACH THEIR
COMMANDED POSITION AND SECOND THE CREW INDICATOR WILL FALSELY
INDICATE A VALVE MISMATCH WHEN THE VALVES ARE COMMANDED CLOSED.
NO IMPACT ON MISSION, VALVE'S AC MOTOR CAN WITHSTAND CONTINUOUS
POWER AND VALVE TALKBACKS ARE NOT MISSION CRITICAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/23/87 C-580
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 679 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83V76AII3AR3 TYPE I
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE CONTROL FEEDBACK FROM MANIFOLD ISOL 3 VALVES (CLOSE POSITION)
CONTINUALLY HIGH CAUSING LOSS OF ALL VALVE CLOSE COMMANDS. THE
FINAL RESULT WOULD BE THE ISOL VALVES STUCK IN OPEN POSITION. NO
MISSION EFFECT, VALVES ARE NORMALLOY OPEN. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN AN INABILITY TO ISOLATE MANIFOLD 3 FROM THE
PROPELLANT TANKS, NO IMPACT ON MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-581
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 680 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83V76AII3AR6 TYPE I
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CONTROL FEEDBACK FROM THE FU & OX MANIFOLD ISOL 4 VALVES
(OPEN POSITION). DUAL EFFECT: FIRST THE RELAY WILL NOT
AUTOMATICALLY BE DE-ENERGIZED ONCE THE VALVES REACH THEIR
COMMANDED POSITION AND SECOND THE CREW INDICATOR WILL FALSELY
INDICATE A VALVE MISMATCH WHEN THE VALVES ARE COMMANDED OPEN.
IMPACT ON MISSION, VALVE'S AC MOTOR CAN WITHSTAND CONTINUOUS
POWER AND VALVE TALKBACKS ARE NOT MISSION CRITICAL.
NO
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/23/87 C-582
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 681 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
1/1
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILURE MODE: FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/i
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83V76AII3AR6 TYPE I
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE CONTROL FEEDBACK FROM MANIFOLD ISOL 4 VALVES (OPEN POSITION)
CONTINUALLY HIGH CAUSING LOSS OF ALL VALVE OPEN COMMANDS. THE
FINAL RESULT WOULD BE THE ISOL VALVES STUCK IN CLOSED POSITION.
THE EFFECT, AN INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME CRITICAL
PROPELLANT DUMPS DURING RTLS OR AN INABILITY TO PERFORM FULL
MISSION OBJECTIVES ON ORBIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-583
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
682 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] BC ] cC ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83V76AII3AR5 TYPE I
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CONTROL FEEDBACK FROM THE FU & OX MANIFOLD ISOL 4 VALVES
(CLOSE POSITION). DUAL EFFECT: FIRST THE RELAY WILL NOT
AUTOMATICALLY BE DE-ENERGIZED ONCE THE VALVES REACH THEIR
COMMANDED POSITION AND SECOND THE CREW INDICATOR WILL FALSELY
INDICATE A VALVE MISMATCH WHEN THE VALVES ARECOMMANDED CLOSED.
NO IMPACT ON MISSION, VALVE'S AC MOTOR CAN WITHSTAND CONTINUOUS
POWER AND VALVE TALKBACKS ARE NOT MISSION CRITICAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO DO1
REPORT DATE 03/23/87 C-584
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 683 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: F BAY 3A, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 83V76AII3AR5 TYPE I
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE CONTROL FEEDBACK FROM MANIFOLD ISOL 4 VALVES (CLOSE POSITION)
CONTINUALLY HIGH CAUSING LOSS OF ALL VALVE CLOSE COMMANDS. THE
FINAL RESULT WOULD BE THE ISOL VALVES STUCK IN OPEN POSITION. NO
MISSION EFFECT, VALVES ARE NORMALLY OPEN. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN AN INABILITY TO ISOLATE MANIFOLD 1 FROM THE
PROPELLANT TANKS, NO IMPACT ON MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-585
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 684 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
_)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, LCA 2
83V76AI8AR J4-71 TYPE I
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO COMMAND MANIFOLD 5 FU & OX ISOL VLVs CLOSE USING
CREW SWITCH OR GPC. WORST CASE RESULTS IN MANIFOLD 5 FU & OX VLVs
BECOMING STUCK IN THE OPEN POSITION. NO MISSION EFFECT,
PROPELLANT CAN BE ISOLATED FROM THRUSTERS BY THE TK ISOL 3/4/5
VLVs. VERNIER THRUSTERS ARE NOT USED DURING ENTRY OR ABORTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-586
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 685 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILURE MODE: FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
_)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: F BAY 3A, LCA 2
PART NUMBER: 83V76AI8AR J4-71 TYPE I
c[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO COMMAND MANIFOLD 5 FU & OX ISOL VLVs USING GPC.
CREW SWITCH CAN STILL OPEN OR CLOSE VLVs. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY
(CREW SWITCH), WORST CASE, RESULTS IN MANIFOLD 5 FU & OX ISOL VLVs
BECOMING STUCK IN THE CLOSED POSITION RESULTING IN
LOSS OF VRCS CONTROL, THEREFORE LOSS OF MISSION CAPABILITY.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-587
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
686 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: F BAY 3A, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 83V76AI8AR J4-51 TYPE I
c[p]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSE GPC COMMAND SIGNAL TO OPEN MANIFOLD 5 FU & OX ISOL VLVs.
VALVES CAN STILL BE OPENED USING CREW SWITCH. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY, WORST CASE, RESULTS IN MANIFOLD 5 FU & OX ISOL VLVs
FAILED CLOSED RESULTING IN LOSS OF VRCS CONTROL.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-588
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBS YSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 687 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/ 3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, LCA 3
83V76AI8ARJ4-51 TYPE I
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE RESULTS IN THE MANIFOLD 5 FU & OX ISOL VLVs BECOMING
STUCK IN THE OPEN POSITION. NO MISSION EFFECT, PROPELLANT CAN BE
ISOLATED FROM THRUSTERS BY THE TK ISOL 3/4/5 VLVs. VERNIER
THRUSTERS ARE NOT USED DURING ENTRY OR ABORTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-589
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 688 ABORT:
HDWIFUNC
312R
3/3
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, MCA 1
81V76AI6AR J4-48 TYPE I
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CREW SWITCH COMMAND SIGNAL TO OPEN MANIFOLD 5 FU & OX ISOL
VLVs. VALVES CAN STILL BE OPENED USING GPC. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY, WORST CASE, RESULTS IN MANIFOLD 5 FU & OX ISOL VLVs
FAILED CLOSED RESULTING IN LOSS OF VRCS CONTROL.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-590
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 689 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: F BAY i, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 81V76AI6AR J4-48 TYPE I
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE RESULTS IN THE MANIFOLD 5 FU & OX ISOL VLVs BECOMING
STUCK IN THE OPEN POSITION. NO MISSION EFFECT, PROPELLANT CAN BE
ISOLATED FROM THRUSTERS BY THE TK ISOL 3/4/5 VLVs. VERNIER
THRUSTERS ARE NOT USED DURING ENTRY OR ABORTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-591
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 690 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, LCA 2
83V76AI8AR J4-53 TYPE II
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DUAL EFFECT: FIRST, FALSE INDICATION OF MANIFOLD 5 FU & OX ISOL
VLV MISMATCH (GPCHAS CORRECT POSITIONS); VALVE TALKBACK NOT
MISSION CRITICAL. SECOND, LOSE CONTROL FEEDBACK TO REMOVE POWER
FROM VLV ONCE IT HAS LATCHED: VALVE CAN WITHSTAND
CONTINUOUS ENERGIZATION.
REFERENCES:
SEQ. 8
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; MC284-0420 REV C AMENDMENT
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-592
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 691 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, LCA 2
83V76AI8AR J4-53 TYPE II
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE RESULTS IN A FALSE CREW (BARBER POLE) INDICATION OF VLV
CLOSURE AND A FALSE CONTROL FEEDBACK WHICH INHIBITS ALL GPC AND
CREW SWITCH "CLOSE" COMMANDS. WORST CASE EFFECT WOULD BE THE
MANIFOLD 5 FU & OX ISOL VLVs BECOMING STUCK IN THE OPEN
POSITION. NO MISSION EFFECT, PROPELLANTS CAN BE ISOLATED FROM
THRUSTER BY THE TK ISOL 3/4/5 VLVs.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-593
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 692 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: F BAY 3A, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 83V76AI8AR J4-55 TYPE II
] c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DUAL EFFECT: FIRST, FALSE INDICATION OF MANIFOLD 5 FU & OX ISOL
VLV MISMATCH (GPCHAS CORRECT POSITIONS); VALVE TALKBACK NOT
MISSION CRITICAL. SECOND, LOSE CONTROL FEEDBACK TO REMOVE POWER
FROM VLV ONCE IT HAS LATCHED: VALVE CAN WITHSTAND
CONTINUOUS ENERGIZATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-594
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
693 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
4) MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
5) DRIVER, HYBRID
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, LCA 3
83V76AI8AR J4-55 TYPE II
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE RESULTS IN A FALSE CREW (BARBER POLE) INDICATION OF VLV
OPENING AND A FALSE CONTROL FEEDBACK WHICH INHIBITS ALL GPC AND
CREW SWITCH "OPEN" COMMANDS. WORST CASE EFFECT WOULD BE THE
MANIFOLD 5 FU & OX ISOL VLVs BECOMING STUCK IN THE CLOSE
POSITION RESULTING IN LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF VRCS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-595
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
694 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, LCA 3
83V76AI8AR J5-K TYPE III
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO COMMAND MANIFOLD 5 FU & OX ISOL VLVs CLOSE USING
CREW SWITCH OR GPC. WORST CASE RESULTS IN MANIFOLD 5 FU & OX VLVs
BECOMING STUCK IN THE OPEN POSITION. NO MISSION EFFECT,
PROPELLANT CAN BE ISOLATED FROM THRUSTERS BY THE TK ISOL 3/4/5
VLVs. VERNIER THRUSTERS ARE NOT USED DURING ENTRY OR ABORTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-596
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
695 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, LCA 3
83V76AI8AR J5-K TYPE III
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO INHIBIT THE MANIFOLD 5 FU & OX ISOL VLV "CLOSE"
CMD. THE INHIBIT FUNCTION IS USED FOR POWER SAVINGS AND IN CASE
OF A GPC OR SWITCH FAILURE. NO EFFECT ON MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-597
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
696 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, IA
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
S)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
FUSE, IA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 $30
33V73A8FI0
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO OPEN OR CLOSE FU & OX MANIFOLD ISOL 1 VALVE USING
CREW SWITCH. GPC COMMANDS ARE STILL AVAILABLE FOR VALVE
OPERATION. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN MANIFOLD ISOL 1
VALVE FAILING CLOSED. THE EFFECT WOULD BE AN INABILITY TO
COMPLETE TIME CRITICAL PROPELLANT DUMPS DURING RTLS (LOSS OF
VEHICLE/LIFE) OR AN INABILITY TO COMPLETE FULL MISSION OBJECTIVES
ON ORBIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-598
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 697 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE,IA
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
FUSE, IA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 $31
33V73A8F27
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO OPEN OR CLOSE FU & OX MANIFOLD ISOL 2 VALVE USING
CREW SWITCH. GPC COMMANDS ARE STILL AVAILABLE FOR VALVE
OPERATION. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN MANIFOLD ISOL 2
VALVE FAILING CLOSED. THE EFFECT WOULD BE AN INABILITY TO
COMPLETE TIME CRITICAL PROPELLANT DUMPS DURING RTLS (LOSS OF
VEHICLE/LIFE) OR AN INABILITY TO COMPLETE FULL MISSION OBJECTIVES
ON ORBIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-599
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 698 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, IA
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
FUSE, IA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PNL 08 $32
PART NUMBER: 33V73A8F38
B [ P] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO OPEN OR CLOSE FU & OX MANIFOLD ISOL 3 VALVE USING
CREW SWITCH. GPC COMMANDS ARE STILL AVAILABLE FOR VALVE
OPERATION. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN MANIFOLD ISOL 3
VALVE FAILING CLOSED. THE EFFECT WOULD BE AN INABILITY TO
COMPLETE TIME CRITICAL PROPELLANT DUMPS DURING RTLS (LOSS OF
VEHICLE/LIFE) OR AN INABILITY TO COMPLETE FULL MISSION OBJECTIVES
ON ORBIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-600
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 699 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
311R
211R
ITEM: FUSE, IA
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
FUSE, IA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PNL 08 $33
PART NUMBER: 33V73A8F43
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO OPEN OR CLOSE FU & OX MANIFOLD ISOL 4 VALVE USING
CREW SWITCH. GPC COMMANDS ARE STILL AVAILABLE FOR VALVE
OPERATION. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN MANIFOLD ISOL 4
VALVE FAILING CLOSED. THE EFFECT WOULD BE AN INABILITY TO
COMPLETE TIME CRITICAL PROPELLANT DUMPS DURING RTLS (LOSS OF
VEHICLE/LIFE) OR AN INABILITY TO COMPLETE FULL MISSION OBJECTIVES
ON ORBIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-601
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
700 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, IA
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
FUSE,IA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PNL 08 $34
PART NUMBER: 33V73A8F39
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO COMMAND MANIFOLD 5 FU & OX ISOL VLVs CLOSE USING
CREW SWITCH. GPC CAN STILL OPEN OR CLOSE VLVs. WORST CASE RESULTS
IN MANIFOLD 5 FU & OX VLVs BECOMING STUCK IN THE OPEN POSITION.
NO MISSION EFFECT, PROPELLANT CAN BE ISOLATED FROM
THRUSTERS BY THE TK ISOL 3/4/5 VLVs. VERNIER THRUSTERS ARE NOT
USED DURING ENTRY OR ABORTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-602
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 701 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
312R
3/3
ITEM: FUSE, 1A
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
FUSE, IA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 $34
33V73A8F44
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ALL BUT ONE COMMAND (A GPC OPEN CMD) TO OPERATE MANIFOLD 5 FU
& OX ISOL VLVs. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY, WORST CASE, RESULTS IN
MANIFOLD 5 FU & OX ISOL VLVs BECOMING STUCK IN THE CLOSED
POSITION. THE EFFECT IS LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF VRCS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-603
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 702 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RELAY
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: i/1
3/3 TAL: 2/IR
3/2R AOA: 2/IR
2/IR ATO: 2/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, MCA 1
81V76AIIIKI
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO OPEN FU & OX MANIFOLD ISOL 1 VALVES. THE FAILURE
CAN RESULT IN THE ISOL VALVES BECOMING STUCK IN THE CLOSE
POSITION. THE EFFECT WOULD BE AN INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME
CRITICAL PROPELLANT DUMPS DURING RTLS (LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE)
OR INABILITY TO COMPLETE FULL MISSION REQUIREMENTS ON ORBIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-604
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 703 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD I, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: F BAY I, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 81V76AIIIKI
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE RESULTS IN FU & OX MANIFOLD ISOL 1 VALVES BECOMING
STUCK IN THE OPEN POSITION. NO MISSION IMPACT, VALVES ARE
NORMALLY OPEN. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN AN INABILITY TO
ISOLATE MANIFOLD 2 FROM PROPELLANT TANKS, NO EFFECT ON MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-605
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 704 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, MCA 1
8 IV76AI 1 IK2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE RESULTS IN FU & OX MANIFOLD ISOL 1 VALVES BECOMING
STUCK IN THE OPEN POSITION. NO MISSION IMPACT, VALVES ARE
NORMALLY OPEN. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN AN INABILITY TO
ISOLATE MANIFOLD 2 FROM PROPELLANT TANKS, NO EFFECT ON MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-606
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 705 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RELAY
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: i/1
3/3 TAL: 2/IR
3/2R AOA: 2/IR
2/IR ATO: 2/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, MCA 1
81V76AIIIK2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE CAUSES FU & OX MANIFOLD ISOL 1 VALVES TO BE FAILED
CLOSED. THE EFFECT WOULD BE AN INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME
CRITICAL PROPELLANT DUMPS DURING RTLS (LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE) OR AN
INABILITY TO COMPLETE FULL MISSION OBJECTIVES ON ORBIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
C
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-607
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
706 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
1/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RELAY
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: I/i
3/3 TAL: 2/IR
3/2R AOA: 2/1R
2/1R ATO: 2/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 2, MCA 2
82V76AII2KI
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO OPEN FU & OX MANIFOLD ISOL 2 VALVES. THE FAILURE
CAN RESULT IN THE ISOL VALVES BECOMING STUCK IN THE CLOSE
POSITION. THE EFFECT WOULD BE AN INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME
CRITICAL PROPELLANT DUMPS DURING RTLS (LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE)
OR INABILITY TO COMPLETE FULL MISSION REQUIREMENTS ON ORBIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-608
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 707 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
7)
8)
S)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBI T: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 2, MCA 2
82V76AII2KI
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE RESULTS IN FU & OX MANIFOLD ISOL 2 VALVES BECOMING
STUCK IN THE OPEN POSITION. NO MISSION IMPACT, VALVES ARE
NORMALLY OPEN. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN AN INABILITY TO
ISOLATE MANIFOLD 2 FROM PROPELLANT TANKS, NO EFFECT ON MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-609
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 708 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RELAY
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: F BAY 2, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 82V76AII2K2
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE RESULTS IN FU & OX MANIFOLD ISOL 2 VALVES BECOMING
STUCK IN THE OPEN POSITION. NO MISSION IMPACT, VALVES ARE
NORMALLY OPEN. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN AN INABILITY TO
ISOLATE MANIFOLD 2 FROM PROPELLANT TANKS, NO EFFECT ON MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-610
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 709 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RT LS: i/1
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P]
LO CAT ION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 2, M CA 2
82V76AII2K2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE CAUSES FU & OX MANIFOLD ISOL 2 VALVES TO BE FAILED
CLOSED. THE EFFECT WOULD BE AN INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME
CRITICAL PROPELLANT DUMPS DURING RTLS (LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE) OR AN
INABILITY TO COMPLETE FULL MISSION OBJECTIVES ON ORBIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-611
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
710 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
4) MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RELAY
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: i/i
3/3 TAL: 2/IR
3/2R AOA: 2/IR
2/1R ATO: 2/1R
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83V76AII3K7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO OPEN FU & OX MANIFOLD ISOL 3 VALVES. THE FAILURE
CAN RESULT IN THE ISOL VALVES BECOMING STUCK IN THE CLOSE
POSITION. THE EFFECT WOULD BE AN INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME
CRITICAL PROPELLANT DUMPS DURING RTLS (LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE)
OR INABILITY TO PERFORM FULL MISSION OBJECTIVES ON ORBIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO DO1
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-612
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 711 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BUR/fEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: F BAY 3A, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 83V76AII3K7
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE RESULTS IN FU & OX MANIFOLD ISOL 3 VALVES BECOMING
STUCK IN THE OPEN POSITION. NO MISSION IMPACT, VALVES ARE
NORMALLY OPEN. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN AN INABILITY TO
ISOLATE MANIFOLD 4 FROM PROPELLANT TANKS, NO EFFECT ON MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO DO1
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-613
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 712 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RELAY
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83V76AII3K8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE RESULTS IN FU & OX MANIFOLD ISOL 3 VALVES BECOMING
STUCK IN THE OPEN POSITION. NO MISSION IMPACT, VALVES ARE
NORMALLY OPEN. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN AN INABILITY TO
ISOLATE MANIFOLD 4 FROM PROPELLANT TANKS, NO EFFECT ON MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-614
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 713 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
i/I
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83V76AII3K8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE CAUSES FU & OX MANIFOLD ISOL 3 VALVES TO BE FAILED
CLOSED. THE EFFECT WOULD BE AN INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME
CRITICAL PROPELLANT DUMPS DURING RTLS (LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE) OR AN
INABILITY TO COMPLETE FULL MISSION OBJECTIVES ON ORBIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-615
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 714 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
i/i
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RELAY
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LI FTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 1/1
3/3 TAL: 2/IR
3/2R AOA: 2/IR
2/IR ATO: 2/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83V76AII3K9
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO OPEN FU & OX MANIFOLD ISOL 4 VALVES. THE FAILURE
CAN RESULT IN THE ISOL VALVES BECOMING STUCK IN THE CLOSE
POSITION. THE EFFECT WOULD BE AN INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME
CRITICAL PROPELLANT DUMPS DURING RTLS (LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE)
OR INABILITY TO COMPLETE FULL MISSION REQUIREMENTS ON ORBIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-616
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 715 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RELAY
FAILURE MODE: FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83V76AII3K9
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE RESULTS IN FU & OX MANIFOLD ISOL 4 VALVES BECOMING
STUCK IN THE OPEN POSITION. NO MISSION IMPACT, VALVES ARE
NORMALLY OPEN. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN AN INABILITY TO
ISOLATE MANIFOLD 1 FROM PROPELLANT TANKS, NO EFFECT ON MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-617
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 716 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RELAY
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/ 3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83V76AII3KI0
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE RESULTS IN FU & OX MANIFOLD ISOL 4 VALVES BECOMING
STUCK IN THE OPEN POSITION. NO MISSION IMPACT, VALVES ARE
NORMALLY OPEN. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN AN INABILITY TO
ISOLATE MANIFOLD 1 FROM PROPELLANT TANKS, NO EFFECT ON MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-618
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
717 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] S[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83V76AII3KI0
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE CAUSES FU & OX MANIFOLD ISOL 4 VALVES TO BE FAILED
CLOSED. THE EFFECT WOULD BE AN INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME
CRITICAL PROPELLANT DUMPS DURING RTLS (LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE) OR AN
INABILITY TO COMPLETE FULL MISSION OBJECTIVES ON ORBIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-619
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
718 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
"7)
8)
9)
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2 ) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD I, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: F BAY i, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 81V76AIIIAIR8
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CONTROL FEEDBACK FROM THE FU & OX MANIFOLD ISOL 1 VALVES.
DUAL EFFECT: FIRST THE RELAY WILL NOT AUTOMATICALLY BE DE-
ENERGIZED ONCE THE VALVES REACH THEIR COMMANDED POSITION, AND
SECOND, THE CREW INDICATOR WILL FALSELY INDICATE A
VALVE MISMATCH. NO IMPACT ON MISSION, VALVE'S AC MOTOR CAN
WITHSTAND CONTINOUS POWERAND VALVE TALKBACKS ARE NOT MISSION
CRITICAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/23/87 C-620
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 719 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY I, MCA 1
81V76AIIIAIR8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, VALVE POSITION TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC & CREW.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-621
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 720 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD I, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] c[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY I, M CA 1
8 IV76AI 1 IAIRI3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE FWD RCS MANIFOLD ISOL 1 SWITCH TALKBACK (CLOSE POSITION) TO
GPC. SWITCH POSITION CAN BE INDIRECTLY DETERMINED BY MONITORING
VALVE POSITION TALKBACKS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-622
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 721 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
67
77
s)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATI ON:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, MCA 1
8 IV76AI 1IAIRI 3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, SWITCH POSITION TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC & CREW.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-623
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 722 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] BC ] c[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, MCA 1
8 IV76AIIIAIRI2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE FWD RCS MANIFOLD ISOL 1 SWITCH TALKBACK (OPEN POSITION) TO
GPC. SWITCH POSITION CAN BE INDIRECTLY DETERMINED BY MONITORING
VALVE POSITION TALKBACKS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-624
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 723 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4]
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD I, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, M CA 1
8 IV76AI IIAIRI2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, SWITCH POSITION TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC & CREW.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-625
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 724 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY I, MCA 1
8iV76AIIIAIRI7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE FU MANIFOLD 1 ISOL VALVE POSITION TALKBACKS (CLOSE POSITION)
TO GPC. CREW POSITION INDICATOR WILL SUPPLY CORRECT VALVE
POSITION. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS LOSS OF ALL TALKBACKS. NO
IMPACT, VALVE POSITION TALKBACKS ARE NOT MISSION CRITICAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/23/87 C-626
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
725 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAD ANALYST:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS SHORT
V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD I, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/ 3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY I, M CA 1
8 IV76AI 1IAIRI7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, VALVE POSITION TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC & CREW.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO DO1
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-627
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 726 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
-I)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD I, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCAT ION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY I, M CA 1
8 IV 76AI 1 IAIR26
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSE FU MANIFOLD 1 ISOL VALVE POSITION TALKBACKS (OPEN POSITION)
TO GPC. CREW POSITION INDICATOR WILL SUPPLY CORRECT VALVE
POSITION. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS LOSS OF ALL TALKBACKS. NO
IMPACT VALVE POSITION TALKBACKS ARE NOT MISSION CRITICAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-628
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 727 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, M CA 1
8 IV 76AI 1IAIR26
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, VALVE POSITION TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC & CREW.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-629
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
728 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD I, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, MCA 1
81V76AIIIAIR27
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE OX MANIFOLD 1 ISOL VALVE POSITION TALKBACKS (OPEN POSITION)
TO GPC. CREW POSITION INDICATOR WILL SUPPLY CORRECT VALVE
POSITION. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS LOSS OF ALL TALKBACKS. NO
IMPACT VALVE POSITION TALKBACKS ARE NOT MISSION CRITICAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-630
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
729 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
67
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RT LS: 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, MCA 1
8 IV76AIIIAIR27
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS RATIONALE:
NONE, VALVE POSITION TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC & CREW.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-631
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 730 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, MCA 1
8 iV76AIIIAIR25
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE OX MANIFOLD 1 ISOL VALVE POSITION TALKBACKS (CLOSE POSITION)
TO GPC. CREW POSITION INDICATOR WILL SUPPLY CORRECT VALVE
POSITION. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS LOSS OF ALL TALKBACKS. NO
IMPACT VALVE POSITION TALKBACKS ARE NOT MISSION CRITICAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-632
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
731 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORB IT: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, MCA 1
81V76AIIIAIR25
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, VALVE POSITION TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC & CREW.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-633
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 732 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
1) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2 ) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
4) MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 2, MCA 2
82V76AII2AIRI
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CONTROL FEEDBACK FROM THE FU & OX MANIFOLD ISOL 2 VALVES.
DUAL EFFECT: FIRST THE RELAY WILL NOT AUTOMATICALLY BE DE-
ENERGIZED ONCE THE VALVES REACH THEIR COMMANDED POSITION AND
SECOND THE CREW INDICATOR WILL FALSELY INDICATE A VALVE MISMATCH.
NO IMPACT ON MISSION. VALVE'S AC MOTOR CAN WITHSTAND CONTINOUS
POWER AND VALVE TALKBACKS ARE NOT MISSION CRITICAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-634
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 733 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 2, MCA 2
82V76AII2AIRI
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, VALVE POSITION TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC & CREW.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-635
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 734 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2 ) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/ 3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 2, MCA 2
82V76AII2AIR8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE FWD RCS MANIFOLD ISOL 2 SWITCH TALKBACK (CLOSE POSITION) TO
GPC. SWITCH POSITION CAN BE INDIRECTLY DETERMINED BY MONITORING
VALVE POSITION TALKBACKS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-636
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 735 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 2, MCA 2
82V76Al12AIR8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, SWITCH POSITION TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC & CREW.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-637
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
736 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 2, MCA 2
82V76Al12AIR9
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE FWD RCS MANIFOLD ISOL 2 SWITCH TALKBACK (OPEN POSITION) TO
GPC. SWITCH POSITION CAN BE INDIRECTLY DETERMINED BY MONITORING
VALVE POSITION TALKBACKS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-638
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 737 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 2, MCA 2
82V76Al12AIR9
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, SWITCH POSITION TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC & CREW.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-639
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 738 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 2, MCA 2
82V76AI12AIR10
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE FU MANIFOLD 2 ISOL VALVE POSITION TALKBACKS (CLOSE POSITION)
TO GPC. CREW POSITION INDICATOR WILL SUPPLY CORRECT VALVE
POSITION. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS LOSS OF ALL TALKBACKS. NO
IMPACT VALVE POSITION TALKBACKS ARE NOT MISSION CRITICAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-640
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 739 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 2, MCA 2
82V76Al12AIR10
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, VALVE POSITION TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC & CREW.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-641
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
740 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
B)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 2, MCA 2
82V76Al12AIR24
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE FU MANIFOLD 2 ISOL VALVE POSITION TALKBACKS (OPEN POSITION)
TO GPC. CREW POSITION INDICATOR WILL SUPPLY CORRECT VALVE
POSITION. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS LOSS OF ALL TALKBACKS. NO
IMPACT VALVE POSITION TALKBACKS ARE NOT MISSION CRITICAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-642
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 741 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 2, MCA 2
82V76Al12AIR24
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, VALVE POSITION TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC & CREW.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-643
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
742 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
V)
B)
9)
l) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
313 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ]
LOCATION: F BAY 2, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 82V76AII2AIR25
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE OX MANIFOLD 2 ISOL VALVE POSITION TALKBACKS (OPEN POSITION)
TO GPC. CREW POSITION INDICATOR WILL SUPPLY CORRECT VALVE
POSITION. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS LOSS OF ALL TALKBACKS. NO
IMPACT VALVE POSITION TALKBACKS ARE NOT MISSION CRITICAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-644
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 743 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 2, MCA 2
82V76Al12AIR25
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, VALVE POSITION TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC & CREW.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-645
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
744 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: F BAY 2, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 82V76AlI2AIRI1
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE OX MANIFOLD 2 ISOL VALVE POSITION TALKBACKS (CLOSE POSITION)
TO GPC. CREW POSITION INDICATOR WILL SUPPLY CORRECT VALVE
POSITION. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS LOSS OF ALL TALKBACKS. NO
IMPACT VALVE POSITION TALKBACKS ARE NOT MISSION CRITICAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-646
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
745 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 2, MCA 2
82V76Al12AiRll
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, VALVE POSITION TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC & CREW.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-647
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 746 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3,
83V76AI13AIRI
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CONTROL FEEDBACK FROM THE FU & OX MANIFOLD ISOL 3 VALVES.
DUAL EFFECT: FIRST THE RELAY WILL NOT AUTOMATICALLY BE DE-
ENERGIZED ONCE THE VALVES REACH THEIR COMMANDED POSITION, AND
SECOND, THE CREW INDICATOR WILL FALSELY INDICATE A
VALVE MISMATCH. NO IMPACT ON MISSION, VALVE'S AC MOTOR CAN
WITHSTAND CONTINOUS POWERAND VALVE TALKBACKS ARE NOT MISSION
CRITICAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/23/87 C-648
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 747 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER
BREAKDOWN j HIERARCHY:
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/ 3 ATO : 3/ 3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3,
83V76Al13AiR1
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, VALVE POSITION TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC & CREW.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-649
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 748 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83V76AI13AIR16
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE FWD RCS MANIFOLD ISOL 3 SWITCH TALKBACK (CLOSE POSITION) TO
GPC. SWITCH POSITION CAN BE IN DIRECTLY DETERMINED BY MONITORING
VALVE POSITION TALKBACKS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-650
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
749 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: F BAY 3A, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 83V76AlI3AIRI6
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, SWITCH POSITION TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC & CREW.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO DO1
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-651
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
750 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LO CAT I ON:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83V76Al13AIR19
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE FWD RCS MANIFOLD ISOL 3 SWITCH TALKBACK (OPEN POSITION) TO
GPC. SWITCH POSITION CAN BE INDIRECTLY DETERMINED BY MONITORING
VALVE POSITION TALKBACKS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-652
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 751 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ,] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83V76Al13AiR19
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, SWITCH POSITION TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC & CREW.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-653
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
752 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: F BAY 3A, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 83V76AlI3AIR22
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE FU MANIFOLD 3 ISOL VALVE POSITION TALKBACKS (CLOSE POSITION)
TO GPC. CREW POSITION INDICATOR WILL SUPPLY CORRECT VALVE
POSITION. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS LOSS OF ALL TALKBACKS. NO
IMPACT VALVE POSITION TALKBACKS ARE NOT MISSION CRITICAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-654
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 753 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: F BAY 3A, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 83V76AII3AIR22
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, VALVE POSITION TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC & CREW.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-655
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 754 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
s)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83V76Al13AIR23
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE FU MANIFOLD 3 ISOL VALVE POSITION TALKBACKS (OPEN POSITION)
TO GPC. CREW POSITION INDICATOR WILL SUPPLY CORRECT VALVE
POSITION. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS LOSS OF ALL TALKBACKS. NO
IMPACT VALVE POSITION TALKBACKS ARE NOT MISSION CRITICAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-656
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
755 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83V76AlI3AIR23
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, VALVE POSITION TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC & CREW.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-657
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
756 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
v)
s)
9)
l) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83V76AII3AIR31
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE OX MANIFOLD 3 ISOL VALVE POSITION TALKBACKS (OPEN POSITION)
TO GPC. CREW POSITION INDICATOR WILL SUPPLY CORRECT VALVE
POSITION. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS LOSS OF ALL TALKBACKS. NO
IMPACT VALVE POSITION TALKBACKS ARE NOT MISSION CRITICAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-658
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
757 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83V76Al13AiR31
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, VALVE POSITION TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC & CREW.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-659
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
758 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
B)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS : 3/ 3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: F BAY 3A, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 83V76Al13AIR30
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE OX MANIFOLD 3 ISOL VALVE POSITION TALKBACKS (CLOSE POSITION)
TO GPC. CREW POSITION INDICATOR WILL SUPPLY CORRECT VALVE
POSITION. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS LOSS OF ALL TALKBACKS. NO
IMPACT VALVE POSITION TALKBACKS ARE NOT MISSION CRITICAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-660
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 759 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HFW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83V76All3AIR30
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, VALVE POSITION TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC & CREW.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-661
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 760 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83V76All3AIR4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSE CONTROL FEEDBACK FROM THE FU & OX MANIFOLD ISOL 4 VALVES.
DUAL EFFECT: FIRST THE RELAY WILL NOT AUTOMATICALLY BE DE-
ENERGIZED ONCE THE VALVES REACH THEIR COMMANDED POSITION, AND
SECOND, THE CREW INDICATOR WILL FALSELY INDICATE A
VALVE MISMATCH. NO IMPACT ON MISSION, VALVE'S AC MOTOR CAN
WITHSTAND CONTINOUS POWER AND VALVE TALKBACKS ARE NOT MISSION
CRITICAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/23/87 C-662
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 761 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83V76AI13AIR4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, VALVE POSITION TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC & CREW.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-663
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 762 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83V76Al13AiR17
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE FWD RCS MANIFOLD ISOL 4 SWITCH TALKBACK (CLOSE POSITION) TO
GPC. SWITCH POSITION CAN BE IN DIRECTLY DETERMINED BY MONITORING
VALVE POSITION TALKBACKS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-664
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 763 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
l) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2 ) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIG::T PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83V76AlI3AIR17
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, SWITCH POSITION TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC & CREW.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-665
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 764 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83V76Al13AIR29
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE FWD RCS MANIFOLD ISOL 4 SWITCH TALKBACK (OPEN POSITION) TO
GPC. SWITCH POSITION CAN BE INDIRECTLY DETERMINED BY MONITORING
VALVE POSITION TALKBACKS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-666
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 765 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83V76Al13AIR29
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, SWITCH POSITION TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC & CREW.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-667
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 766 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: F BAY 3A, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 83V76AII3AIR6
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE FU MANIFOLD 1 ISOL VALVE POSITION TALKBACKS (CLOSE POSITION)
TO GPC. CREW POSITION INDICATOR WILL SUPPLY CORRECT VALVE
POSITION. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS LOSS OF ALL TALKBACKS. NO
IMPACT VALVE POSITION TALKBACKS ARE NOT MISSION CRITICAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-668
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 767 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83V76AII3AIR6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, VALVE POSITION TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC & CREW.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-669
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
768 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] S[ ] c[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83V76AII3AIR24
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE FU MANIFOLD 1 ISOL VALVE POSITION TALKBACKS (OPEN POSITION)
TO GPC. CREW POSITION INDICATOR WILL SUPPLY CORRECT VALVE
POSITION. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS LOSS OF ALL TALKBACKS. NO
IMPACT VALVE POSITION TALKBACKS ARE NOT MISSION CRITICAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-670
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 769 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] c[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83 V76AII3AIR24
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, VALVE POSITION TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC & CREW.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-671
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 770 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: F BAY 3A, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 83V76AII3AIR32
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE OX MANIFOLD 1 ISOL VALVE POSITION TALKBACKS (OPEN POSITION)
TO GPC. CREW POSITION INDICATOR WILL SUPPLY CORRECT VALVE
POSITION. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS LOSS OF ALL TALKBACKS. NO
IMPACT VALVE POSITION TALKBACKS ARE NOT MISSION CRITICAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO DO1
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-672
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 771 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83V76AII3AIR32
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, VALVE POSITION TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC & CREW.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-673
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 772 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: F BAY 3A, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 83V76AII3AIR7
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE OX MANIFOLD 4 ISOL VALVE POSITION TALKBACKS (CLOSE POSITION)
TO GPC. CREW POSITION INDICATOR WILL SUPPLY CORRECT VALVE
POSITION. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS LOSS OF ALL TALKBACKS. NO
IMPACT VALVE POSITION TALKBACKS ARE NOT MISSION CRITICAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-674
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
773 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
e)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3
83V76AlI3AIR7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, VALVE POSITION TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC & CREW.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-675
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
774 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] c[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, LCA 3
83V76AI8R Ji-94 TO J2-87 (A)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE FRCS MANIFOLD 5 ISOL SWITCH POSITION TALKBACK TO GPC. NO
IMPACT SWITCH TALKBACK NOT MISSION CRITICAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-676
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
775 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
_)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C C ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, LCA 3
83V76A18R J1-94 TO J2-87 (A)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, SWITCH TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-677
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
776 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTL_: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, LCA 3
83V76AI8R Ji-94 TO J2-87 (A)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, SWITCH TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-678
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 777 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBI T: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: F BAY 3A, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 83V76AI8R Ji-94 TO GND (B)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE FRCS MANIFOLD 5 ISOL SWITCH POSITION TALKBACK TO GPC. NO
IMPACT SWITCH TALKBACK NOT MISSION CRITICAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-679
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 778 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: F BAY i, LCA 1
PART NUMBER: 81V76AI6R JI-82
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE FRCS MANIFOLD 5 ISOL SWITCH POSITION TALKBACK TO GPC. NO
IMPACT SWITCH TALKBACK NOT MISSION CRITICAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-680
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
779 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY l, LCA 1
81V76A16R J1-82
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, SWITCH TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-681
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
780 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
s)
6)
"I)
8)
9)
l) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2 ) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
4) MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBI T: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: F BAY 3A, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 83V76A18R Ji-88
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE MANIFOLD 5 FU VLV POSITION TALKBACK TO GPC.
TALKBACK NOT MISSION CRITICAL.
VALVE POSITION
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-682
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 781 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: F BAY 3A, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 83V76AI8R JI-88
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, SWITCH TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-683
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: I/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 782 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, LCA 3
83V76AI8R JI-90
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSE MANIFOLD 5 FU VLV POSITION TALKBACK TO GPC.
TALKBACK NOT MISSION CRITICAL.
VALVE POSITION
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-684
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 783 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, LCA 3
83V76A18R J1-90
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, SWITCH TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-685
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 784 ABORT:
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, LCA 3
83V76AISR JI-91
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE MANIFOLD 50X VLV POSITION TALKBACK TO GPC. VALVE POSITION
TALKBACK NOT MISSION CRITICAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-686
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 785 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, LCA 3
83V76AISR Ji-91
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, SWITCH TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-687
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 786 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, LCA 3
83V76AI8R Ji-89
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE MANIFOLD 50X VLV POSITION TALKBACK TO GPC.
TALKBACK NOT MISSION CRITICAL.
VALVE POSITION
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-688
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
787 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: F BAY 3A, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 83V76AISR Ji-89
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, SWITCH TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-689
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
788 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
4) MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3,
83V76AI8R J2-83, 104
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DUAL EFFECT: FIRST, FALSE INDICATION; CREW HARDWIRED TALKBACK WILL
INDICATE MANIFOLD 5 FU & OX ISOL VLV MISMATCH AND GPC WILL
INDICATE BOTH VLVs STUCK PARTIALLY OPEN/PARTIALLY CLOSED;
TALKBACKS ARE NOT MISSION CRITICAL. SECOND, LOSE CONTROL
FEEDBACK TO REMOVE POWER FROM VALVE ONCE IT HAS LATCHED; VALVE CAN
WITHSTAND CONTINUOUS POWER APPLICATION.
REFERENCES:
SEQ. 8
VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; MC284-0420 REV C AMENDMENT
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-690
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 789 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BUR/tEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, MCA 3,
83V76AI8R J2-83, 104
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, SWITCH TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE TO HYBRID DRIVER LOGIC
CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-691
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
790 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD I, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS IN THE OPEN POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD I, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PNL 08 S30
PART NUMBER: 33V73A8S30
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY MDM CLOSE COMMANDS. IF THE SWITCH FAILS IN
THE OPEN POSITION, THE VALVE WILL OPEN AND CANNOT BE CLOSED BY
SWITCH OR MDM COMMAND. TO CLOSE THE VALVE, THE CREW MUST REMOVE
CONTROL BUS POWER FROM THE OPEN CONTACTS, AND THEN USE
THE GPC READ/WRITE PROCEDURES. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL
CAUSE THE INABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CE, DE
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-692
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 791 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/IR
ITEM: MANIFOLD l, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FAILS IN THE CLOSED POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD l, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD l, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 $30
33V73ASS30
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM OPEN COMMANDS. IF THE SWITCH
FAILS IN THE CLOSED POSITION, THE VALVE WILL CLOSE AND CANNOT BE
OPENED BY SWITCH OR MDM COMMAND. TO OPEN THE VALVE, THE CREW
MUST REMOVE CONTROL BUS POWER FROM THE SWITCH'S CLOSE CONTACTS
AND THEN USE THE GPC READ/WRITE PROCEDURES. FAILURE OF THE MDM
COMMAND PATH WILL AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS, PROPELLANT DUMP
LENGTHS DURING ABORTS, AND MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL
ENOUGH PROPELLANTS DURING RTLS ABORTS TO MEET THE CG SAFETY
BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, CE, DE
REPORT DATE 03/23/87 C-693
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 792 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD I, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS IN THE GPC POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3)
4)
S)
4)
7)
8)
9)
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD i, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 2/ IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 $30
33V73A8S30
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
VALVE CAN NOT BE CONTROLLED BY SWITCH, ONLY BY MDM OPEN OR CLOSE
COMMANDS. TO OPERATE THE VALVE, THE CREW MUST USE THE GPC
READ/WRITE PROCEDURES. FAILURE OF THE MDM COMMAND PATH WHILE THE
VALVE IS IN THE CLOSED POSITION WILL AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS,
PROPELLANT DUMP LENGTH DURING ABORTS AND ENTRY, AND MAY CAUSE THE
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS DURING RTLS ABORTS TO MEET
THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CE, DE
REPORT DATE 03/23/87 C-694
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
793 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
I, 2
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD i, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD I, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS i, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 $30
33V73A8S30
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM OPEN COMMANDS. IF THE OPEN
CONTACTS FAIL OPEN WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN ANY POSITION, THE VALVE
WILL REMAIN IN THAT POSITION, CANNOT BE OPENED BY SWITCH COMMAND,
ONLY BY MDM COMMAND, AND CAN CLOSED BY THE SWITCH OR THE MDM.
FAILURE OF THE MDM COMMAND PATH WILL AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS,
PROPELLANT DUMP LENGTHS DURING ABORTS, AND MAY CAUSE THE
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS DURING RTLS ABORTS TO MEET
THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CE, DE
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-695
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 3/3
794 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
I, 2
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD I, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2 ) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
4) MANIFOLD I, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD i, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS i, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 $30
33V73ASS30
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY MDM CLOSE COMMANDS. IF THE OPEN CONTACTS
FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN THE OPEN OR GPC POSITION, THE
VALVE WILL OPENAND CANNOT BE CLOSED BY SWITCH OR MDM COMMAND. IF
THE OPEN CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN THE
CLOSED POSITION, THE VALVE WILL REMAIN CLOSED AND CAN BE OPENED
WITH THE SWITCH, BUT CANNOT BE CLOSED AGAIN BY SWITCH OR MDM
COMMAND. TO CLOSE THE VALVE, THE CREW MUST REMOVE CONTROL BUS
POWER FROM THE CONTACTS, AND THEN USE GPC READ/WRITE PROCEDURES.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO CLOSE THE
VALVE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CE, DE
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-696
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 3/3
795 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
4
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD I, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 3,
SWITCH GPC CONTACTS FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD l, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD l, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 $30
33V73ASS30
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THESE CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CE, DE
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-697
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 3/3
796 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
4
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD I, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 3,
SWITCH GPC CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
_)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD I, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] BC ] cC ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 $30
33V73A8S30
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THESE CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CE, DE
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-698
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 3/3
797 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
5, 6
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD i, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
S)
_)
7)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD I, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD l, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS 5, 6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 $30
33V73A8S30
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM CLOSE COMMANDS. IF THE CLOSE
CONTACTS FAIL OPEN WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN ANY POSITION, THE VALVE
WILL REMAIN IN THAT POSITION, CAN BE OPENED BY SWITCH OR MDM
COMMAND, BUT _OT BE CLOSED BY SWITCH COMMAND, ONLY BY MDM
COMMAND. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO
CLOSE THE VALVE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CE, DE
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-699
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
798 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
5, 6
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD i, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD I, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD I, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS 5, 6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 $30
33V73A8S30
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM OPEN COMMANDS. IF THE CLOSE
CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN THE CLOSED OR GPC
POSITION, THE VALVE WILL CLOSE AND CANNOT BE OPENED BY SWITCH OR
MDM COMMAND. IF THE CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH
IS IN THE OPEN POSITION, THE VALVE WILL REMAIN OPEN AND CAN BE
CLOSED WITH THE SWITCH, BUT CANNOT BE OPENED AGAIN BY SWITCH OR
MDM COMMAND. TO OPEN THE VALVE, THE CREW MUST REMOVE CONTROL BUS
POWER FROM THE CLOSE CONTACTS, AND THEN USE GPC READ/WRITE
PROCEDURES. FAILURE OF THE MDM COMMAND PATH WILL AFFECT ONORBIT
OPERATIONS, PROPELLANT DUMP LENGTHS DURING ABORTS, AND MAY CAUSE
THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS DURING RTLS ABORTS TO
MEET THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CE, DE
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-700
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 799 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FAILS IN THE OPEN POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B C ] c C ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 $31
33V73A8S31
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY MDM CLOSE COMMANDS. IF THE SWITCH FAILS IN
THE OPEN POSITION, THE VALVE WILL OPEN AND CANNOT BE CLOSED BY
SWITCH OR MDM COMMAND. TO CLOSE THE VALVE, THE CREW MUST REMOVE
CONTROL BUS POWER FROM THE OPEN CONTACTS, AND THEN USE
THE GPC READ/WRITE PROCEDURES. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL
CAUSE THE INABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CE, DE
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-701
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
800 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS IN THE CLOSED POSITION
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/IR
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
S)
9)
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 S31
33V73A8S31
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM OPEN COMMANDS. IF THE SWITCH FAILS
IN THE CLOSED POSITION, THE VALVE WILL CLOSE AND CANNOT BE OPENED
BY SWITCH OR MDM COMMAND. TO OPEN THE VALVE, THE CREW MUST REMOVE
CONTROL BUS POWER FROM THE SWITCH'S CLOSE CONTACTS
AND THEN USE THE GPC READ/WRITE PROCEDURES. FAILURE OF THE MDM
COMMAND PATH WILL AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS, PROPELLANT DUMP
LENGTHS DURING ABORTS, AND MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANTS DURING RTLS ABORTS TO MEET THE CG SAFETY
BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, CE, DE
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-702
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
801 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS IN THE GPC POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 S31
33V73A8S31
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
VALVE CAN NOT BE CONTROLLED BY SWITCH, ONLY BY MDM OPEN OR CLOSE
COMMANDS. TO OPERATE THE VALVE, THE CREW MUST USE THE GPC
READ/WRITE PROCEDURES. FAILURE OF THE MDM COMMAND PATH WHILE THE
VALVE IS IN THE CLOSED POSITION WILL AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS,
PROPELLANT DUMP LENGTH DURING ABORTS AND ENTRY, AND MAY CAUSE THE
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS DURING RTLS ABORTS TO MEET
THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, CE, DE
REPORT DATE 03/23/87 C-703
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
802 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
i, 2
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS i, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LO CAT ION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 $31
33V73ASS31
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM OPEN COMMANDS. IF THE OPEN
CONTACTS FAIL OPEN WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN ANY POSITION, THE VALVE
WILL REMAIN IN THAT POSITION, CANNOT BE OPENED BY SWITCH COMMAND,
ONLY BY MDM COMMAND, AND CAN CLOSED BY THE SWITCH OR THE MDM.
FAILURE OF THE MDM COMMAND PATH WILLAFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS,
PROPELLANT DUMP LENGTHS DURING ABORTS, AND MAY CAUSE THE
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS DURING RTLS ABORTS TO MEET
THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CE, DE
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-704
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 3/3
803 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
I, 2
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS l, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 S31
33V73A8S31
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY MDM CLOSE COMMANDS. IF THE OPEN CONTACTS
FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN THE OPEN OR GPC POSITION, THE
VALVE WILL OPEN AND CANNOT BE CLOSED BY SWITCH OR MDM COMMAND. IF
THE OPEN CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN THE
CLOSED POSITION, THE VALVE WILL REMAIN CLOSED AND CAN BE OPENED
WITH THE SWITCH, BUT CANNOT BE CLOSED AGAIN BY SWITCH OR MDM
COMMAND. TO CLOSE THE VALVE, THE CREW MUST REMOVE CONTROL BUS
POWER FROM THE CONTACTS, AND THEN USE GPC READ/WRITE PROCEDURES.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO CLOSE THE
VALVE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, CE, DE
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-705
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 3/3
804 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
4
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 3,
SWITCH GPC CONTACTS FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAF ING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 $31
33V73ASS31
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THESE CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CE, DE
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-706
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 805 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
4
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 3,
SWITCH GPC CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] CC ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 $31
33V73ASS31
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THESE CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CE, DE
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-707
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 3/3
806 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
5, 6
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS 5, 6
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 $31
33V73A8S31
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM CLOSE COMMANDS. IF THE CLOSE
CONTACTS FAIL OPEN WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN ANY POSITION, THE VALVE
WILL REMAIN IN THAT POSITION, CAN BE OPENED BY SWITCH OR MDM
COMMAND, BUT CANNOT BE CLOSED BY SWITCH COMMAND, ONLY BY MDM
COMMAND. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO
CLOSE THE VALVE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CE, DE
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-708
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
807 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
5, 6
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS 5, 6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 S31
33V73A8S31
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM OPEN COMMANDS. IF THE CLOSE
CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN THE CLOSED OR GPC
POSITION, THE VALVE WILL CLOSE AND CANNOT BE OPENED BY SWITCH OR
MDM COMMAND. IF THE CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH
IS IN THE OPEN POSITION, THE VALVE WILL REMAIN OPEN AND CAN BE
CLOSED WITH THE SWITCH, BUT CANNOT BE OPENED AGAIN BY SWITCH OR
MDM COMMAND. TO OPEN THE VALVE, THE CREW MUST REMOVE CONTROL BUS
POWER FROM THE CLOSE CONTACTS, AND THEN USE GPC READ/WRITE
PROCEDURES. FAILURE OF THE MDM COMMAND PATH WILL AFFECT ONORBIT
OPERATIONS, PROPELLANT DUMP LENGTHS DURING ABORTS, AND MAY CAUSE
THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS DURING RTLS ABORTS TO
MEET THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, CE, DE
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-709
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 808 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FAILS IN THE OPEN POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
v)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PNL 08 S32
PART NUMBER: 33V73ASS32
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY MDM CLOSE COMMANDS. IF THE SWITCH FAILS IN
THE OPEN POSITION, THE VALVE WILL OPEN AND CANNOT BE CLOSED BY
SWITCH OR MDM COMMAND. TO CLOSE THE VALVE, THE CREW MUST REMOVE
CONTROL BUS POWER FROM THE OPEN CONTACTS, AND THEN USE
THE GPC READ/WRITE PROCEDURES. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL
CAUSE THE INABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, CE, DE
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-710
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
809 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS IN THE CLOSED POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LO CAT I 0 N:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 $32
33V73A8S32
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM OPEN COMMANDS. IF THE SWITCH FAILS
IN THE CLOSED POSITION, THE VALVE WILL CLOSE AND CANNOT BE OPENED
BY SWITCH OR MDM COMMAND. TO OPEN THE VALVE, THE CREW MUST REMOVE
CONTROL BUS POWER FROM THE SWITCH'S CLOSE CONTACTS
AND THEN USE THE GPC READ/WRITE PROCEDURES. FAILURE OF THE MDM
COMMAND PATH WILL AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS, PROPELLANT DUMP
LENGTHS DURING ABORTS, AND MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANTS DURING RTLS ABORTS TO MEET THE CG SAFETY
BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, CE, DE
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-711
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 810 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/IR
ITEM: MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FAILS IN THE GPC POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PNL 08 $32
PART NUMBER: 33V73ASS32
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
VALVE CAN NOT BE CONTROLLED BY SWITCH, ONLY BY MDM OPEN OR CLOSE
COMMANDS. TO OPERATE THE VALVE, THE CREW MUST USE THE GPC
READ/WRITE PROCEDURES. FAILURE OF THE MDM COMMAND PATH WHILE THE
VALVE IS IN THE CLOSED POSITION WILL AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS,
PROPELLANT DUMP LENGTH DURING ABORTS AND ENTRY, AND MAY CAUSE THE
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS DURING RTLS ABORTS TO MEET
THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CE, DE
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-712
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
811 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
l, 2
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS i, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 $32
33V73A8S32
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM OPEN COMMANDS. IF THE OPEN
CONTACTS FAIL OPEN WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN ANY POSITION, THE VALVE
WILL REMAIN IN THAT POSITION, CANNOT BE OPENED BY SWITCH COMMAND,
ONLY BY MDM COMMAND, AND CAN CLOSED BY THE SWITCH OR THE MDM.
FAILURE OF THE MDM COMMAND PATH WILL AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS,
PROPELLANT DUMP LENGTHS DURING ABORTS, AND MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY
TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS DURING RTLS ABORTS TO MEET THE CG
SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CE, DE
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-713
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 3/3
812 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
I, 2
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS i, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PNL 08 $32
PART NUMBER: 33V73A8S32
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY MDM CLOSE COMMANDS. IF THE OPEN CONTACTS
FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN THE OPEN OR GPC POSITION, THE
VALVE WILL OPEN AND CANNOT BE CLOSED BY SWITCH OR MDM COMMAND. IF
THE OPEN CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN THE
CLOSED POSITION, THE VALVE WILL REMAIN CLOSED AND CAN BE OPENED
WITH THE SWITCH, BUT CANNOT BE CLOSED AGAIN BY SWITCH OR MDM
COMMAND. TO CLOSE THE VALVE, THE CREW MUST REMOVE CONTROL BUS
POWER FROM THE CONTACTS, AND THEN USE GPC READ/WRITE PROCEDURES.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO CLOSE THE
VALVE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CE, DE
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-714
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 3/3
813 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
4
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 3,
SWITCH GPC CONTACTS FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
S)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 3, 4
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PNL 08 $32
PART NUMBER: 33V73A8S32
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THESE CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, CE, DE
C-715REPORT DATE 03/18/87
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 3/3
814 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
4
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 3,
SWITCH GPC CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
s)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 $32
33V73A8S32
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THESE CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CE, DE
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-716
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